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ABSTRACT
GRAND STRATEGY ANALYSIS: A PROTO-THEORETICAL
APPROACH
Patrick Magee 
Old Dominion University, 2005 
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty
International relations scholarship begins and ends with assumptions -  about 
human nature; about human interaction; about starting points, relative information, and 
outcomes. Such assumptions are necessary to further the intellectual coherence and 
development of scholarly work. However, they restrict the applicability of scholarly 
research to those situations that parallel the work’s underlying assumptions.
This work argues the body of international relations scholarship as a whole would 
benefit from the development of a pre-theory state, absent any assumptions about 
international relations, from which observers can identify those works of scholarship that 
are most effective in explaining perceptive states and the strategic decisions taken in light 
of them. Such a state of thinking acts as a proto-theory of international relations.
Proto-theory embraces the full realm of international relations scholarship, other 
fields, and any other area of human thought that provides insight into the manner in 
which strategic thinkers perceive themselves, their nations, and their situations. By 
expressing no initial preference for a particular model of decision-making or theory of 
international relations, it offers a means of transcending debates regarding the 
“correctness” of any particular view. Rather, proto-theory allows observers to focus on 
the explanatory power of any particular concept regarding the context under 
investigation.
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This work tests the feasibility of a proto-theoretical approach to international 
relations by employing it in an examination of the United States’ abandonment of its 
longstanding strategy of containment. It identifies the views prevalent in the United 
States prior to and at the time of its decision to alter its grand strategy in general and its 
approach to its competition with the Soviet Union in particular. It then compares the 
scholarly approaches most relevant to those views to determine if the behavioral 
indicators identified by them are accurate in their description of subsequent grand 
strategy.
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To intemperate intellects who will see my deepest understandings as childishly simplified
and most diligent efforts as insufficient
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
In matters of business and affairs of state there is never any need to avail oneself of the 
work of academics [dottori] since with their excessive subtleties they are more likely to 
ruin them than bring them to a good conclusion.
Pope Clement VIII, La Legazione di Roma di Paolo Paruta (1592-1595)
What is grand strategy analysis and why is it important? Grand strategy can be 
understood to be any national strategy “in which all factors bearing on the evolving 
situation -  including economic, political, and psychological factors as well as military -  
are taken into account over long periods of time, including times both of peace and 
war.”1 It is an attempt to unify national policies to achieve long-term goals. Few 
considerations have the power to trump its importance to a nation’s leaders and citizenry. 
How does one understand and anticipate grand strategy, as well as the foreign policy 
behavior that flows from it, or more precisely, how does one do grand strategy analysis?
The short answer is that it takes a dedicated and sustained effort by some of the 
best minds a society produces. Today scholars, analysts, and strategists collaborate in 
think tanks, research institutes, and policy groups to share information, insight, and
This paper follows the format requirements of Kate L. Turabian, A Manual for 
Writers o f Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 6th ed., rev. John Grossman and Alice 
Bennett (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
1 Paul H. Nitze, “Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s,” Foreign Affairs 59, no. 1 
(Fall 1980), 82. This work uses the term “grand strategy” the way Nitze described it.
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expectations about the way the world works in an attempt to deepen their understanding 
of strategic situations. This effort, as well as this study, flows from the assumptions that 
1) more accurate strategic analysis leads to better-informed strategists and 2) better- 
informed strategists make better grand strategies.2 The demand for compelling analysis 
and effective grand strategies is always very high. Political leaders have sought reliable 
forewarning of international events since time immemorial. Their governments must 
have some sense of the future so they can develop effective strategies to meet it. Will 
neighboring tribes appear suddenly with goods for trade or rocks in their hands? How 
long until Athens feels powerful enough to attack Sparta? Will a declining Soviet empire 
rain ICBMs on American cities in the night rather than accept its fate as a collapsing 
superpower? The future, and indeed often the present, is difficult to discern and very 
rarely what it appears to be, especially in the field of politics.
The nature of any field of academic research is nonstop investigation and 
opinionated contentiousness; international relations scholarship is no different. Experts 
investigate, identify, and debate influences at work throughout events that are yet to 
occur, happening at the moment, or long since absorbed by history. How important were 
various structural pressures in the Japanese decision to attack at Pearl Harbor? How
2 Sun Tzu first formalized this assumption when he stated, “Know the other and 
know yourself: Fight one hundred battles without danger; Know not the other and yet 
know yourself: One victory for one defeat; Know not the other and know not yourself: 
Every fight is certain defeat.” International relations, of course, will always contain an 
element of danger. Grand strategy analysis is an attempt to provide decision makers with 
the knowledge wisdom necessary to make the most successful strategic decisions 
possible, usually defined in terms of security and prosperity. Available at 
http://www.chionline.com/war/Chap-3.html, accessed 30 January 2005.
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justified were Western fears of a Russian plot to expand toward the Persian Gulf? Will 
China rise to become the next superpower? Unlike the “hard sciences,” international 
affairs never offers definitive answers, for, human opinions being highly individualized, 
it is usually impossible to find two scholars who say anything is certain to happen, is 
happening, or happened in precisely the same way, or for the same reasons.
This fog of uncertainty is unsatisfying to intellectuals, of whom are demanded 
omniscience, and unacceptable to professionals, of whom are demanded prescience.
Those who deal in international relations have long been compelled to find means of 
penetrating its murkiness. Caesars sought auguries in animal entrails. Incan priests 
studied the stars from mathematically astounding architecture. Military institutions and 
think tanks simulate countless possible and impossible scenarios. One observer noted, 
“This was a very natural way of trying to solve a very old problem -  decision-making 
under conditions of uncertainty.”3
Decision makers and their advisors gain their required confidence in the decisions 
that must be made in political life through the belief that they are using the best available 
means of understanding the forces guiding the future. Techniques vary from age to age, 
but the methodology of international relations forecasting and strategy formulation 
remains the same -  seek portents of events by the best available methods, then use the 
best knowledge and wisdom available to analyze their meanings. From these a leader can 
devise an appropriate grand strategy.
3 Shlomo Gazit, “Estimates and Fortune-Telling in Intelligence Work,” 
International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980), 36.
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Confidence in any particular method or combination of methods for achieving a 
measure of foreign policy prescience comes from a combination of methodical analysis 
of available data and informed intuition. Ultimately, foreign policy predictions and the 
decisions made in the light of them will always be informed guesses. They vary in 
accuracy according to the relevance of the techniques employed, the ability of those 
involved to acquire, synthesize, and use the information at hand, and plain dumb luck.
The rewards of a successful quest for reliable predictors of international political 
behavior, whether pursued by mysticism or political mathematics, are great. They 
include such gains as national survival, prosperity, and security. Yet no single approach 
to understanding international relations has lasted the twin scrutiny of informed criticism 
and time.4 An important reason for this is that no expert or group of experts has or can 
have an understanding of the entire discipline. While seemingly obvious, this is often a 
pitfall of theoretical analysis, in which one can mistakenly attribute one particularly 
sophisticated or novel worldview to all political actors.5 In actuality, each actor learns 
his or her own lines best of all. This skews their understanding of the play to ward the 
importance of their own scenes. Positional views will be influenced further by their own
4 The closest approach to hegemony has been political realism, founded in the 
United States and Great Britain on Renaissance methodologies, German writings about 
power, and Western experiences in the aftermath of the First World War. It has lasted 
longer than any other approach, yet can hardly claim sustenance as universal, since it has 
an impressive array of detractors.
5 An assumption of worldview homogeneity is a necessary technique of game 
theory. However, when the context of game situations translates into analysis of real 
world behavior, this assumption must be discarded in favor of individuality. The reasons 
for doing so will be addressed throughout this work.
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5beliefs. It matters that Marlon Brando played the Godfather and Winston Churchill led 
Britain through the Second World War. Complex, thorough, descriptive, and useful 
analysis of international relations requires understanding of all levels of analysis, from 
international structures to individual persons.
Within the complexities of international relations are identifiable trends in 
behavior that can be seen throughout all models and belief systems. They are bom of 
human strengths and frailties, common to individuals and political entities. These include 
such well-known phenomena as arms spirals, policy oversteers, and the insecurities 
inherent in projecting unfavorable power differentials. The identification of such 
behaviors and the circumstances often surrounding them is the reason for theoretical 
research.
Yet the problem remains that in the study of grand strategy it is not enough to 
build models and identify similarities. Every situation brings forth a very different set of 
players and circumstances. Indeed, it cannot always be simplified even this much.6 
Typically prevalent beliefs and goals in a situation are reliable but not infallible 
indicators of behavior. For example, self-interest and security are overwhelmingly 
dominant considerations in most foreign policy decisions. However some goals, such as
6 Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal argued, “All human beings carry multiple 
identities, and these identities are all defined in relation to the surrounding society . . . 
sets of identities carried by individuals can range from quite simple (self, family, clan) to 
extremely complicated (self, family, gender, profession, interest group, nation, religion, 
civilisation, humankind) ..  .This double-edged quality of identity -  unifying on the one 
hand, dividing on the other -  has been central to the making and breaking of human 
civilisation throughout history, and seems certain to remain so.” Barry Buzan and Gerald 
Segal, Anticipating the Future (London: Simon & Schuster, 1998) 117.
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6the maintenance of honor or the protection of the powerless, sometimes override broader 
goals of security, power acquisition, or international peace.
Bernard Brodie noted, “Whether with respect to arms control or otherwise, good 
strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology. Some of the greatest military 
blunders of all time have resulted from juvenile evaluations in this department.”7 It is not 
merely that “irrational” pursuit of such “extraneous” purposes eventually affects the 
overall calculus of power -  it often does -  but that the degree to which these purposes are 
either vital or extraneous varies widely depending on who is making the judgment.
Several examples illustrate the veracity of this frustrating inconvenience for the 
pursuit of general and unified theories of international relations. Recapture of Christian 
holy lands on several occasions became more important considerations than the usually 
bitter rivalries among European chivalric states. German leaders believed achieving 
domestic racial purity outweighed the immense costs of their persecution of Jews. They 
pursued this goal at a time during which all available resources might have been more 
efficiently mobilized for their exhausting attempt at German mastery over Europe. These 
kinds of decisions cannot be understood without an approach to analyzing them that 
embraces precisely the scholarship that parallels the thinking of those who made them.
This work presents a thorough examination of American grand strategies from 
1977 to 2001 as a means of describing a proto-theoretical methodology for applying 
theoretical concepts and knowledge of situational specificities in the same study. There
7 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 332.
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are, understandably, two components to the analysis presented in this work. One delves 
into the traditions and values that informed the making of American grand strategies and 
foreign policies in the era under investigation. This requires examination of 
philosophical and historical traditions and values most common to American grand 
strategists and ways in which these ideas form an American worldview at this period in 
history. The second component selects theoretical models and insights that parallel the 
American worldview and helps illustrate identifiable trends in American strategic 
choices. Taken together these steps create a powerful tool of grand strategy analysis that 
creates a clear and accurate understanding of American strategic choices in the latter 
years of the Cold War.
Purpose
This approach to grand strategy is a work of international relations analysis, rather 
than international relations theory or international history. Its purpose is to find new and 
more efficient ways for international relations scholarship to assist understanding and 
projection of grand strategy. It is therefore a work designed to create a reliable, proto- 
theoretical approach to the study of grand strategy. This is regardless of whether those 
strategies are static or fluctuating, explicit or unrecognized, successful or failed.
Hans Morgenthau noted all great contributions to political science, from Plato and 
Aristotle to The Federalist Papers and Niebuhr, were responses to challenges arising
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8from political reality.8 Modem political reality is that people and their political entities 
have become so interconnected that grand strategy analysis has become more important 
and more difficult than at any point in human history. Very few uses of power in one 
situation do not resonate with great effect elsewhere. Pakistan’s assistance in the Afghan 
War contributes to the decline of Soviet military strength (and diminishes a formerly 
steady supply of weaponry and parts to its areas of interest, such as India). This induces 
India to surprise Pakistan, and the world, by testing a nuclear weapon. A boycott of 
French products by American consumers hopes to punish the recalcitrant ally by lowering 
the value of French stocks. Many of these are in the portfolios of American investors. 
Contributors to international events, large and small, often do foresee that their efforts 
would have such unexpected and profound consequences, especially for themselves.
Interconnectedness enhances the reach and importance of most foreign policy 
decisions and actions. Yet vast differences in the way policy makers and analysts view 
the ways in which events affect the international situation persist. These views are 
important factors of behavior and cannot be ignored by any analyst seeking a true 
understanding of the situation. Western values, for example, dominate theoretical models 
and Western policy-making circles, largely because this body of work resides largely in 
the West. Indeed, Western policy makers can often be classified according to the
8 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Power as a Political Concept,” in Power, ed. John R. 
Champlin (New York: Atherton Press, 1971), 30.
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9scholarly terms of “realist” or “liberal institutionalist” as easily as their academic 
counterparts. However, as R.B.J. Walker reminds us, “The West is not the world.”9
These differences in view and approach are increasingly important as events, 
decisions, and people integrate ever more tightly. Grand strategy itself has changed with 
the times. Whereas a long term approach to international relations was once understood 
to last fifty to one hundred years, today a grand strategy of ten to twenty years can be 
considered to have completed a full life cycle. As a result, grand strategy analysis is 
becoming more complex at a time when decision makers seek more urgently to increase 
the accuracy of their projections. If political reality is that foreknowledge has become 
simultaneously more difficult to achieve and more imperative, then the challenge arising 
is to find more effective and more efficient ways of applying the best international 
relations scholarship to the conduct of international relations.
The task of this paper is to present a way to make international relations 
scholarship more beneficial to analysts. John Nash’s theories on manifolds would note 
have earned him a Nobel Prize if they had not been applicable to game theory. It is only 
when discoveries become useful that they receive recognition for their importance.
Today many of the best insights of international relations scholars lay dormant in journals
9 “European philosophy is not the only discourse attempting to give meaning to 
human experience. The problems confronting modem industrial societies are not entirely 
the same as those facing most of humanity, although they are undoubtedly structurally 
related (emphasis added).” R.B. J. Walker, “East Wind, West Wind: Civilizations, 
Hegemonies, and World Orders,” in Culture, Ideology, and World Order, ed. R.B.J. 
Walker (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 6.
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because no methodology has shown how they are useful for understanding real world 
problems.
The lack of a methodology for approaching grand strategy analysis has become 
increasingly insupportable as the world has grown more complex. Non-methodological 
application of scholarly insights and area knowledge was more effective when the 
world’s great powers were few and fundamentally similar. This is no longer the case. To 
understand, for example, a terrorist attack by suicide bombers requires more than an 
understanding of international power differentials. The analyst must first identify the 
worldview of those involved in making strategic decisions. This requires investigation of 
traditions of martyrdom, the wide variance in interpretation of Islamic concepts of just 
war, and other situation-specific concepts. Then the analyst identifies works of 
scholarship that help explain the ways in which this worldview informs their perceptions.
This puts the analyst as close as possible to the position of the decision maker and 
allows the most informed and accurate projection possible of the grand strategy that will 
take shape. Until recently documentation of many beliefs and views was not 
comprehensive enough to make such an approach to analysis very useful. There was 
simply not sufficient information and experience available to allow for accurate 
representation of specific strategic viewpoints. Individuals with expertise in area studies 
were fewer and access to them was limited. Information technology was not up to the 
task of gathering and disseminating information about views in sufficient volume and 
with sufficient accuracy for to be useful for textured analysis in a reasonable amount of 
time.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
Recent advances in documentation and information technology are changing this. 
At this moment in human civilization it has become possible for researchers to gain 
sufficient insight into situations to begin to address more comprehensively the milieu of 
situational peculiarities, belief systems, and divergent goals. Today years of delving 
through endless shelves of dusty books and reams of forgotten paper can be 
accomplished in minutes or hours in computerized books and electronic document 
collections. While complete mastery of an era or even a single event remains impossible, 
it is becoming possible for such efforts to be effective. International relations scholarship 
requires new approaches no longer constrained by the limitations of previous research 
methods and offering a richer type of analysis that takes advantage of the rising tide of 
information available.
Drawing from seemingly disparate disciplines, this work examines differences in 
human perception and the ways in which they factor into the formation of grand 
strategies. It seeks to take the best ideas of international relations theory and combine 
them with the unprecedented ability of the modem era, with its massive documentation 
and dissemination of information, to move closer than ever to an understanding of the 
people, places, and events specific to any given situation. It offers a means for using 
international relations scholarship effectively for grand strategy analysis.
Structure
This work describes a methodology for applying scholarly insights to 
international behavior. It describes the merits and elements of a proto-theoretical 
approach and then uses this approach to explain a major historical change in grand
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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strategy. Traditional international relations methodology consists of arguing the merits of 
a particular theory and then testing it against the facts of history. Apart from its logical 
shortcomings, this is not very useful for the policy maker, who usually knows only a 
fraction of the information about any given situation. This does not necessarily mean that 
grand strategy is the result of short-term crisis control thinking. However, historical 
accounts of grand strategy are written with the benefits of leisurely research and can often 
lend uncharacteristic coherence to periods that were in actuality highly chaotic. It often 
seems the grand conspiracies of history are the creations of historians.
Historical accounts contain as many relevant facts as the historian can gather in a 
reasonable amount of time. National strategy must be made from current perceptions, 
which are almost always based on less data than is made available to historians.
Therefore it makes sense to examine grand strategies in such a way that they account for 
available knowledge and prevalent modes thinking at the time grand strategy is made.10 
This is often very difficult to do.11 Thinking in these terms is very much like an actor’s 
speaking his lines in such a way that he does not show awareness of the events that will 
take place in the next scene. A proto-theoretical approach requires this kind of process to 
reflect the available information and intellectual predispositions of the day.
10 Jerel A. Rosati discusses the difficulties and procedures for doing so in The 
Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on 
Behavior (Charleston: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), esp. Appendix “B: 
Research Method.”
11 For an example of a methodology of information categorization and decision 
making, see Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses o f 
History for Decision Makers (London: Free Press), 1986.
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This paper describes how to apply scholarly insights continuously throughout a 
long-term grand strategic situation. For this reason this methodology will be applied to a 
period that the international relations community at present understands most widely and 
comprehensively, the latter days of the Cold War. Examining this period in history 
requires an understanding of what American strategists knew and believed. The nature of 
the strategists involved dictates that the analysis will also be generally consistent with the 
most well-known and prominent theories of international relations today. If done 
successfully, this study can serve as an impetus to retrieve less widely known, but still 
quite valuable theories from the depths of research libraries and place their insights in the 
hands of policy makers.
The main body of the study is a demonstration of a proto-theoretical approach that 
brings international relations theory to bear on the grand strategy of the United States 
during the last years of the Cold War. It describes the evolving situation in strategic 
terms, identifies the understandings brought by the application of relevant scholarly 
insights, and then demonstrates how the analysis applies in specific situations.12 Just as a 
combination of bureaucracy and adhocracy provide a powerful means for coping with 
emerging issues of business, structured theorizing and on-the-fly application of 
theoretical understandings can create a highly efficient way of advancing knowledge of 
international affairs. This work uses international relations theory in this way to show the
12 For more information on the purposes of case studies in political science 
research, see John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What is It Good for?” American 
Political Science Review 98, no. 2 (May 2004), 341-54.
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effectiveness of a proto-theoretical approach for producing insights into American 
strategic behavior. Its success rests on two areas: the ability of a proto-theoretical
I
approach to identify scholarship with considerable explanatory power and the degree to 
which this fosters understanding of grand strategy.
Elements o f a Proto-Theoretical Approach 
What is the relationship between theory and practice in international relations? 
Quite simply, scholars and policy makers can and should work together to produce 
relevant research and informed strategies. Knowledge of when and how to apply 
scholarly insights can help practitioners visualize patterns, tendencies, decisions, and 
outcomes in international politics. Deeper comprehension of generalities in political 
behavior aids those trying to understand its specifics, and vice versa. Paul Nitze, an 
architect of American containment strategy, argued strenuously for a strong partnership 
between academia and government. “The two are inseparable; theory and practice being 
complementary, they constitute harmonic aspects of one whole.”13
An example of successful collaboration can be seen in the development of the 
American intelligence community. In 1941 Japan surprised the United States with a 
devastating sneak attack on its naval installation in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The American 
national security apparatus was deeply embarrassed at its inability to foresee Japanese
13 Paul H. Nitze, Tension between Opposites: Reflections on the Practice and 
Theory o f Politics (New York: Scribner’s, 1993), 15. Quoted in Joseph Lepgold and 
Miroslav Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue 
o f Policy Relevance (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 1.
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strategy, and few things cause more action in Washington, D.C. than embarrassment. 
President Franklin Roosevelt sought William Donovan, a noted policy maverick, and 
offered him wide latitude to fix the situation.
Donovan’s search for ways of improving analysis took him directly to Archibald 
MacLeish, Librarian of Congress. MacLeish told Donovan what intelligence experts 
have been saying ever since, that the best sources of foreign intelligence were books, 
magazines, newspapers, and maps. The volume of data contained therein is so vast that 
only professional researchers, with general ideas about the structure of international 
relations, could prioritize the information and develop coherent analysis of it. The best 
people for the job, therefore, would be scholars.
Systematic academic research did not play much of apart in American foreign 
policy until Donovan’s professors began turning out their estimates in the 1940s.14 The 
Institute for International Studies at Yale had been running intelligence seminars with the 
state department since the mid-193 Os, tackling problems sent up from Washington in 
small study groups and forwarding the results back every couple weeks. These groups 
engaged in strategic analysis in its purest form—Arnold Wolfers examined British and 
French inter-war foreign policy, A. Whitney Griswold weighed American policy toward 
the Far East, Samuel Flagg Bemis judged American efforts in Latin America.15
14 Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint o f the Essential CIA 
(Washington, DC: Acropolis, 1976), 42.
15 Robin W. Winks, Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961,2nd 
ed. (New Flaven: Yale University Press, 1996), 42.
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Their studies circulated in the state department, but most officials viewed the 
Institute as a somewhat superfluous organization that only occasionally provided 
something interesting or useful for policy makers. Donovan’s group of professors 
initially drew similar derision from State, which believed the experience and intuition of 
Foreign Service officers were the only reliable indicators of foreign relations. Charles 
Lindbergh scoffed the group of academics was nothing but a group of Ivy League types, 
“full of politics, ballyhoo, and controversy.”16
One of the starkest contrasts between the military mindset and that of academia 
can be seen in performance requirements. Whereas services and bureaucracies rely on 
clear chains of command and performance of duty to the letter, academia favors the 
idiosyncratic individual, the person of odd curiosity and distinctive knowledge. The 
freewheeling thinker who transcends tradition and conventional wisdom receives the 
highest accolades. In any academic community there are scholars of whom it is said that 
they have twenty fresh ideas a day, ten of them quite mad, five naive or stupid, three 
without point, and two exciting and potentially of great value.17 Most bureaucracies, 
seeking to homogenize their members, produce fewer ideas, almost all spoken in 
whispers until men of rank endorse them. A state department official who proposed two 
ideas that are dismissed as madness over the course of a year would be cleaning out his 
desk.
16 R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History o f America’s First Central 
Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 1.
17 Winks, Cloak & Gown, 23.
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Spurred by MacLeish’s advice, Donovan built an analysis apparatus of academics 
that were specialists in the field of foreign affairs.18 Many of them kept offices in the 
Library of Congress, spending their days reading the vast amount of material the library 
contained dealing with their respective specialties. Gathering information from their field 
offices around the globe, the scholars would hammer out a picture of events and present a 
range of policy options and recommendations to be given to policy makers.
This system of consultation and cooperation evolved from these early efforts at 
collaboration into the modem intelligence and foreign policy communities. Comprised of 
research institutions, think tanks, policy institutes, and government organs, this set of top 
minds in international relations scholarship and practice meets continuously to inject 
academic research into policymaking and political reality into scholarly research. The 
group of individuals involved fashions an epistemic community of top experts in 
international relations.
Despite the development of a modem foreign policy community comprised of 
academics, analysts, and policy makers, within all three groups is a tendency to criticize 
their colleagues for a lack of cooperation. Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic noted in 
their 2001 study of the relationship that academics and policy makers often do not make
18 One of Donovan’s first recruits was Dr. William Langer, Professor of European 
History at Harvard. Langer became Chief of the Research and Analysis Branch and 
brought a number of notable scholars to assist him, including Dr. Sherman Kent from 
Yale (later Director of the CIA’s Office of National Estimates). For a time the group of 
scholars set up shop in the Library of Congress and around Washington, DC and 
comprised the bulk of Donovan’s staff. Professional research scholars would do the vast 
majority of research and analysis under the COI, as well as the OSS and early CIA.
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very good use of each other’s work. “Many scholars no longer try to reach beyond the 
Ivory Tower, and officials seem increasingly content to ignore it.”19 They point out that 
these sentiments have become much more common in the last few decades. Arthur Stein 
points to two other reasons collaboration is not always the rule: “Scholars focus 
narrowly, with the consequence that what a policymaker needs to know is to be found 
across disciplines and fields. Moreover, scholars focus on the general and generic, and 
policymakers are interested in the particular.”20
One reason the academic and policy communities do not choose to work more 
closely in all areas is that international relations scholarship is not designed exclusively 
for use in the policy-making world. The academic world is a protected enclave in which 
scholars can conduct pure research. Although not quite Jonathan Swift’s flying island of 
Laputa, Academy at Lagado or, mystical island of Glubbdubdrib, research institutions 
can appear to be incomprehensible and forbidding for those not familiar with them.21 At 
first blush many scholars and much of today’s scholarship may seem either irrelevant or 
inaccessible to policy makers.
19 Lepgold and Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower, 2-3.
20 Arthur A. Stein, “Counselors, Kings, and International Relations: From 
Revelation to Reason, and Still No Policy-Relevant Theory,” in Being Useful: Policy 
Relevance and International Relations Theory, ed. Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 57.
21 Jonathan Swift’s satirical novel, Gulliver’s Travels (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1986 reprint) contains three archetypes of academicians. The mathematical 
philosophers of Laputa spend their lives in contemplation and only emerge when flapped 
about the face by servants; the scientists of the Grand Academy at Lagado conduct 
endless and completely inapplicable research, such as trying to extract sunbeams from 
cucumbers; Glubbdubdrib is the home of a sorcerer-historian who has the power to 
summon great figures from the dead and quiz them about their times.
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David Newsome relates, “From a practitioner’s perspective, it often seems as if 
university scholars are increasingly withdrawing . . .  behind a curtain of theory and 
models that only insiders can penetrate.”22 Practitioners either do not know about many 
scholarly advances or cannot understand how such progress affects their work. It is here 
that the work of the analyst is most important -  bringing together the work of both fields 
and making them relevant to each other. Think tanks, policy institutes, round table 
discussions, and speaker series of scholars and policy makers are very important to the 
process of bringing their work together and have done much to bridge the gap. 
Nonetheless, more remains to be done.
Some theorists, in turn, insist international relations theory is not supposed to be 
relevant to those investigating foreign policy. An area of intense debate among 
international relations scholars, this line of reasoning seeks to exclude theoretical models 
from criticism that they are inapplicable. One of the field’s most influential theorists, 
Kenneth Waltz, argues research efforts into theory should remain separate from the world 
of policy.23 Yet even Waltz and his fellows cannot avoid making policy statements from
22 David D. Newsome, The Public Dimension o f Foreign Policy (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1996), 138.
23 See Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 
1979), 69-73, 122-23; Kenneth Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A 
Response to My Critics,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 330-34, 343-44; and Kenneth Waltz, “The 
Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in The Origin and Prevention o f Major Wars, ed. 
Robert I. Royberg and Theodore K. Rabb (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1989), 42-3.
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time to time.24 Colin Elman criticizes Waltz and other neorealists for their incongruity: 
“Neorealists who believe that their theories are unable to make foreign-policy 
predictions, should stop making them . . .  In addition, neorealists who believe that they 
are unable to make foreign policy predictions should start criticizing neorealists who 
do.”25
What this debate eclipses is the unspoken consensus that pure research has an 
important role in international relations scholarship. It is the role of the analyst to bring 
the results of scholarship to policy making, while providing feedback from policy to 
academic investigations. Just as policy makers benefit from schooling in theory, many 
theorists benefit from the practical experience of politics. Lepgold and Nincic concluded, 
“Unlike literature, pure mathematics, or formal logic, the study of international relations 
may be valued largely for its practical implications and insights.”26 Paul Nitze agreed,
“It is by action -  in my terms, by the practice of politics -  that theory . . .  can be kept in 
touch with reality”27
A strong working relationship between academics, analysts, and policy makers is 
essential to scholarly progress, informed analysis, and effective strategy. Those who 
make grand strategies get their ideas from somewhere -  philosophy, faith, education -
24 Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign 
Policy,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (Autumn 1996), in particular 10-1 and notes on pages 
10, 12-4.
25 Colin Elman, “Cause, Effect, and Consistency: A Response to Kenneth Waltz,” 
Security Studies 6, no. 1 (Autumn 1996), esp. 61.
26 Lepgold and Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower, 6.
27 Paul H. Nitze, Tension between Opposites, 15. Quoted in Lepgold and Nincic, 
Beyond the Ivory Tower, 1.
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regardless of whether their intellectual sources are explicit. Often obscured through 
filters of practical experience, the elements comprising their worldviews nevertheless are 
almost always found in the writings of academe. And very few academic ideas cannot 
find expression in contemporary or historical situations.
Theoretical models are reliable for discovering the commonalities of international 
political behavior, but they cannot be employed effectively for grand strategy analysis 
without identification and understanding of relevant assumptions and differences -  in 
individuals, in cultures, in beliefs, in histories, in worldviews. Only through an 
understanding of the specifics of a given situation can an analyst begin to understand 
international behavior and make generalized statements about such elements as grand 
strategy.28At the level of grand strategy analysis one must start from a position of 
theoretical neutrality. An analyst cannot express a preference for a favorite model and 
apply it to all of recorded history. The way to achieve this is for the analyst to suspend 
theoretical preferences and personal beliefs in favor of a pre-theory state.29 This pre- 
theoiy state, or proto-theory, permits the analytical mind no presuppositions about human
28 Whittle Johnston, professor of Government Foreign Affairs at the University of 
Virginia, used to say to the author repeatedly during his lectures, “Foreign affairs are in 
the details, and if you don’t know the details you don’t know anything.” This statement 
can be disheartening to any student devoted to broad international relations concepts, 
which are supposed to abstract from details, but remains true.
29 “Proto” refers to the primordial state from which descendants arise, a proto­
theory being a pre-theory state from which any theory can arise. Proto-theory is a 
concept that applies across many fields of inquiry. See the collaborative study by James 
Mahoney, Department of Sociology at Brown University, and Gary Goertz, Department 
of Political Science at University of Arizona, “The Possibility Principle and Case 
Selection: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Analysis,” July 2003, available at 
http://www.compasss.org/mahoney_goertz2003.pdf, accessed 7 November 2004.
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political interaction. All theories and models from which the analyst may choose are 
equally valid in that they -  and their assumptions -  do not yet exist in the analyst’s mind.
The first information, that which disrupts the proto-theoretical state and catalyzes 
analysis, is an examination of the fundamental beliefs and views held by the entities 
involved -  such as nations, non-state entities, individuals. These views include political 
ideology, religious obligation, cultural norms, and national style. From these the analyst 
can distill an aggregated appreciation for “the national view.” National views quite often 
have counterparts in international relations theory.
The informed analyst can recognize parallels between the foundations of a 
national view and the assumptions of international relations theories and models. 
Selecting those academic understandings that “fit” the scenario allows the analyst to 
bring to bear on the situation the tremendous power of academic insight. The stunningly 
diverse nature of theoretical inquiry and modeling dictates that, at the level of grand 
strategy analysis, theoretical insights should be working together. Each approach chosen 
is modified with specificities of the situation and combined with other applicable 
approaches. Thus academic insights function as component parts of a single approach 
that appreciates as many characteristics as possible without applying those insights in 
ways and to areas that do not fit.
This can be a difficult task. Each analyst is encumbered by his or her own beliefs 
about international relations and human behavior. In most situations this body of 
knowledge, wisdom, and assumption serves the analyst very well. It is, in fact, the type 
of expertise one seeks to develop prior to and during one’s term in office as a policy 
maker. However, this same set of beliefs can be detrimental -  even fatal -  to attempts to
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understand international behavior if it contaminates the first stage of analysis. It 
prejudices the choice of insights and models used to illustrate a situation. This can cause 
mistakes ranging from decreased explanatory power (if the differences between the 
analyst’s assumptions and those in play are minor) to a complete lack of correlation 
between expectation and outcome. In the absence of unified field theory (which remains 
unlikely), a proto-theoretical approach to grand strategy analysis is not only the best that 
can be achieved at the moment, but perhaps the closest approach to one that can be 
considered valid. But before this can happen, it is appropriate to express five cautions 
regarding strategic analysis.
1. Accepting Limitations of Theoretical Work 
George Santayana advised, “Scepticism is the chastity of the intellect, and it is 
shameful to surrender it too soon or to the first comer.”30 It is important to uphold 
traditions of scientific skepticism when approaching the study of international 
phenomena. An analyst should be cautious about embracing too enthusiastically and too 
often one particular approach to international relations. A healthy reserve of caution can 
only strengthen a field in which there often appears to be sufficient evidence to support 
nearly any claim about the workings of the international system. E.H. Carr noted, “No
30 George Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Scribner, 1923), 
69-70. Santayana’s approach to philosophy analysis parallels closely a proto-theoretical 
approach to grand strategy analysis.
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science deserves the name until it has acquired sufficient humility not to consider itself 
omnipotent.”31
Three common potential missteps in this area limit the scientific validity of 
international relations research. They are the result of a lack of scientific training among 
professionals. This is hardly surprising; diplomats, policy makers, and international 
relations scholars tend to come from backgrounds of politics, history, business, and law. 
Yet as strategic analysis grows and develops into a mature field, it must accept the 
responsibilities of validity and falsifiable output that are the hallmarks of good research.
The first possible misstep is a propensity for theoretical misapplication. During 
their examination of the fundamental forces of international politics theorists can often 
fall to the temptation of applying their work to situations that do not parallel their 
theoretical assumptions. It is tempting to make logical connections and speculations that 
are quite often correct and very useful, but nonetheless unsupported by their research 
foundations. Doing so is akin to abandoning mathematics for numerology; an 
international relations theorist seeking to convince colleagues of a model’s explanatory 
power and utility can devolve accidentally into a historical conspiracy theorist.
The second potential misstep is more common to academic research, but 
especially probable in the creation and application of international relations theory. It is 
what Stephen Brooks dubbed rather fittingly “the pathology of zero-sum paradigm
31 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years ’ Crisis: An Introduction to the Study o f  
International Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964 reprint), 9.
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wars.”32 William Wohlforth, investigating the use of newly available documents from
the Cold War era, noted:
There is no documented case of a noted scholar of international relations 
(IR) who has changed his or her view of any theory in response to fresh 
historical evidence. There are, however, cases of scholars who have 
abandoned theories whole hog in response to other sorts of evidence, such 
as statistical findings, events, or failed predictions.33
He argued that lost in the competitive atmosphere is any concept of how degrees of
confidence might be revised to accommodate new data. “It is international versus
domestic influences, power versus ideas, or institutions versus interests. Historical
researchers find this sort of language off-putting, naive, and obviously wrongheaded.”34
In a case involving theoretical debate that becomes an all-or-nothing methodology
dispute, the possibility of advance by interactive scholarship is excluded because each
side dismisses the findings of the other on methodological grounds. In the few situations
where this occurs, the possibility for effective strategic analysis evaporates.
Rather than deny the limits of theorizing, why not embrace them? Proficiency 
with a large variety of analytical tools and appropriate situational selectivity are not only
32 Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” International Organization 51, no. 3 
(Spring 1997), 445-77.
33 In one of the best examples, a founder of regional integration theory abandoned 
it in part because it failed to anticipate one perturbing variable: Charles de Gaulle. See 
Ernst Haas, The Obsolescence o f Regional Integration Theory, Research Series no. 25 
(Institute of International Studies, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). This 
is similar to Isaac Asimov’s concept of “The Mule,” a man whose extraordinary political 
abilities invalidate mathematical predictions of historical trends. Isaac Asimov, 
Foundation (New York: Gnome Press, 1951).
34 William C. Wohlforth, “A Certain Idea of Science: How International 
Relations Theory Avoids the New Cold War History,” Journal o f Cold War Studies 1, no. 
2 (Spring 1999), 47.
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signs of a well-rounded theorist, but denote also an effective analyst of grand strategy. 
Describing the forces underlying international events requires a flexible methodology that 
allows for updates, changes, and reversals of modes of thought. This should include the 
use of theoretical knowledge in its appropriate context, taking into account the dynamic 
nature of the situations to which they are applied.
Doing otherwise is akin to choosing to complete all tasks by using only the 
hammer in one’s hand. No tool is appropriate for every chore. In fact, the more jobs a 
tool does, so the axiom goes, the less effectively that tool does each one of them. 
Therefore it makes sense to carry a toolbox filled with different devices for different 
aspects of the overall work. When all nails have been driven and only screws are left, the 
best thing to do is put down that hammer and pick up a screwdriver. Likewise, when a 
group of strategists stops behaving like internationalists and starts acting like realists, it is 
appropriate to adjust analyses of their motivations, tendencies, and projections 
accordingly.
A third common misstep is a more extreme version of a zero-sum debate: striving 
for universality. Advances in theoretical understanding demonstrate very effectively 
many of the salient features of various international systems and behaviors.35 The nature 
of theoretical investigation, however, is that the more situations a general theory
35 Examples of these attempts include Samuel Huntington’s civilization theory, 
Paul Kennedy’s study of great power rises and declines, and various studies of arms 
spirals, deterrence, and interest balancing. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f 
Civilizations and the Remaking o f World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) 
and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers, Economic Change and 
Military Conflictfrom 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).
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describes, the more poorly it describes specific expressions of them. The closer any 
theory gets to universalism, the less it useful it becomes. A unified theory of 
international behavior, therefore, is self-defeating.36 While universalism remains the 
Holy Grail of international relations theory and, like the venerable object itself, will most 
likely never be found, it nonetheless has proven an irresistible quest.
Theories of international relations are built on rules -  rules such as the drive for 
security. But these rules are not universal; every actor has the capacity to define an 
individualized set. While some rules are commonly held, none are universal -  there will 
always be actors for whom assumptions of a theoretical model do not apply. Structural 
realist analysis, for example, pursued at all times and through power calculus alone 
becomes impossible. The variables that comprise power can never be truly distinguished 
in any objective sense. For pure structural realism to work it would have to be based on 
universally accepted philosophies of power and identical perceptions of comparative 
strength. Such homogeneities of opinion and perception are not a characteristic of 
humanity. Differing philosophies of the nation-state and differences of opinion over the 
quantity and quality of power held by one’s self and one’s neighbors have marked every
36 Harry Eckstein noted, “International relations theories are written to explain 
relations among states in all times and places. As a consequence, the degree to which 
their validity hinges on the explanation of any one episode is always unclear. For this 
reason, “critical cases”-that is, events that must conform to a theory’s expectations if the 
theory is true-never occur in international relations.” Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and 
Theory in Political Science,” in Strategies o f Inquiry, Handbook o f Political Science 7, 
ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79- 
137.
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conflict in recorded history. Were this not the case then actual contests of power would 
be unnecessary—anyone could do the math and know the outcome beforehand.
Theories of international behavior can never fully embrace the complexity of 
understanding the individual goals and situations of a fixed set of over seven billion souls 
at any particular moment, much less a constantly regenerating and evolving world 
population over a significant period of time. No method for understanding how 
individual perceptions of even one common influence on behavior, such as power, can 
even justifiably claim widespread and enduring acceptance of academic or policy-making 
circles. ‘Ends’ being individual and disparate, ‘means’ always will be defined and 
weighed differently.
Faced with the inconvenience of its impossibility, the pursuit of universality seeks 
inexorably to avoid admitting its fate by one of two ways: complexification or 
oversimplification. Complexification places theory in the position of attempting to model 
the entirety of international relations by inclusion of as much data and as many models as 
possible. The eventual end of this attempt must be a model so saturated with information 
that is indistinguishable from the world itself and therefore not very useful. 
Oversimplification, the more common error, begets a tendency to attempt an explanation 
of the entire milieu of international politics as the result of one or a few tangible causes. 
Unfortunately human perceptions, desires, and actions are never that simple. 
Oversimplification, a necessity for theorizing, leads to some useful abstractions but not 
very useful models.
Humanity has a nasty habit of invalidating even the most advanced predictive 
techniques. The reality of international political behavior is that, while historical
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tendencies can be demonstrated, specific behavior cannot be predicted with absolute 
certainty. There is no universal theory of international relations because people and 
situations are fundamentally different from one another in ways that disrupt all attempts 
at certainty.37 The conditions of history and politics fluctuate from satisfying the 
conditions of one theory to another, or none at all. Rather than seek a “theory of 
everything,” proto-theory seeks to make every theory potentially useful.
2. Broadening Theoretical Concepts to Examine International Behavior 
Abstraction from reality is vital to good research. It is the means by which 
scholars discern patterns amid the swirling clouds of data. Grand strategy analysis, 
however, occupies the space between theorizing and perception and requires both to be 
effective. Scholarly insight combines with situational peculiarity to create a picture of 
both individual perception and likely method of response. These are the driving factors 
of international behavior and cannot be considered extraneous to grand strategy analysis. 
Only when international relations scholars ask broader questions of how the influences 
they identify relate to international behavior as a whole does their work move from the 
fringes to the center of debates over grand strategy.
37 Edward Lorenz demonstrated the ways in which very small, almost 
imperceptible changes in initial conditions can cause significant changes for expected 
outcomes in complex systems. His equations described what came to be known as the 
“butterfly effect,” a metaphor in which a butterfly flapping its wings in Brazil causes a 
snowstorm in Japan. See Edward N. Lorenz, The Essence o f Chaos (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1993).
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The overwhelming majority of competition transpires outside the realm of any 
particular expression of behavior, such as war, and affects national power far more 
profoundly than a series of skirmishes or even decisive battles. Turnover of British Hong 
Kong to communist China, development of a European identity, and the sudden 
emergence of industrial powerhouses in previously unremarkable places are examples of 
developments altering dramatically the perceptions, calculations, and foreign policies of 
the world’s nations. Limiting analysis, therefore, to any particular variable removes the 
majority of history from the data set and is therefore not very useful for the study of 
grand strategy. It forces evaluation of broad generalities based on uncommon 
occurrences.
William Wohlforth, commenting on the developments in international relations 
scholarship, concluded that writings in the field show an increased preoccupation with 
the special problems inherent in the study of world politics. “Not only is international 
politics a “complex, path-dependent system” in Robert Jervis’s words, but the 
phenomena we seek to explain tend to be extremely rare events: wars, crises, alliance 
changes, extended rivalries, and arms races.”38 International relations theorists act, albeit 
correctly, from their belief that such spheres can be studied separately. Studies of war 
initiation, economic patterns, trade policies, and other international phenomenon yield 
valuable insights into the foundations of particular policies.
38 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Social and Political Life 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). Quoted in Wohlforth, “A Certain Idea 
of Science,” 42.
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This research agenda, however, can become entrenched in one particular aspect of 
international behavior and ignore the fact that, for grand strategists, all these seemingly 
separate spheres are part of the larger picture. An adversary in one sphere cannot be an 
ally in another at this comprehensive level of analysis, for linkage occurs far too often in 
political maneuvering to be ignored. Aggressive political maneuvers bring about grain 
embargo s. Human rights concerns affect trading preferences. By separating what is, in 
the minds of policy makers, inseparable, international relations theorists create their own 
theoretical conundrums and render their work less useful to those trying to understand 
behavior.
Broadening examination from one particular concept to international behavior as 
a whole allows an analysis to call upon the entire realm of scholarly work on 
international relations. A model examining major war initiation, for example, becomes a 
model for the severity of change in overall strategy when its conceptualization expands 
beyond the decision for war. It then becomes useful for identifying systemic influences 
that could lead a nation to join OPEC or request Soviet military advisors. Studying the 
whole of behavior, rather than a specific expression of it, can provide early warning of 
evolving grand strategies.
A proto-theoretical approach should not be misunderstood as a comprehensive 
treatment of concepts and traditions that inform the making of all grand strategies and 
foreign policies. Such a generalization would be self-defeating, for it violates the central 
assumption of the approach -  namely, that the concepts and traditions in the minds of 
decision makers at the times of decision making, rather than general concepts or universal 
theoretical models, are the most reliable guides to understanding international behavior.
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Development of theoretical models remains an important pursuit in the vocation 
of international affairs and plays an important role in the work presented herein, but the 
development of models is not the goal of this work. It demonstrates instead a means of 
fitting these models to international events more effectively by describing ways of 
choosing them appropriately and making adjustments to theories to help them apply to 
reality. This work seeks not to advance theory itself, but the application of it.
It is important to note that, when examining grand strategies of the past, the 
theoretical models one selects need not have existed during the time under examination. 
The views prevalent at the time can and usually are most effectively described by theories 
and models devised after the fact. A true picture of the strategists’ worldviews must be 
limited to the theories and models available at the time, but analysis of the behavior that 
flowed from these views should not be. History is frozen in time, but analysis can and 
must be responsive to progress.
The task here is not to criticize the policy maker for missing something that 
appears obvious to modem eyes; it does little good to upbraid Franklin Roosevelt for 
being oblivious to an insight of dynamic differentials theory.39 Instead modem tools of 
analysis can be used to identify important influences at play in historical situations, much
39 Bernard Mennis writes, “Of course, an especially knowledgeable person, 
through introspection, may .. .become cognizant of the fact that the beliefs he holds are 
not isolated entities. The relatively few individuals who have achieved this level of 
sophistication are aware of the systemic nature of their political thinking.” Bernard 
Mennis, American Foreign Policy Officials: Who They Are and What They Believe 
Regarding International Politics (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 
149.
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in the way modem theories of evolution and genetics offer a better understanding of 
species long extinct. Illustrating influences that could not have been understood at the 
time is instructive for those using those same theoretical tools to analyze present and 
future scenarios.
3, Choosing Applicable Scholarship
Expanding the area of inquiry to international behavior has two important effects 
for the use of theoretical models. The first is that it makes the choice of model dependent 
upon the situation. This opposes the traditional scholarship of testing of a model by 
choosing case studies that fit its assumptions. In practical international relations preset 
behavioral rules do not always define the progression of situations—situations often 
define behavior in unexpected ways, Incorporating this feature into analysis prevents the 
observer from influencing results prematurely with analytical frameworks.
If the situation is one in which a state’s decision makers believe their military 
strength can be used to secure economic stability through conquest, then analysts would 
do well to select scholarship that incorporates these views. If the situational parameters 
are different -  for example, if they are leaders of a theocracy that maintains the 
consequences of declining relative power position are less severe than the disfavor of the 
Supreme Being -  then theoretical assumptions made about goals, beliefs, and rationality 
must be different as well, This calls for an altogether different set of theories and models 
to describe it.
The second effect of broadening the area of inquiry is the type of strategic 
response indicated by theoretical models may vary drastically from the expectations of
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those model’s original designers. For example, in an illustration of relative power trends 
State A perceives itself about to undergo certain and inevitable decline (111, 1), How will 
its leaders respond? A theory of war initiation indicates the time is ripe for violence, A 
theory of trade policy indicates the state will deny trade of strategic resources to its 
competitors. But threat and response need not flow from the same set of theoretical 
assumptions, A state feeling threatened economically can respond militarily, and vice 
versa, Proto-theory accounts for the likelihood those scholarly insights best describing 
the way a nation perceives its situation may not be the same ones that best describe its 
strategic response.
IE 1. State A’s Long Term Power Trends
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Information about a state’s perceived capabilities and situational peculiarities, 
therefore, is vital for understanding grand strategy. Does a state have temporary
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offensive military superiority and leaders who believe it can be used successfully? Or 
does it have instead abundant natural resources and little domestic industrial capability?
A threat indicated by realist analysis of relative power levels, for example, might be met 
by a response flowing from idealist belief in the influence of international institutions.
In his investigations into Soviet worldviews, for example, Wohlforth found that 
perceptions of power could be more dynamic than measurements of material 
relationships. “Rapid shifts in behavior may be related to perceived shifts in the 
distribution of power which are not captures by typical measures of capabilities.”40 Even 
during periods in which actual power did not appear to change, he has found perceptions 
of power that shifted and demonstrated how those shifts influenced behavior.41
Theoretical examination of grand strategy begins with a series of questions. Who 
are those who make grand strategy and how do they view the world and their place in 
it?42 What do they want for themselves and their nation? What traditions, values, and
40 William C. Wohlforth, Elusive Balance: Power ami Perceptions during the 
Cold War (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1993), 294.
41 “All policies are future-oriented . . .  A decision to reform, retrench, or go to 
war reflects expectations about future trends and assessments of the likely effect of 
today’s policies on tomorrow’s distribution of power resources.” William C. Wohlforth, 
“Realism and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 
1994/95), 98.
42 There are two important areas that fall under the concept of “worldview,” The 
first is the worldview of the individual policy maker. This view is difficult to determine 
beyond a reasonable level of precision. For one attempt to build models of individual 
worldviews in an administration, see Rosati, Carter Administration’s Quest. The 
worldviews of individual policymakers often have determinate effects on specific policy. 
The second is the aggregate national worldview taken from the multitude of individual 
views, which typically align themselves into several recognizable viewpoints and wrestle
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events influence their decision-making? Are their policy circles thinking about the 
lessons of Munich, Vietnam, or 9-11? Once a picture of how a state sees itself and its 
goals emerges, it is time to look at that state’s options and capabilities. What does the 
state have at its disposal? On which battlegrounds are its leaders most familiar and most 
comfortable—international institutions, military campaigns, business practices? A nation 
run by its business elite tends to maneuver better in the more familiar fields of trade and 
finance than armed conflict and can be expected to steer conflict toward financial areas 
where they have a comparative skill advantage.
Beliefs define perceptions,43 It should be clear that, strictly speaking, an 
individual does not usually express a “belief system,” Rather, policy makers express 
preferences regarding the issues on his or her desk, It is up to the analyst to detect 
patterns and impose structure to their beliefs,44 Understanding grand strategies requires 
that events be described according to the viewpoints of those perceiving them prior to 
application of theoretical models, A volcanic eruption may seem an unambiguous event,
for prominence as “the aggregate worldview.” It is this emergent “mainstream” 
worldview that determines a nation’s grand strategy,
43 The interaction of beliefs and perceptions was the subject of a study headed by 
social psychologist Milton Rokeach, His group conducted the Great American Values 
Test in 1979, an experiment in which the researchers broadcast a television program of 
the same name designed to influence viewers to adopt or strengthen support for a specific 
set of values, attitudes, and behaviors. The study then sampled for viewers and tracked 
its effects on their beliefs, Sandra J, Ball-Rokeach, Milton Rokeach, and Joel W, Grube, 
The Great American Values Test: Influencing Behavior and Belief through Television 
(New York; The Free Press, 1984), In his earlier writings, Rokeach pointed out that 
belief systems serve two powerful and conflicting sets of motives; “the need for a 
cognitive framework to know and to understand and the need to ward off threatening 
aspects of reality.” Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind; Investigations into the 
Nature o f Belief Systems and Personality Systems (New York; Basic Books, 1960), 67, 
See also Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values: A Theory o f Organization and 
Change (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc,, 1969).
44 Mennis, American Foreign Policy Officials, 149.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
but viewpoints, defined according to belief systems, matter a great deal. Someone who 
believes gods reside in underground may define volcanic activity as outbursts of a god 
dissatisfied. Someone who believes gods do not exist at all may perceive the activity as a 
dangerous geologic event. These viewpoints have profound consequences for the 
strategies that a state will follow.
In many situations an understanding of deep-seated beliefs can help define 
choices far more profoundly than an understanding of relevant experiences. Christian 
tenants against suicide hold firmer for someone who truly believes that God watches, 
ready to inflict terrible punishment for taking one’s own life. On the other hand, the good 
graces of Allah and an eternity of bliss with seventy virgins can be a powerful incentive 
for a young Islamic man considering martyrdom. And death means something much 
different to one who believes good works are rewarded by reincarnation onto a higher 
path of life, encouraging a strategy of nonviolence by Buddhist monks that utterly 
confuses Chinese soldiers in Tibet, Analysis that begins with proto-theory and then 
selects those works of scholarship that parallel the views and assumptions of the 
strategists involved can account for these differences,
4, Reducing Reluctance to Use Mathematical Representation 
A primary obstacle to effective use of international relations scholarship is a 
prevailing reluctance among policy makers and analysts to use mathematics to examine 
and display long-term trends, “The attitude of mainstream scholars of world politics
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toward the relationship between science and history is much like the Bolshevik’s attitude 
toward the relationship between socialism and capitalism,”45 This is not surprising, 
given the non-scientific backgrounds of most practitioners and scholars. However, this 
reluctance to embrace such a powerful set of analytical tools is inappropriate, given the 
numerous pressures for clarity and precision. Verbal depictions of a nation’s relative 
power, for example, are often quite useful, but far more effective are visual illustrations 
of the approximate scope and velocity of perceived long-term trends.46
While a certain areas of international relations scholarship lend themselves easily 
to scientific descriptions and have done so (i.e. international economics, population 
growth), mainstream approaches rarely chose to use them for grand strategy analysis.
One reason for this is lingering confusion about the scientific method. Initial attempts to 
imbue the field of international relations with scientific credibility brought about nearly 
universal embrace of the scientific method in works of or involving theory. Researchers 
specify theories (hypotheses), lay out variables, make predictions, and compare them to 
historical situations (evidence) in the case studies (tests) that follow theoretical writings. 
While useful for many fields of scientific research, this method does not make sense for
45 Wohlforth, “A Certain Idea of Science,” 39.
46 This is not to say that all international relations scholars eschew mathematical 
representation. Several journals of international relations, such as American Political 
Science Review and American Journal o f Political Science, can be considered to concern 
themselves primarily with mathematical representation. Yet the field as a whole tends to 
shy away from the technique. For a list of authors that work in this area, see Claudio A, 
Cioffi-Revilla, Mathematical Models in International Relations: A Bibliography, Institute 
for Research and Social Science Technical Papers no. 4 (Chapel Hill; University of North 
Carolina, 1979).
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the study of international affairs. Why not? Simply put, the scientific method rests on a 
set of preconditions that international relations cannot satisfy.
First, the conditions of international relations situations are never repeatable. 
While laboratories can be functionally alike, nations cannot. Similarly the date on a 
calendar can be eliminated when studying the behavior of molecules, but a border 
conflict between India and Pakistan after they tested nuclear weapons looks very different 
than it might have in 1983. People and events in history are stochastic; no two sets of 
conditions in international relations have ever been alike in any scientifically absolute 
way.
Second, grand strategists are never equivalent- Two hydrogen atoms may be 
expected to behave exactly the same under the same circumstances, but two leaders 
cannot. Neville Chamberlain was not Winston Churchill and certainly not Adolph Hitler. 
Third, results, even in similar situations with similar decisions, do not occur in exactly 
the same way or to the same degree. Facing a rising colossus on its eastern border, the 
German general staff twice enacted the grand strategy underlying the Schliffin Plan -  
defeat the West and turn to face Russia. It failed both times, but came a great deal closer 
to succeeding in the 1930s than it did in the 1910s, The study of international political 
behavior simply cannot meet the criteria under which the scientific method is valid, for 
nothing in international relations is truly repeatable.
While the dynamic nature of the international environment precludes use of the 
scientific method, this need not deter completely use of quantitative techniques for the 
study of international behavior. Scholars often encounter situations in which a foreign 
word or phrase conveys the overall conceptions or minor subtleties of a situation far
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better than the language in which one is writing. Similarly, there are certain nuances in 
analyzing international relations, such as changing power differentials over time, that 
offer their insights more readily through mathematical representation than through the 
written word.
John Gillespie noted, “The inconvenience of clumsy language becomes a hazard 
when constructing complex arguments.”47 In many cases, the “picture” produced by 
demonstrating graphically various elements of behavioral logic, here most often in the 
language of differential calculus, is worth a thousand written words of explanation.
James Rosenau explained, “While mathematical tools are not inherently superior to any 
others, and while their use does not necessarily preclude reliance on other modes of 
inquiry, they are distinctive . . ,  They require explicit premises and procedures that clearly 
differentiate them from historical, case-study, quantitative, and journalistic forms of 
investigation.”48
It is important to note one should not believe everything that flows from 
quantitative analysis, nor should it be considered a priori “scientific” because it has an 
identifiable result. The greatest utility of quantitative analysis lies in its ability to 
illustrate trends in situations that may have gone unnoticed otherwise. Numerical outputs
47 John V. Gillespie, “Why Mathematical Models?” in Mathematical Models in 
International Relations, ed. Dina A. Zinnes and John V. Gillespie (New York; Praeger, 
1976), 47.
48 James N. Rosenau, “Intellectual Identity and the Study of International 
Relations, or Coming to Terms with Mathematics as a Tool of Inquiry,” in Mathematical 
Models in International Relations, ed. Dina A. Zinnes and John V, Gillespie (New York; 
Praeger, 1976), 5.
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do not “prove” ideas of international relations any more thoroughly than any other logical 
argument. If there is one great lesson of international relations scholarship, it is that there 
are no immutable laws dictating human behavior, only general tendencies identified by 
historical expertise and contextual similarities.
It is important for grand strategy analyses to avoid discussions of exactitude. 
Theoretical works examine perceptions, trend lines, and critical points, none of which 
correspond precisely with objective reality. The “wooly” quality of international 
relations scholarship—such as the inevitable inexactitude of measuring perceived power 
-  make exact numbers or percentages impossible, and the promulgation of such figures 
inherently misleading. International relations theories and models, properly conceived, 
are imprecise and do not provide predictions. They illustrate tendencies and probabilities 
in international behavior.
While Rosenau stated correctly the potential utility of quantitative analysis,
everyone who studies political science discovers the truth in Mark Twain’s quip that
there were “lies, damn lies, and statistics.” The use of mathematical techniques such as
differential calculus can be highly misleading to both practitioners and observers,
especially when done incorrectly. Special care must be taken to define variables when
possible, describe the limitations of representing intangibles, such as relative power, and
above all ensure the end results of using these techniques are relevant and understood
properly in the context of that which they describe. Rosenau cautioned of the
possibilities of misusing advanced mathematics;
All of this [mathematical descriptiveness] is the case, of course, only if the 
axioms and model are sound, creative, and relevant and the analyst 
knowledgeable and skillful as a mathematician. As in everything else, 
mathematical analysis is no more cogent than the creativity with which it
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is used. There can be poor mathematics, just as there can be poor history 
or poor quantitative interpretation. In addition to mastering the discipline 
of mathematics, the analysts must have a feel for the substantive problems 
to which the discipline is applied, if the full power of the mathematical 
tools is to be realized.49
Recognition of the possibility of inaccuracy and misrepresentation should not 
deter international relations analysts from examining work that uses such techniques. 
They need not be suspicious of the results of such studies solely because they are 
untrained in and insecure about the methodologies involved. The test is not whether one 
can follow the progression from one equation to the next, but whether one is impressed 
with the insights application of mathematical reasoning yields.
The largest obstacle to the use of advanced mathematical techniques in the study 
of geopolitics remains lingering bashfulness on the part of scholars, policy experts, and 
policy makers. Gillespie described the question as follows: “Why mathematical models? 
Because of the precision of the language for handling difficult and complex questions. 
Why not mathematical models? Because it is a language not shared by many 
international relations scholars.”50 This justification is hardly sufficient, for it is 
unconscionable for the study of international phenomena to be hobbled by unwillingness 
on the part of international relations scholars to learn a new language.
Rosenau echoes these arguments powerfully with his own views on the matter:
Few would dismiss an analysis written in German or Arabic because they 
lack knowledge of these languages. On the contrary, the tendency is to 
assume it is sound and valuable (why else would it be available?) And to
49 Ibid, 7.
50 Gillespie, “Why Mathematical Models?” 59.
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seek help in getting a translation of its essential thrust. Why should we 
take any less constructive an attitude toward mathematics! It too is a 
language.51
Not only is mathematics a language; it is the most widespread language in the world. All 
those with at least a rudimentary education speak its basics. Indeed, mathematical 
representation can be considered humanity’s only truly universal dialect.
5. Altering Analysis for Each Significant Change in Perception 
National viewpoint and strategists’ choices of best grand strategy available are 
both the result of a collection of ideas and beliefs that must be understood prior to 
choosing the theoretical concepts that will help better understand international behavior. 
A static picture of perceptions, however, is insufficient for a full understanding of the 
way grand strategy forms, evolves, and changes. To be truly effective for the policy 
maker this kind of analysis must be dynamic and respond to the acquisition and 
development of new information.
Relative power analyses tend to remove the first level of analysis on the 
misconception that the vicissitudes inherent to individual perceptions contaminate 
scientific results. In many fields this can be the case, but in international behavior this is 
not so. It is rather like studying how hard a pitcher can throw a baseball without taking 
into account how motivated the pitcher is to do so at that moment; intangibles such as 
anger and resolve are ‘scientifically’ excised, leaving one with a pure but highly
51 Rosenau, “Intellectual Identity,” 8.
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inaccurate projection of what will happen. Factoring in the way perceptions influence 
beliefs about the future is an important step toward accuracy.
Emerging events and situations will alter perceptions of future trends. This, 
however, is only half the battle, for the concept of constantly variable perceptions must 
be applied to all moments leading up to the point of analysis. Perceptions of the past alter 
as easily and often as perceptions of the future. How effective was the Monroe Doctrine 
at keeping European Powers out of the western hemisphere? Why did Japan attack the 
United States? How significant was detente in American efforts to rein in Soviet 
adventurism? As the answer to these and similar questions changes with each news item, 
journal article, or book, perceptions of long-term trends change as well.
A nation whose policy makers have an understanding of a situation in the past that 
differs significantly from the understanding of that situation held in earlier days has its 
own particular understanding of present trends and projections of their nation’s course in 
the future. Analysis of grand strategy must be changed each time decision makers’ 
historical perceptions change, regardless of whether that change is the result of shifting 
opinions among a group of decision makers or changes in that group’s composition.
History abounds with examples of individual behaviors that do not fit any 
prediction made by pure theorizing. The Mongol general Mongke brought his 
unstoppable horde to the gates of Vienna twice, but on both occasions reversed course 
and marched back to Karakorum, first to avoid missing a meeting of the grand council 
and a second time to attend the Great Khan’s funeral. Would any other general in his 
position have done the same? Charles de Gaulle refused to employ tactics brutal enough 
to quell the revolt of the pied noirs in Algeria, allowing instead a sizable and valuable
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portion of France to declare independence. The Truman administration refused to use the 
American nuclear monopoly to establish its dominance over a rising and increasingly 
belligerent Soviet empire, a decision that seemed incomprehensible to Saudi king Abdul 
Aziz.52
IE 2. Bilateral Relative Power (1 st viewpoint)
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Belief and circumstance affect the way people perceive past, present, and future 
trends. Analysis of grand strategy must not be blind to new information that may alter 
drastically the insights that are useful. Perhaps in the latter half of the Cold War much of 
the U.S. policy community believed they had been in a state of power parity with the
52 An account of his reaction can be found in Robert Lacey, The Kingdom: 
Arabia and the House o fSa ’ud (New York: Avon Books, 1981), 281.
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Soviet Union since 1950 (111. 2). If the waning years of the Cold War brought about the 
view that the United States had always been the stronger of the two adversaries and 
destined to win the struggle, that revision in historical viewpoint makes the long-term 
trend look very different (111. 3). Subsequent policy in the waning years will be reflective 
of this shift in view.
UL 3. Bilateral Relative Power (2nd Viewpoint)
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Recognizing a change in the way history informs understanding is an important 
step in understanding how policy makers perceived long-term relative power trends 
throughout the period studied. Only when this information is incorporated in a 
continuous fashion can the grand strategies chosen at the time begin to reflect perceptions 
accurately and be useful for understanding current and future grand strategies.
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Conclusions
The knowledge and experience of a master poker player are required to grasp 
fully the relationships between a few people holding small portions of a 52-card deck and 
seated in a tight circle. How, then, is an analyst to grasp fully the relationships of seven 
billion people holding a wide range of interests and residing in nearly two hundred 
nations? The unsatisfactory answer is that such a task is, of course, impossible. Like 
poker, grand strategy forecasting remains an art, a game of calculated risks. International 
affairs professionals, bearing responsibilities of national security and increasing demands 
for prosperity, engage in this unending search for a competitive edge. What are the other 
players’ tells?53 Are true intentions any easier to read across national borders than a 
baize-covered table? Are bluffs more visible in a stirring national address than a highly 
raised bet?
What this study offers is a way of counting cards, a methodology for using the 
most relevant international relations scholarship to analyze state behavior. A proto- 
theoretical approach to grand strategy analysis is by no means infallible, but it provides a 
reliable guide to understanding a wide range of international behavior. The analytical 
techniques seek to give scholars, analysts, and statesmen a way of pooling their efforts 
for the betterment of all three fields of endeavor.
53 In poker a player’s tell is an action, usually unconscious, that lets other players 
gain insights into that player’s cards. Twisting a wedding ring, holding one’s breath, and 
darting one’s eyes around are common tells associated with bluffing. Nations often 
exhibit similar “tells,” such as troop movements or aggressive posturing, that experienced 
diplomats recognize as giveaways of that nation’s unseen objectives.
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Ultimately, the study and exercise of international political power require an 
instinct and talent for the field that cannot be replaced by scholarship and analysis -  a 
truth largely obfuscated as mathematical understanding and computing power have 
become increasingly potent. The technological and methodological advances of the 
twenty-first century provide an endless series of new and powerful tools of analysis. 
These can augment greatly the descriptive power of an idea, but can never replace the 
intangibles of talent, creativity, and imagination that impart quality to the work produced. 
Applying the methodology described in this section will yield new, different, and 
hopefully more accurate understanding of grand strategies, specific developments, and 
the course of human events. Misapplied, this approach can produce outright falsehoods 
and also, more dangerous, the most pernicious and misleading of truths. Combined with 
the inherent abilities of a strong analyst, it can be a powerful addition to the field of 
international relations, both for scholars and practitioners.
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CHAPTER II 
UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN WORLDVIEWS
Introduction
Abstracting from details is supposed to allow one to grasp larger forces at work. 
Theorizing elbows aside the minutia of politics and provides “the big picture” of 
international relations. Recognizing the structure of politics provide a framework for 
discovering many forces and trends that would remain otherwise hidden. The inability of 
theorists to predict specific outcomes and events has always been excused because their 
role is not explanation of day-to-day politics, but common trends in international 
relations. Undertaken in the sense of “teach a man to fish,” this body of research seeks 
general explanations, based on the idea that comprehension of the logic underlying 
political behavior is an effective means of foreshadowing future events and the most 
efficient research agenda possible.
When the mantle of leadership passed to the Soviet Union and the United States, 
so passed the opportunity and responsibility of increasing knowledge of international 
affairs. Each nation created a worldview that was unique to its culture.1 The United 
States drew inspiration from the revered political and philosophical figures of the Old 
World, most especially Brits, Franks, Germans, Greeks, and Italians. These influences 
were the foundations of American strategic views and will be addressed more fully in the
1 For an early study of how this process occurs, see Ernest Barker, National 
Character and the Factors in Its Formation (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1927).
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literature review. Soviet political thought combined the Europeanization of its most 
cosmopolitan historical figure, Peter the Great, a Chinese bureaucratic model left behind 
by the Mongol Golden Horde that had occupied Russian soil for hundreds of years, and a 
new ideology of class struggle that sprang from the writings of Karl Marx and actions of 
Vladimir Lenin.
These two competing views of the world clashed frequently and virulently 
throughout the Cold War. Informed by very different traditions and values, neither 
superpower seemed capable of truly understanding the objectives and concerns of the 
other. Neither side predicted the long-term strategies and intentions of the other with 
accuracy, for Cold War history is strewn with accounts of surprise at the behavior of the 
actors’ adversaries. Neither side accepted any work of the other in its attempt to better 
understand international relations. And neither side foresaw the end of their conflict
What was most surprising about these limitations was that scholars proved 
ultimately unable to provide a comprehensive picture of the earth-shattering 
developments about to occur within their own turf. The end of the Cold War caught 
nearly everyone, including the milieu of American scholars myopically preoccupied with 
it, unanimously unaware and unprepared. The best scholarship in the field provided little 
warning of the most important shift in the structure of international relations in the latter 
half of the twentieth century: the fall of the Soviet empire and the world’s subsequent 
transition from bipolar confrontation to American hegemony. This spectacular failure 
shook up international relations scholars, especially those of the United States.
Adherence to the dominant model of international relations scholarship, political realism,
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became suddenly unfashionable. Its assumptions were shown to be inadequate for 
describing the world as it existed and transformed.
This kind of awakening is good for the fields of international relations theory and 
American foreign policy. Unrecognized weaknesses in theorizing, such as inappropriate 
assumptions and flawed causal logic, are heaved from their hidden depths by such 
intellectual tremors and exposed bare for all to contemplate. Ignorance of patterns and 
blindness to signs and portents of change shocked those who studied the making of 
foreign policy into realizing they needed better theories, better models, and better 
methodologies for applying them. Collective humility stimulates new modes of thinking, 
new questions about old assumptions, and provides increasing confidence in those tenets 
that remain valid after the dust settles.
This work demonstrates the effectiveness of a proto-theoretical approach by 
suspending assumptions about international relations. It begins with a review of the 
intellectual traditions and philosophical foundations of the American approach to 
international relations. This identifies the assumptions about politics, power, morality, 
and other factors that underlie American worldviews during the time to be studied. The 
section immediately following this review identifies and explores the set of scholarly 
writings that parallel American assumptions and views. These scholarly works will be 
designated as the body of scholarship that will be most useful for identifying salient 
features of American grand strategy.
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Literature Review: Foundations o f American Grand Strategy 
A proto-theoretical approach begins with discovery of the philosophic traditions 
most influential on the nation’s approach to international relations. Only by 
understanding how grand strategists view themselves, their world, and their place in it 
can one begin to understand their foreign policy choices. The study begins with 
identification of the foundations of its international relations thought. Woven throughout 
American history have been many traditions and ideals unique to the character of the 
United States, but realism and exceptionalism have been the most omnipresent.
Therefore the study begins with a review of Western approaches to those concepts 
underlying these two traditions: power and morality.
Philosophic Foundations of American Power and Morality 
Systematic exploration of the sources of American foreign policy behavior, as 
with much of modem philosophic inquiry, begins with the Greeks. One of the most oft- 
quoted examples of early international relations thought is the historical account of a 
retired Greek general, Thucydides. Characterized by his contemporaries as a 
“humourless man, pessimistic, sceptical, highly intelligent, cold, and reserved,” his 
personal manner appears to befit the image that comes to mind when many observers 
view his realist descendents: cold, calculating, and impersonal.2 For Thucydides, and
2 See the introduction to Thucydides, History o f the Peloponnesian War, trans 
M.I. Finley (London: Penguin, 1972) 9; Peter R. Pouncey, The Necessities o f War: A 
Study o f Thucydides ’ Pessimism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 1-8.
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the scholars who have stood upon his shoulders, power was of necessity the paramount 
consideration in matters of politics. His seminal declaration, . .  what made war 
inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta. . . ” has 
become, like his persona, permanently associated with grand strategy.3
Thucydides opened his investigation into the great events of his lifetime, History 
o f the Peloponnesian War, with a sometimes implicit, but more often overt focus on the 
primacy of power. Yet his famous statement, which inexorably finds its way into nearly 
every major realist work on the nature of political relations, represented only one of his 
many observations regarding the primacy of power. Thucydides realized that power can 
be understood as arising from a variety of sources and could be defined in many ways, 
depending on the orator or strategist of the moment. Perceptions and beliefs about power 
were the paramount determinants of behavior. In his conception of international order, 
his notions of state honor and interest, and his view of the radically circumscribed place 
of morality in foreign policy, the well-known historian effectively defined an early 
paradigm of international relations.4
Thucydides achieved this with his analysis of the first major Athenian foreign 
policy event recorded in the study: the dispute over Corcyra. Unprepared for what its 
leaders perceived to be an imminent attack by superior Corinthian forces, the minor state 
of Corcyra sent representatives to Athens to apply for membership in the powerful
3 Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 49.
4 Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 4.
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Athenian league. Corinthian ambassadors made the journey as well, framing a public
debate in which each set of representatives tried to sway the Athenian assembly. The
Corinthians attempted to persuade their audience with arguments of legality and fair
treatment of other powers, while the Corcyraean orators sagely began and ended their
arguments in terms of Athenian interest:
We have come to ask you for help, but cannot claim that this help is due to 
us because of any great services we have done to you in the past or on the 
basis of any existing alliance. We must therefore convince you first that 
by giving us this help you will be acting in your own interests (emphasis 
added). . .  but some of you may think that there is no immediate danger of 
war. Those who think along those lines are deceiving themselves; they do 
not see the facts that Sparta is frightened of you and wants war.5
Such arguments can be very effective. Faced with a choice between upholding 
customary law and following prurient self-interest, the Athenian assembly chose the latter 
and formed a defensive alliance with the Corcyraeans. Thucydides’ account of the debate 
illustrated the manner in which the opportunities offered by alliance with a power on the 
coastal route to Italy and Sicily, combined with the negative consequences of allowing an 
enemy’s ally to strengthen its positions, were overriding interests and foreshadowed the 
Athenian decision.
Thucydides’ interpretation displayed his understanding of the role of power in 
politics. Faced with a choice between a substantial increase in power and the moral 
stature derived by a reputation for fidelity to existing agreements, even states as
5 Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 53-62.
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“enlightened” as Athens invariably choose the short path to power.6 He noted 
differences in national character are important, but the anarchic nature of the international 
system and subsequent concerns for security dictate overwhelmingly a state’s grand 
strategy and foreign policy decisions. Considerations of legality and notions of ‘right’ 
reign paramount only in the absence of immediately vital interests.
Another, and more often discussed, example of Thucydides insights into the
primacy of power is his careful examination of the Athenian reaction to a revolt by the
citizens of Mytiline. As a means of deterring its other smaller allies from following suit,
the Athenians responded by ordering their adult male population put to death and their
women and children sold into slavery. A crisis of conscience arose among the Athenian
populace after the message had been sent to the regional commander, prompting a hasty
public assembly to reconsider this course of action.7 Perceiving that moral arguments do
not usually overcome arguments presented in terms of interest, especially regarding
matters of grand strategy, the Athenian leader Diodotus did not pursue arguments that
would draw upon popular sentiment against the cruel verdict. He chose instead to appeal
to Athenian interest in terms of power and presented his case for leniency as an early
form of cost-benefit analysis:
If we are sensible people, we shall see that the question is not so much 
whether they are guilty as whether we are making the right decision for 
ourselves. I might prove that they are the most guilty people in the world, 
but it does not follow that I shall propose the death penalty, unless that is
6 Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought, 6.
7 See J. Talboys Wheeler, An Analysis o f Thucydides (London: George Bell and 
Sons, 1895), 107.
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in your interests; I might argue that they deserve to be forgiven, but should 
not recommend forgiveness unless that seemed to me the best thing for the 
state.8
Diodotus stayed the cruel punishment by presenting his policy as the most prudent for 
Athenian interests, rather than appealing to the same kinds of moral arguments that failed 
to sway the assembly in other matters of importance.
Thucydides’ understanding of the primacy of considerations of interest and
relative power in foreign policy was most evident in his next chronicle, that of the Melian
debate. Here, he recorded how the Athenians believed in the critical importance of
superior relative power in their relations in the larger world of foreign relations. During
their presentations the Athenians did not bother to make even surface arguments
regarding the morality of their foreign policies. Instead they presented their demands for
Melian compliance with their demands entirely as a matter of their overwhelming
capacity to compel the Melians to accept their desired terms:
We on our side will use no fine phrases . . .  we recommend that you 
should try to get what it is possible for you to get, taking into 
consideration what we both really do think; since you know as well as we 
do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard 
of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the 
strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they 
have to accept [emphasis added].9
The Athenian belief that strength allows freedom of action remained a strong 
theme throughout Thucydides’ work and is most evident in the policy speeches of the 
greatest orator of the time, Pericles. Pericles often praised Athenian honor and virtue in
8 Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 219.
9 Ibid, 401-02.
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the abstract, usually in times of despair, but chose the cool language of interest to discuss 
strategy. Thucydides made it clear that he preferred Pericles in the latter mode, as did the 
Athenians.10
Thucydides intentionally moved his work beyond that of either objective history 
or subjective history to the realm of political analysis by chronicling the effectiveness of 
naked power in decisions regarding strategy and foreign policy. He described his work 
as non-traditional scholarship, in the sense that it was “not a piece of writing designed to 
meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last for ever.”11 Rather than retell 
the history of the Peloponnesian War according to the heroic conceptions of its winning 
protagonist or as a vindication of Athenian political philosophy, he examined the several 
means by which contemporary political figures attempted formulate grand strategies. In 
this sense Thucydides anticipated modem American international relations scholarship in 
much more than prioritizing a set of considerations and preferences regarding the 
meaning of power.12 History o f the Peloponnesian War was the first major treatment of 
the role of power perceptions in grand strategy and became required reading in the 
political education of American strategists.
While it was an aged Athenian general, relaxing in exile and chronicling the wars 
of his youth, who laid the foundations of modem grand strategy, it was a middle-aged
10 Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought, 7.
11 Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 48.
12 For a fascinating recent study of Thucydides and his influence on realism, see 
Thomas Heilke, “Realism, Narrative, and Happenstance: Thucydides’ Tale of Brasidas,” 
American Political Science Review 98, no. 1 (February 2004), 121-38. Heilke argues 
realism cannot be communicated by a set of axioms alone; it requires narrative.
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diplomat, wearing the robes of former offices and reminiscing of the intrigues from his 
political career, who first codified the heretofore unspeakable justifications for the 
behavior of those who designed i t 13 Many centuries after the death of Thucydides, as 
Europe rediscovered the wisdom of the Greeks, Niccolo Machiavelli proposed the key to 
understanding international political behavior was a calculation of power, interest and 
consequence. He regarded this as a simple fact of politics, observable to all but the most 
abstract moralist. Unlike Thucydides, however, this Florentine strategist did not appear 
to be disturbed by this knowledge.
Machiavelli argued the pursuit of power over neighboring states by a sovereign is 
neither amoral nor immoral; rather it is the manifestation of a separate realm of morality. 
A statesman’s worth as an authority figure derives entirely from his effectiveness in 
gaining and maintaining relative power for his state. Thus a reputation for morality and 
possession of moral authority are important only insofar as they affect considerations of 
power.
Machiavelli, who did not always distinguish between foreign and domestic policy 
the way modem international relations scholars attempt to do, made clear in The Prince 
that a reputation for moral authority was more important and even preferable to the 
possession of it. He stressed,
13 Machiavelli has become, in popular terms, the quintessential realist. R.B. J. 
Walker noted, “He has become the most privileged icon, the most resonant, symbol, the 
name (almost) at the top of the list of names, the writer of die text that more than any 
other has become synonymous with ‘the tradition’.” R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: 
International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 33.
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A prince, therefore, need not necessarily have all the good qualities I 
mention above, but he should certainly appear to have them. I would even 
go so far as to say that if he has these qualities and always behaves 
accordingly he will find them harmful; if he only appears to have them 
they will render his service. He should appear to be compassionate, 
faithful to his word, kind, guileless, and devout. And indeed he should be 
so. But his disposition should be such that, if  he needs to be the opposite, 
he knows how.14
Power was a morality unto itself; the civic responsibility of princes required it.
Among Machiavelli’s many contributions to political thought was a practical 
conception of the utility of power that caused his contemporaries to vilify his name so 
vehemently that it became a long-standing synonym for the Christian devil.
Machiavelli’s controversial idea was that the unique responsibilities of political authority 
create a separate ethic for those who wield it. Set clearly in The Prince and rather 
inconsistently expanded in The Discourses, Machiavelli’s breathtakingly original 
worldview provides a compelling argument for the morality of the power-minded ruler.
Machiavelli’s differentiated model of specific spheres of morality, one personal 
and one political, arises from the vesture of communal authority in the person of the 
sovereign. His political ethic differed from that of private life in several important 
conceptual and practical areas. Statesmen would, from time to time, face situations in 
which, to safeguard the state, they must act in ways deemed abhorrent for the average 
man. Machiavelli believed leaders in such situations should not hesitate to design any
14 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. George Bull (London: Penguin, 1981), 
100-01. There remains, however, a vigorous semiotic debate over the true meaning of 
Machiavelli’s use of the word virtu to describe this character trait. See Harvey C. 
Mansfield, Jr., Machiavelli’s Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), Ch. 1.
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policies and enact any measures necessary for the strength and integrity of the states for 
which they were responsible.
Machiavelli argued that a ruler, imbued with leadership and burdened with 
responsibility, cannot and should not be constrained by personal ethics, for the stakes of 
politics are higher than the honor and integrity than one person. When a prince must act 
to safeguard the state, “no considerations of justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, nor 
of glory or of shame, should be allowed to prevail. But putting all other considerations 
aside, the only question should be, What course will save the life and liberty of the 
country?”15 Machiavelli’s bold declaration of the primacy of power and interest 
proclaimed his belief that the only way for a statesman to be moral was to be an effective 
formulator and practitioner of grand strategy.
Machiavelli did not eschew the idea of honorable behavior by political leaders.16 
Rather, he included a reputation for personal integrity and trustworthiness in the calculus
15 SeeNiccold Machiavelli, The Discourses ofNiccold Machiavelli, trans. Leslie 
J. Walker (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), book 3, Ch. 41 and Harvey C. 
Mansfield, Jr., Machiavelli’s New Models and Orders: A Study o f the Discourses on Livy 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 425-27.
16 R.B.J. Walker described the problem facing international relations scholarship 
when it comes to the study of Machiavelli: “Read as the paradigmatic realist, he is 
immediately reduced to instant formulas -  about the priority of power over ethics, about 
the necessity of violence and intrigue in the affairs of state, about ends justifying means 
and raison d ’etat. All of which is clearly not to read Machiavelli at all, but to endorse a 
caricature, a product of a long, complex, and particularly suspicious interpretative history 
. . .  Although there may be continuing controversies about and conflicting interpretations 
of the meaning and significance of Machiavelli’s texts, the received caricature cannot 
survive even a moderately attentive first reading.” Nevertheless, this ‘caricature’ has 
enormous influence on modem political thought, both by scholars and policy makers, 
most of whom do not, for whatever reasons, study Machiavelli in sufficient depth to go 
beyond the caricature. See Walker, Inside/Outside, 33-4.
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of a prince’s, and therefore a state’s, overall power. It was the reputation for, rather than 
the possession of, morality that Machiavelli found valuable, at least insofar as foreign 
rulers may be induced to behave in ways that he defined as irrational, such as accepting 
that the gentlemen’s agreements of various princes are a better determinant of foreign 
policy than considerations of interest.
Machiavelli’s ideal statesmen were ethically suspect in all their political
maneuvers, yet held unquestioned dedication to the safety and security of their states. To
be certain this concept would not be overlooked, he reiterated this position several times
throughout The Prince and The Discourses, holding remarkable consistency in the ideas
underlying his several formulations of his view of the ethic of responsible statesmanship.
You must realize this: that a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot 
observe all those things which give men a reputation for virtue, because in 
order to maintain his state he is often forced to act in defiance of good 
faith, of charity, of kindness, of religion. As I said above, he should not 
deviate from what is good, if that is possible, but he should know how to 
do evil, if that is necessary.17
He continued, “So it follows that a prudent ruler cannot, and must not, honour his word
when it places him at a disadvantage and when the reasons for which he made his
promise no longer exist.” The prince has an undeniable obligation to set aside his
personal standards when acting in a sovereign capacity.
Machiavelli should not be viewed as a blunt realist, for he shows an appreciation 
for the intricacies and delicacies of his advice. Sir Herbert Butterfield, in his 1960 
examination of the Florentine advisor’s stances, noted Machiavelli wrote most
17 Machiavelli, The Prince, 100-01.
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extensively about dealing with periods of crisis.18 His basic philosophy reflected his
understanding of the effects of repeated acts of untrustworthiness. One study concluded:
His awareness of long-term drawbacks of faithlessness made 
Machiavelli’s advice on this point cautious; while his urgings on the 
advantages reflected shrewd insight that acceptance of faithlessness in 
some circumstances was, in a world of sovereign princes, a condition of 
extending faith in others.”19
In this sense the “Machiavellian problem” of statecraft remains with us through the
present day, and as we shall see, each of his successors attempted to deal with it in his
own way.20
Throughout his treatment of the sources and uses of power Machiavelli made the 
first transition, in the words of Michael Joseph Smith, from political scientist to “policy 
scientist,” eager to urge particular policies on those in power.21 He was the first to write 
down general principles of international relations with the idea that they be read and 
employed by current policy makers. That he would be tempted to apply scientific 
principles and methods to his field, politics, is hardly surprising, given his professional 
and personal relationship with Leonardo da Vinci.22 It is hardly surprising later
18 Herbert Butterfield, The Statecraft o f  Machiavelli (London: Faber & Faber, 
1960), 92.
19 G.R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T.G. Otte, Diplomatic Theory from 
Machiavelli to Kissinger (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 13.
20 Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought, 12. See also Howard Williams, 
International Relations in Political Theory (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1992), 
51-4.
21 Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought, 11.
22 Roger D. Master, Machiavelli, Leonardo, and the Science o f Power (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996). The degree to which da Vinci influenced 
Machiavelli has never been established by direct evidence. See the review of Master’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
American scholars would begin formal efforts to create a science of international politics
with notions of the primacy of power and the differentiated morality regarding uses of it
taken from Thucydides and Machiavelli.
Following these two towering influences on the American philosophy of
international relations were other important refinements and insights on the two themes.
Thomas Hobbes wrote extensively of the underlying causes of the pursuit of power and
was well versed in the ideational underpinnings of international relations thought.
Enamored of Thucydides, he produced a well-received translation of History o f the
Peloponnesian War while in his thirties. Hobbes recalled in his own short third-person
autobiography, A Prose Life, that, “Of all the Greek historians, Thucydides was a source
of particular delight. . .  In it the weaknesses and eventual failures of the Athenian
democrats, together with those of their city state, were made clear.”23
Hobbes reasoned that people do not seek power for its own sake. Rather, they
seek power because it represents a means of acquiring those other things that make life
worthwhile: prestige, opportunity, comfort, and enjoyment. It also provides for their
protection from enemies, who view the weak as irresistible targets and have little regard
for the good of any but their own.
But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in 
a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times Kings, and 
Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in 
continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having
book by Albert Somit in the March 1988 issue of American Political Science Review. 
However close the personal relationship between the two had been, the influence of da 
Vinci’s contributions to scholarship would have been hard to avoid for a scholar living in 
exile near Florence during the early sixteenth century.
23 Thomas Hobbes, A Prose Life, available at 
http://art.supereva.it/hobbes.freeweb/texts.htm, accessed 7 November 2004.
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their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their 
Forts, Garrisons, and Guns, upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and 
continual Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of warre.24
For Hobbes the desirability of power is self-evident: power enables a contented life.25
His writings influenced American thinking by laying the foundation for a society highly
preoccupied with the purposes of power.
The degree to which one subscribes to the view that power is always preferable to 
the lack of it is highly illustrative of how closely one’s assumptions parallel those of 
realism. Is power really beneficial? Is it desirable? For Hobbes and many of his 
intellectual descendents in the United States this is clearly the case. Hobbes’s writings, 
much like those of Machiavelli, offer practical justification for the pursuit of power by 
arguing that it is useful to acquire power regardless of whether one finds having power 
intrinsically satisfying. Together with Machiavelli’s differentiation it forms the basis of 
the American belief that its leaders have a moral requirement to pursue international 
power for the sake of their nations and themselves. The United States will always, 
therefore, be sensitive to changes in international power and intolerant of unfavorable 
trends in this area.
Hobbes’s stance provoked scrutiny of individual and collective purpose in the 
conduct of international relations. That leaders sought power and should be expected to 
do so was obvious. “In the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a
24 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), Ch. 13.
25 Williams, International Relations, 57.
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perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.”26 Why 
mankind wanted power made the issue immeasurably more complicated. Hobbes’ 
explanation provoked much investigation of means and ends in international relations, a 
theme that would fuel later searches for ways of achieving individual and national 
security by means other than increases in relative power.27
Alone among his contemporaries, Hobbes accepted Machiavelli’s differentiation 
between the moral requirements of a man and those of a leader of men. In fact, he 
approached with a novel combination of the differentiated political requirements of those 
in authority with his own concepts of Christian duty, defining distinct political roles for 
authority figures and citizens. Hobbes concluded the sovereign’s guiding purpose is to 
ensure the safety and prosperity of his people; therefore, the sovereign is obliged to God 
to promote this end successfully. “But by Safety here, is not meant a bare Preservation, 
but also all other Contentments of life, which every man by lawfull industry, without 
danger, or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.”28
At the same time, citizenries were obligated to ensure the safety, well-being, and 
authority of their sovereigns, for “the good of the sovereign and of the members are 
inseparable.”29 The resources of the state being necessary to the formulation of credible
26 Hobbes, Leviathan, 123.
27 At times this search has included the crusade for peace, creation of local 
balance of power systems, creation of an international society, founding of international 
institutions, and democratization. Realists stress that these means were, for reasons 
rooted in human nature, temporary at best and ultimately unreliable.
28 Hobbes, Leviathan, 268.
29 Ibid, 144.
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foreign policy, citizenries must submit their own interests to that of the state when called
upon to do so. “The strength and wealth of the sovereign are derived from, and
dependent upon, the strength and wealth of the members. Conversely, a society is weak
if the sovereign cannot command its wealth and power.”30
Machiavelli and Hobbes provided one final philosophical challenge that continues
to influence modem American strategy: the difference between a view that centers an
understanding of an ever-changing world, as proposed by Machiavelli, and a view that
begins with the metaphysics of being, such as that of Hobbes. In this sense American
worldviews have a fundamentally combative tradition rooted in one of the deepest rifts
within Western thought since the classical period. It underlies many of the contrasts to be
found in recent literature on realism and structural realism. R.B J .  Walker noted the
appropriate response to this continuing rift is “to begin unpacking the assumptions and
contradictions which lie buried in the claim to political realism itself.”31
The assumption of universal seeking for power, central to modem American
realism, has been questioned by many of the scholars most often cited to buttress realist
logic. Max Weber argued persuasively that the acquisition of power in international
politics is ultimately self-defeating:
Every political structure naturally prefers to have weak rather than strong 
neighbors. Furthermore, as every big political community is a potential 
aspirant to prestige, it is also a potential threat to all its neighbors; hence 
the big political community, simply because it is big and strong, is latently
30 M.M. Goldsmith, Hobbes’s Science o f Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1966), 207.
31 Walker, Inside/Outside, 112.
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and constantly endangered. Finally, by virtue of an unavoidable “dynamic 
of power,” wherever claims to prestige flare up-and this normally results 
from an acute political danger to peace -they challenge and call forth the 
competition of all other possible bearers of prestige.
Weber made these observations in the context of general theorizing about power in
political relations, but also substantiated his view with by referencing the profound events
of his o wn experience, noting in 1922, “The history of the last decade [1900-1910],
especially the relations between Germany and France, shows the prominent effect of this
irrational element in all political foreign relations.”32
One could hardly argue that Weber sought to discourage anyone from specifying
power as the goal of politics. Indeed, his definitions of both politics and the state
emphasized the centrality of the struggle for power. For Weber the domestic realm is the
place in which statesmen competed for power against each other; at the level of
international relations they worked together to vie for power against their counterparts in
other nations.33 Weber understood the term “politics” to mean the struggle for power
among either statesmen or states.34
32 Max Weber, Economy and Society, trans. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich 
(New York: Bedminster Press, 1968 reprint).
33 The influence of Weber’s dualist approach to the struggle for power is starkly 
evident in the civic polities of those foreign policy circles influenced by realist thought; 
foreign policy has been debated from party lines, but its ultimate goals are traditionally 
regarded as bipartisan.
34 “A state is a human territory which successfully claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory . . .  The state is considered the 
sole source of the “right” to use force. Hence “politics” for us means striving to share 
power or striving to influence the distribution of power either among states or among 
groups within a state.. . .  When a question is said to be apolitical question . . .  what is 
always meant is that interests in the distribution, maintenance, or transfer of power are
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The power component of Weber’s conception of politics dominated his approach
to international relations and had profound effects upon the development of realist, and
ultimately American, views. Weber began his analysis in “Politics as Vocation” by
noting the only definition of the state that made any sense was one formulated according
its relative capabilities. In this conception, Weber influenced heavily the later writings of
American realist scholars, echoing noticeably in Morgenthau’s later declaration,
“International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.”35
The other great contribution of Weber to later American views that deserves note
here is his conception of power in the international arena as being most clearly expressed
in terms of the capability of nations to use violence. He proclaimed,
Sociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of what it does. There 
is scarcely any task that some political association has not taken in hand, 
and there is no task that one could say has always been exclusive and 
peculiar to those institutions which are designated as political. . .  
Ultimately one can give a sociological definition of the modem state only 
in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political 
association: namely, the use of physical force.36
Weber did not draw distinctions between the exercise of power and the threat of physical
force -  to him, whether implicit or explicit, all exercises of power were backed by
potential violence.
Unlike many of his German contemporaries, Weber’s worldview and the role of 
power in determining its winners and losers did not arise from then-fashionable racial or
decisive for answering the questions and determining the decisions.” See Max Weber, 
“Politics as Vocation,” From Max Weber: Essay in Sociology, ed. and trans. Hans H. 
Gerth and C. Wright Mill (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 494.
35 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 31.
36 Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” 494.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
Social Darwinist concepts.37 Weber rejected the notion that history condemned 
barbarism; indeed, he feared that advanced civilizations that did not express their power 
by building and maintaining superior military capabilities would not survive the rigors of 
a competitive international environment.38 At the same time these advanced civilizations 
must show an appreciation for purposes of power or lose their way.
Weber’s arguments, taken together with events of the early twentieth century, 
fostered a preoccupation with military force by the theoretical school that emerged in 
their wake. This had profound consequences for the subsequent development of 
American views about international relations by fostering a concentration among 
American scholars on creating models primarily concerned with measuring relative state 
capacity for violence.
In sum, the philosophic traditions of American foreign policy created an 
American approach to international relations that is characterized by an unending search 
for the meaning of power and the role of morality in the pursuit and exercise of it. Many 
other philosophic traditions informed American worldviews, including French malaise 
about the drive for hegemony, British conceptions of the responsibilities of a Great 
Power, and German methods of achieving and preserving Great Power status. Taken 
together they formed the core of what would become the twin pillars of American 
international relations thought.
37 David Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory o f Modem Politics (London: 
Polity Press, 1947), 43.
38 Michael Joseph Smith Realist Thought, 27.
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American Exceptionalism and Political Realism 
The American experience was bom from a combination of idealism and realism.
A variety of motivations spurred the colonization of the North American continent by 
European powers and their peoples -  social and political escape, economic opportunity, 
religious experiment -  but the most common themes to their aspirations were newness 
and opportunity. America was a new venture for some and a new life for others.39 The 
unifying characteristic of early settlement objectives is that they each contained an 
element of improving the old ways of doing things through freedom from conventional 
strictures, be they trade without traditional business structures, worship without Anglican 
oversight, or politics without the direct supervision of Great Power bureaucracies.40
The reason they came to America to accomplish their ambitions was a deep- 
seated sense of realism about the limitations of their own existence under their previous 
systems. This frustration extended across many diverse backgrounds and found 
expression in their approach to building a new life. For example, the second sons of 
European nobility, restrained from achieving their full potential at home by laws of 
primogeniture, often agreed to manage their family’s interests in America and become 
lords of their own domains. Remote from direct family and state control, they built their 
own empires, especially in the rural south, and grew distant from European ideas and
39 See Jon Butler, Becoming America: The Revolution before 1776 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
40 An account of the diverse groups settling the United States and their influence 
on the development of colonial mentalities can be found in Daniel J. Boorstein, The 
Americans: The Colonial Experience (New York: Random House, 1958).
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conventions. The same held true in many cases for merchants, shipwrights, traders, 
trappers, and other tradesmen.
The United States was thus built in large measure from its citizens’ 
conglomerated ambitions and subsequently prone to youthful idealisms. As it matured 
from colony to territory to country to world power, its people retained their sense of 
being a model of political evolution, the idea that their existence as a nation could and 
should be a newer and better model for political life than those that spawned it.41 The 
American government itself was an experiment in the most philosophically advanced 
form of government yet devised, representative democracy. Its people took great pride in 
their success and emerging role as an example for civilizing political life, especially after 
the French revolution appeared to validate their belief in historical trends toward freedom 
and democracy.
As American domestic politics were to be very different, so would U.S. foreign 
behavior. Early American intellectuals viewed states system left behind as corrupt and 
power-hungry. Europe would not draw the United States back into its cesspools of 
intrigue and strife, a conviction expressed by successive American presidents from the 
very first administration onward. Its combination of geographic seclusion and political 
isolation permitted the United States a rare opportunity to pursue a grand strategy based 
on its commitment to idealism long past its adolescence and into early adulthood. Eager
41 Bernard Bailyn is considered one of the most influential scholars on this aspect 
of early American history. His most celebrated work on the subject is The Ideological 
Origins o f the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1967).
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to prove their difference and worthiness, the American people and their government 
embraced and pursued the doctrine of idealism assiduously.
Rooted in the experiences of nineteenth century Europe and America, the doctrine 
of idealism originated in a period of unbridled optimism over highly successful 
application of Enlightenment principles and methods to nearly every field of scientific 
inquiry. Encouraged by the advances of their counterparts in other fields, many scholars 
assumed a similarly scientific investigation of individual and collective human behavior 
would yield a solution to the problem of peace. The idealist view held faith in the 
perfectibility of man, or more precisely, the belief that, through education, reform, and 
regulation, man would realize the truth of his essential goodness, an assumption whose 
roots lay in contemporary religious doctrines regarding man’s fall from original grace and 
struggle for redemption.
Echoing the findings of natural and physical sciences, the idealist vision rested on 
the assumption that objective and knowable laws that have their roots in logic in general 
must govern politics and society. Following quickly upon a mechanistic view of 
humanity is the conclusion that such a creature, if he desires it, must be capable of 
manufacturing a stable, peaceful international order through the application of reason and 
science. War, in the conception of these scholars, was a scourge of humanity. Violent 
conflict could never be anything but a dishonorable method of statecraft, exacting a high 
toll on the collective good and sullying indiscriminately all who used it. It followed from 
this view that all causes of war were imperfections to be identified and corrected through 
moral, rational, legal, or, if required, military means.
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The roots of this worldview lay in nineteenth century liberalism and borrowed 
heavily from Adam Smith’s theories of economics to describe its state of international 
affairs and predict an eventual end to international conflict. Economics demonstrated 
that beneath the competitive behavior of self-interested consumers was an inner logic of 
the free market that worked to benefit all.42 Similarly, the underlying state of 
international relations came to be understood as a harmony of state interests disrupted by 
the imperfect machinations of power politics. Seemingly intractable problems could be 
explained to be the result of misinformation, misperception, and a few evil men, for 
peace must be preferable to war. Perfect competition among each nation’s interests could 
be expected to bring about to international harmony, in much the same way perfect 
competition in economics could be expected to bring about maximum prosperity for all.
The First World War tested the validity of scientific utopianism. Unprecedented 
devastation wrought by worldwide conflict lent a sense of urgency to a host of idealistic 
goals, including the end of war as a means of solving disputes. Accordingly, national 
governments, private associations, and the nascent League of Nations each tried to outdo 
each other in the organization of international conferences to solve the problem of peace. 
Statesmen became somewhat obsessed over finding what Hans Morgenthau later derided 
as a simple, rational, mechanical solution to something complicated, irrational, and 
incalculable.43
42 Adam Smith, Wealth o f Nations (1976), available at 
http://www.bibliomania.com, accessed 7 November 2004.
43 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 47.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
74
The idealists of the early twentieth century were themselves inheritors of a long 
legacy of various forms of failed optimism. Development of a flourishing bourgeoisie in 
eighteenth-century France spawned a new class of intellectuals to define and defend its 
interests. The political lessons of their day were war-weariness and the futility of 
territorial expansion, most notably derived from France’s recent failed drive for 
Continental hegemony. The philosophes distilled this feeling into harsh criticisms of 
power-seeking in general and foreign affairs in particular. While this environment 
fostered great achievements in domestic political philosophy, it led the era’s most 
celebrated thinkers to dismiss international relations as inherently corrupt and ultimately 
unimportant.44
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, among others, argued vainglorious 
self-interest by princes brought about wars the citizenries did not want. Only a 
republican form of government could prevent wars from continuing. Their celebration of 
popular integrity became unfashionable after J.S. Mill observed the majority was a 
largely uneducated mass capable of barbarous acts of tyranny. Casualties produced by 
the independence of the United States and revolution in France demonstrated in a very 
real way the masses were capable of independently organized violence.
44 The philosophes’ views did not contain themselves to the coffee houses and 
parlors, but quickly found quiet agreement among government officials. For a 
contemporary account of popular sentiment and public morality see the writings of the 
Marquis D’Argenson, French foreign minister from late 1944 to early 1947, especially 
his memoirs and the posthumously published Considerations sur le Gomernement 
Ancien et Present de la France (Amsterdam, 1764), in which he asserts foreign policy is 
subservient to domestic interests.
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In the nineteenth century the preservation of monarchy against creeping 
republicanism was supposed to end international conflict.45 Its later abolition heralded 
the coming of a more peaceful age, for public opinion, if allowed to make itself an 
effective determinant of grand strategy and foreign policy, should have sufficed to end 
war. Similarly, the imperial struggle for overseas possessions became, for a time, the 
sinister culprit. Treaties to restrict colonial competition, specifically the Treaty of Berlin 
and Peace of Versailles, proved ineffective at both regulating war and creating conditions 
for peace. The independence of these colonies fifty years later brought the world no 
closer to a pacific system of foreign relations.
For a time secret diplomacy was blamed for allowing ignorant citizenries to 
support war and subsequent futile efforts did not end the practice. Outright renunciation 
of the use of force failed. Making wars illegal in the 1928 Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand 
Pact) did nothing to abolish them 46 European scholars proposed monopoly capitalism 
created internal contradictions and class struggles that were diverted into foreign wars-a 
socialist peace thesis. Subsequent attempts at various forms of socialism provided
45 The Congress of Vienna represented the most extensive attempt to create peace 
from view. Delegates assumed the preservation of the stability of European monarchies 
would ensure the stability of Europe and an end to major war. See Edward Vose Gulick, 
Europe's Classical Balance o f Power (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967) and Henry A. 
Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems o f  Peace 1812- 
22 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).
46 As late as 1936 Alfred Zimmem called the Kellogg-Briand “the most far- 
reaching engagement so far entered into by the sovereign states of the world” and 
“practically speaking, irrevocable.” Alfred Zimmem, The League o f Nations and the 
Rule o f Law (London: Macmillan and Company, 1936), 392.
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neither peaceful coexistence nor enough goods and services to prevent their 
constituencies from overthrowing their socialist governments.47
It would be an exaggeration to describe the scholarship of this period as uniformly 
utopian, for it exhibited substantial variety. During their researches and concrete 
attempts at finding permanent peace, however, scholars and international elites shared an 
ethic of snubbing, at least publicly, the power politics that were supposedly the culprit 
responsible for the outbreak of hostilities that led to the Great War.
Thus the period between the first and second world wars presented the first great 
challenge to realist thinking. But the common view of this interwar ear as one of idealist 
legalism versus more pragmatic realism is simplistic and inaccurate, especially when 
examining the development of American views. The liberal idealism of Woodrow 
Wilson, codified in the Fourteen Points and expanded in subsequent legal scholarship, 
represented the apex of willingness on the part of the international community in general 
and the United States in particular to apply the ethic of exceptionalism to a European 
system ensnared in the corruption of its realist history. In abandoning its own attempt by 
rejected its League of Nations, the United States demonstrated it was not made of ideals 
alone. America’s duality would confound itself and other nations in the interwar period 
and continues to present a lasting snarl of confused behavioral expectations, especially 
among foreign leaders and international relations scholars, through the present day.
47 Current proposals deriving from this view include the pooling of state 
sovereignties, the disarmament of nations, and universal free trade, none of which appear 
likely to bring the world closer to perpetual peace.
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Whether one believes they were enwrapped in the nobility of their aspirations or 
merely enveloped in the horror of the Great War, Americans as a whole came to the 
position that liberal internationalists failed to appreciate that politics cannot be an 
abstraction from the essential elements ofhumanity. They understood that human beings 
have not always been completely good, rational, or altruistic. Furthermore, human 
behavior has never conformed precisely to the world of scientific explanation, in which 
all phenomena and behavior have identifiable sources than can be isolated for 
experimentation, understanding, and prediction. Minds, hearts, and souls are notoriously 
indistinct, often nebulous, and do not lend themselves easily to necessities of scientific 
investigation such as precise categorization and mechanistic repeatability.
Americans were not alone in embracing this view of naked idealism. E.H. Carr’s 
Twenty Years ’ Crisis appeared in 1939 as a reaction to Arnold Toynbee’s idealistic 
commentary in the Royal Yearbook o f International Affairs48 However, it was not in 
Great Britain that Carr’s original work bore fruit.49 American scholars and policy 
makers ended the Second World War by championing the seemingly contradictory but 
overwhelming American themes of idealism and realism. American idealism lay behind
48 Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” in 
International Relations -  Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in 
International Thought, ed. Robert M. A. Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2001), 27-52, reference on 31.
49 Where Carr failed to develop a science of international relations in England he 
succeeding in sparking one in the United States. International relations theory has been 
and continues to be dominated by American scholars. This lent a particularly American 
flavor to the directions of research and purposes of scholarly debate. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that American research interests, such as bilateral conflict and 
hegemonic stability, have received the most attention in academic circles.
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American efforts at institution building and its willingness to work with recalcitrant 
partners such as Soviet Russia and China. American realism informed its growing body 
of scholarship regarding the acquisition and uses of power and the nature of international 
relations.
The American international relations thinkers who succeeded the idealists moved 
toward acceptance of these as unfortunate but inalienable truths and sought instead to 
temporize by working with, rather than against, the forces giving rise to conflict. They 
echoed early critics of liberal utopianism, including E.H. Carr, who stated flatly, “No 
political utopia will achieve even the most limited success unless it grows out of political 
reality.”50 Their acceptance began to embed itself in international relations scholarship 
in the early twentieth century, but did not begin to take precedence until disillusion over 
failed attempts to secure peace forced a reexamination of the task itself.
This was the moment the realist school of thought came to the fore of American 
foreign policy circles, a position it has yet to relinquish after more than six decades of 
theoretical challenge. Political realism resurged after the failure of appeasement in the 
1930s, the trauma of the Second World War, and the onset of the Cold War. Its growing 
strength brought a torrent of research that brought the American tradition of realism from 
a nebulous set of values and perceptions to a formal school of thought, with its own 
definitions, experts, and research agendas. This intellectual approach seemed on target in
50 Carr, Twenty Years ’ Crisis, 10. Carr’s work was not a work of international 
relations theory, but a critique of prevailing wisdom that resonated very strongly with the 
emerging school of realist thought.
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blaming war on the evil side of human nature and the resulting failure of leaders in the 
interwar period to balance against the rising power of Germany, Italy, and Japan, along 
with the widely perceived failure of the League of Nations, discredited alternative 
approaches toward political practice.51
The standard of American foreign relations analysis in the mid-to latter-twentieth 
century thus shifted from idealism tinged with moments of expediency to a belief in the 
methods of realism to achieve the goals of liberalism. Realist pragmatism, which 
provoked a wave of counter-models, was itself largely a reaction to traditional thinking, 
especially in American foreign policy circles during the first half of the twentieth 
century.52 As Raymond Aron observed in 1966, an important characteristic of realists 
was their attempt to “think against.”53 E.H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans J.
Morgenthau, and many of their fellow intellectuals rebelled against the prevailing 
intellectual standard of their era—theoretical derivations of Wilsonian ideals combined 
with long-standing American values.
In their rejection of the idealistic approach the realists brought a grudging 
acceptance that there is no perfectible, scientific explanation of foreign relations, no
51 The most prominent treatment of these issues is found in Carr’s Twenty Year’s 
Crisis, which communicated disapproval of interwar diplomacy from an authoritative, 
realistic point of view.
52 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962). Kuhn describes the manner in which descriptive 
models are overthrown by more advanced understandings, which are themselves 
overthrown in turn.
53 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory o f International Relations, trans. R. 
and A.B. Fox (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1966), 596.
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magic formula that would end the phenomenon of international conflict.54 Carr 
described the coming era as one in which the idealist will discover “one of the facts 
whose causes he will have to analyse is the fact that few people do desire a “world-state” 
or “collective security,” and that those who think they desire it mean different and 
incompatible things by it.”55 As such, there would be no absolute solution to the 
problem of human conflict until man abandoned his individuality.
The first and most lasting assertion of realism as a formal school of thought 
arrived with the publication of Hans J Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations in 1948. 
Over half a century after its appearance, the work still stands as an exemplar of twentieth- 
century realism and is the classic text both assigned to first year IR students and 
referenced by respected IR scholars. Morgenthau’s statement of political realism had an 
immediate influence on every subsequent research agenda in the field. Its adherents 
included the overwhelming majority of scholars in the early and middle years of the Cold 
War.
54 Realist suspicion about the pursuit of a science of international relations has 
not faded easily. Many decades after the emergence of political realism, Carr wrote to 
Stanley Hoffman, “Whatever my share in starting this business (the field of international 
relations), I do not know that I am particularly proud of it. I suspect that we tried to 
conjure into existence an international society and a science of international relations. 
We failed. No international society exists, but an open club without substantive rules. 
No science of international relations exists. The study of international relations in 
English-speaking countries is simply the study of the best war to run the world from 
positions of strength.” September 30,1977. Quoted in Jonathan Haslam, The Vices o f  
Integrity: E.H Carr, 1892-1982 (London: Verso, 1999), 252.
55 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 10.
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American political realism’s unabashed embrace of human fallibility represented 
a disavowal not only of the recently dominant ethic of Wilsonian idealism, but 
liberalism’s entire approach to thinking about human behavior. International relations 
scholars and practitioners in the 1930s and 40s began to recognize, albeit often 
grudgingly, the fundamental pervasiveness of man’s imperfections. They began to agree 
that politics are still governed by objective laws, yet their roots lie in human nature rather 
than in immutable and flawless logic. A world of limited resources and competition- 
driven inhabitants ensures the continuation of opposing interests and periods of conflict. 
Morgenthau noted all of the successful statesmen of modem times, from Richelieu to 
Churchill, have made the national interest the ultimate standard of their politics.56
As the most dominant school of thought in an age of available and affordable 
publishing, political realism boasts whole libraries of work attempting to espouse its 
history, character, and qualities. Complicating the use of the term is the fact that each 
realist seems to have his own realism. This case study seeks to shim the controversies 
inherent in exacting definitional exercises by using instead a working definition: political
56 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 34. This does not mean, however, that 
realists believed the nation-state would remain forever dominant and the problem of 
peace unsolvable. Neither Carr nor Morgenthau believed the nation-state to be the 
ultimate form of government, nor did they hold the international system would forever 
endure. Writing in 1970, Morgenthau foresaw that the forces of globalization would 
leave the nation-state “no longer valid” and soon “obsolete.” The advent of “nuclear 
power, together with modem technologies of transportation and communications, which 
transcends the ability of the any nation-state to control and harness it and render it both 
innocuous and beneficial, requires a principle of political organization and structure 
transcending the nation-state.” See Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Intellectual and Political 
Functions of Theory,” in International Theory: Critical Investigations, ed. J. Der Derian 
(New York: New York University Press, 1995), 50.
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realism is a school of political thought whose basic tenants include international anarchy, 
the dominance of state actors in international politics, and the primacy of power as the 
currency and goal of their efforts.
Many of the top foreign policy minds at the time of realism’s emergence were 
American, either by birth or immigration, and at first found this new approach extremely 
distasteful, for the American intellectual establishment had a long and proud heritage of 
condemning the tactics of what it derided as a corrupt, power-hungry, immoral European 
system. In doing so these critics upheld a mythology of their intellectual predecessors, 
many of whom had fled their native European empires to create a republic based on the 
liberal ideas ascendant at the end of the eighteenth century. This viewpoint’s 
pervasiveness over the first hundred and fifty years of United States history meant that 
the ideas of liberal idealism and American exceptionalism, while temporarily reduced in 
stature from the 1920s through 1960s, nonetheless permeated to a remarkable degree 
American foreign policy conduct and rhetoric.
Coincident with the breakdown of long-standing intellectual traditions was a 
grudging acceptance of the realities of immediate and long-term American primacy. 
Distaste for power politics among the world’s newly ascendant international relations 
heavyweights was matched by distaste among those who had once wielded the greatest 
quantity of power themselves: the foreign policy elite of Europe. While these figures 
learned to cope with their diminished role in global affairs, the foreign policy elites of the 
United States, as well as the Soviet Union and China, achieved their newfound influence 
in power politics at the very moment when they each were trying to promulgate their own 
particular political system as morally superior to that of their new opponents. Their
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idealist traditions yielded haltingly but definitively to the competitive realities of the 
international system.
The years 1917-1945 demonstrated conclusively the inescapable fact that the 
maintenance of a stable international order required more from the world’s new Great 
Powers than their idealism; it required their power. Similarly, these nations grudgingly 
came to terms with their need for the rest of the world. The United States could not 
escape the consequences and responsibilities of its growing power, yet had long refused 
to relinquish the overextended adolescence provided by its geographic isolation. The 
Soviet Union had yet to perfect its own socialist paradise, yet found a need to remake the 
rest of the world in its image before it succumbed to the pressure of rising American 
hegemony and rapid Asian economic growth. Extensive overseas interests required 
leaders who were deeply engaged in overseas enterprises, as early twentieth century 
events in Europe and Latin America demonstrated.
These developments were not instantaneous, nor perceived immediately by those 
who participated in them. The United States, with its free society and rapid economic 
development, appeared to be the most ideally suited for innovative approaches to the old 
ideas of power politics. Yet these forces took root slowly, as American foreign policy 
circles were slow to accept these new realities. It was safer for American academics and 
politicians to warn against the loss of America’s privileged moral ground than to devise a 
framework for making the world respect the superiority of its power. To counter their 
position any competing approach to international relations would require solid 
intellectual grounding.
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Reinhold Niebuhr offered realism a profound theological connection between 
human nature and political behavior.57 “Man is insecure and involved in natural 
contingency; he seeks to overcome his insecurity by a will-to-power which overreaches 
the limits of human creatureliness.” Political behavior is the extension of all human 
pursuits; therefore man’s imperfections will translate to international relations. 
International peace will never happen until man ceases to be man. Lasting peace is a 
state of affairs that would not be realized because humanity holds a ceaseless ambition to 
struggle toward perfection, rather than allow it to happen.
Niebuhr felt man’s original sins of inquisitiveness and pride remained with him 
forever:
Man is ignorant and involved in the limitations of a finite mind; but he 
pretends that he is not limited. He assumes that he can gradually 
transcend finite limitation until his mind becomes identical with the 
universal mind. All of his intellectual and cultural pursuits, therefore, 
become infected with the sin of pride. Man’s pride and will-to-power 
disturb the harmony of creation.58
Contrasting his understanding of man’s pride with his own humble approach, Niebuhr
tried to imbue the field with a sense of its own limitations. He warned that intellectual
pride leads man to ignore the contingent nature of his knowledge. Because of their
intellectual pride, the great philosophers have all made the mistake of imagining
themselves “the final thinker.”
57 See Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children o f Light and the Children o f Darkness: A 
Vindication o f Democracy and a Critique o f Its Traditional Defense (New York: 
Scribner, 1949).
58 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny o f Man 1 (New York: Simon & 
Shuster, 1949), 178-79. The biblical foundation of his belief is found in Genesis, Ch. 3.
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As a fundamentalist country, the United States required more than philosophical 
justifications for its outlooks and grand strategies. Niebuhr provided American 
approaches to international relations with a theological foundation, more of a necessity 
for American acceptance in the early twentieth century than in the early twenty-first. 
Doing so brought him much praise from his contemporaries. George Kennan, for 
example, wrote that Niebuhr was the “father of us all.” Niebuhr was not so much the 
father of the realism as its parson. His political and moral guidance sought to prevent 
others from taking the extremes of credulous idealism and cynical realism. Niebuhr’s 
most distinctive contribution to the idea of realism in the theory of international relations 
was to fashion a religious foundation for Weber’s ethic of responsibility.59
Niebuhr’s writings, like most ecclesiastical work, are open to interpretation by 
those seeking to marshal his authority for their individual positions. His aphoristic style 
invites ambiguous quotation. Niebuhr’s legacy remains unclear and his contributions 
relatively obscure to modem scholars largely because his ambiguity made him difficult to 
pin down on particular topics. His durability as an eminent figure in international 
relations thought and willingness to reconsider his positions furthered his intellectual 
elusiveness.
Niebuhr reflected American uncertainty about the duality of its own approach to 
grand strategy. It is not hard to quote Niebuhr against Niebuhr. In a debate with Niebuhr 
on the Vietnam War, Paul Ramsey was once reported to have remarked that Niebuhr
59 Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought, 132-33.
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seemed not to have read Niebuhr.60 In describing his intellectual relationship with 
Reinhold Niebuhr, the influential international relations scholar Hans Morgenthau once 
remarked, “Reinie and I come out about the same on politics, but I do not need all his 
metaphysics to get where we both get.”61 The differences between the two writers do 
indeed reflect those between theology and political science. Niebuhr called Morgenthau 
“the most brilliant and authoritative political realist.”62
Morgenthau’s project was to change realism from a critique of utopianism and a 
characteristic approach to man and politics into a comprehensive theory that could 
explain the underlying essence of relations among states, illuminate the moral problem in 
statecraft, and provide a sound basis for evaluating specific, contemporary problems of 
national policy. Morgenthau’s writings are so voluminous that some abbreviations and 
selectivity are essential, but the essential thrust of his work is the identification and 
development of American conceptions of realism and morality in international relations.
Bridging the gap between the unique experiences of American democracy and the 
responsibilities of growing American power requires a fusion of the two traditions. At 
critical times in the latter half of the twentieth century the relative prevalence and 
interplay of the traditions of exceptionalism and realism have been the most salient force
60 Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics, ed. Harry R. Davis and Robert C. Good (New 
York: Scribner, 1960), 10. Cited in Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought, 132-33.
61 Quoted by Martin E. Marty, “Reappraisals: The Lost Worlds of Reinhold 
Niebuhr,” American Scholar 45 (Autumn 1976), 569.
62 Reinhold Niebuhr, Man’s Nature and his Communities: Essays on the 
Dynamics and Enigmas o f Man’s Personal and Social Existence (New York: Scribner, 
1965), 71.
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defining the grand strategy of the United States. This dominant political tradition has 
resulted in a very specific set of structural beliefs about power -  “constructed realism” -  
unique in world history and salient to examinations of American grand strategy. The 
theoretical components of constructed realism can be described quite effectively through 
the use of specific aspects of international relations theory that, taken together, inform the 
American approach to grand strategy.
Development of American International Relations Scholarship 
American writings on international relations theory are the synthesis of two 
independent components: one logical and one definitional. The first of these consists of 
behavioral logic and has no reference to the particulars of politics or human nature. The 
second lies in the specification of systems, variables, and assumptions. Theory groups 
people and explores the ways in which they relate to one another. In the case of realist 
thought, theory identifies a system characterized by a lack of overarching authority 
(anarchy), a set of identifiable actors (states), and a set of assumptions about the nature of 
humanity.
Commissioned in the 1950s by William Fox to produce a compendium of 
contributions of Western political thought to current scholarship on the causes of war, 
American international relations theorist Kenneth Waltz took his investigations further 
and produced a major work of international relations theory. In this, his doctoral 
dissertation and first book, Waltz describes the ways in which the fathers of political
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thought influence international relations theorizing and the making of foreign policy.63 
He distinguishes realism’s foundations as separable. In his conception of international 
relations Waltz chose to embrace realism’s behavioral logic while rejecting the notion 
that the insecure nature of humanity drives all international relations.64 He specifies 
instead a world in which the insecure nature of the major institutions expressing human 
political ambitions, states, is the driving force behind international relations.65
In his conception of international relations Waltz redefines two assumptions of 
realism so radically, yet so subtly, that his creation has been credited erroneously as 
founding a competing school of international relations theory. It is nonetheless 
somewhat difficult to distinguish from realism. Structural realism represents in fact more 
of a complement to realism than a rival. Realists view international relations as a broader 
and somewhat vague expression of the ceaseless struggle for power by individuals; Waltz 
views them as the ceaseless struggle for security by states. This distinction is not as 
unambiguous as it may seem, for much confusion exists at all levels of academe about the 
difference between realism and structural realism. The variables both schools employ, 
such as security and power, are open to interpretation. The relation that theoretical
63 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1954). The book was Waltz’s first and the second volume of 
the series, Topical Studies in International Relations. Fox describes the manner in which 
Waltz completed much more than requested in the book’s forward, iii-iv.
64 “It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of 
states.” Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 65.
65 Waltz, Man, the State, and War, Ch. 1.
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concepts have to one another, therefore, is under vigorous debate both among all realists 
and among the IR theory community at large.
Waltz accepts that state leaders generally perceive power acquisition as the same 
thing as security acquisition, as do most realists. He gets there, however, not through 
extension of the rational and irrational impulses of imperfect beings, but by an 
explanation of systemic conditions as an irresistible determinant of outcomes. According 
Waltz’s structural realism, the international environment is a self-help system in which 
states are the main actors and are imbued with a responsibility to provide security for 
their inhabitants.66
The first requirement of security being survival, states must continuously assess 
their security situations for potential threats to their existence and take steps to meet 
them. In this concept structural realism rejects traditional realist concepts of human 
fallibility and echoes the liberal ideal that states are inherently peaceful.67 Where 
structural realism differs from the liberal school is its refusal to accept that the 
international system is a priori peaceful as well. Peaceful states can form very violent 
international systems if the conditions of relative power so dictate. The structural realist
66 Vagaries plague the definitions used in works of structural realism. Waltz 
preferred to call his own particular brand of structural realism ‘neorealism’, while most in 
the field tend to use structural realism and neorealism synonymously. This work will 
attempt to clarify its own use of the terms by confining itself to using ‘structural realism’ 
in general and label specific forms of it with die names of its primary theorists.
67 “Survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have . . .  
survival motive is taken as the ground of action in a world where the security of states is 
not assured, rather than as a realistic description of the impulse that lies behind every act 
of the state.” Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 91-2.
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view of international relations therefore shares traditional realism’s pessimism about the 
prospects of lasting peace.
Structural realism embraces the realist understanding that state leaders believe 
power acquisition, especially military power, will deter other states from attacking them 
and their interests. States are thus compelled to engage in Hobbes’ ceaseless competition 
for power, whether they want to or not.68 The interaction of their efforts creates 
outcomes of greater insecurity, less stability, and ultimately a world in which even states 
that remain inherently peaceful after interaction with their unit and state-level variables 
may yet engage in security competition in ways that sometimes lead to war.
Waltz’ was not the first attempt to explain international behavior as the result of 
systemic pressures. Karl Marx and Immanuel Wallerstein did so with economics.69 
Stanley Hoffman called for a Copemican revolution in the study of international politics 
and sought signs a new paradigm had arrived.70 Morton Kaplan explored relations
68 Waltz, Man, the State, and War, Ch. 6; and Theory o f International Politics,
Ch. 6.
69 Marx did so with international socialism and the end of class struggle, most 
famously in Das Kapital. Immanuel Wallerstein did so with The Modern World System: 
Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins o f the European World Economy in the Sixteenth 
Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974). Neither method of achieving world peace 
via economic justice enjoys much enthusiasm among modem IR scholars.
70 “if we were to put primary emphasis in the study of politics on world affairs, 
and to treat domestic politics in the light of world affairs, instead of the reverse, we might 
produce a Copemican revolution even bigger than the change that transformed economics 
when macro-analysis conquered micro-analysis.” Stanley Hoffman, “International 
Relations: The Long Road to Theory,” World Politics 11, no. 3 (Spring 1959), 347. See 
also the first two chapters of Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver’s Troubles, or, The Setting o f  
American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968) and chapters four and five of
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between states in terms of geopolitical structural power.71 Richard Rosecrance sought to 
explain international politics as a combination of traditional domestic influences and an 
empirical basis for several recurring models of international relations based on systemic 
influences.72 Yet none had the influence on the development of modem IR theory 
enjoyed by structural realism, nor shows the same promise of better understanding the 
ways in which American policy makers view the world.
Waltz rejected these theoretical efforts outright as being both repetitious and 
bland, condemning them “a small gain in explanatory power that has come from the large 
amount of work done in recent decades.”73 He rejected inquiries into the effects of 
interdependence and transnationalism with equal vigor, most famously associated with 
his contemporaries Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.74 He argued instead that the 
configuration of power among states was the determining factor in international relations. 
Processes occurring above or below the level of state interaction, while important, were 
of less importance than systemic pressures for behavior and would never fully explain 
decisions or outcomes.75
Structural realism embraces the view that leaders perceive power as the best 
guarantor of security. States leaders, fearing the effects of being at a disadvantage
his The State o f War: Essays on the Theory and Practice o f International Politics (New 
York: Praeger, 1965).
71 Morton Kaplan, Systems and Process in International Politics (New York:
John Wiley, 1957).
72 Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International 
Systems in Perspective (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1963).
73 Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 18.
74 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World 
Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1977).
75 Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 95.
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relative to other powers, therefore face incentives to increase their power at every turn. 
Waltz believed, however, that more aggressive maneuvers that seek this end trigger 
systemic reaction. This reaction had long been understood in terms of balancing, 
although balancing had been used to refer to a specific grand strategy rather than a 
systemic effect. Offensive maneuvers, for Waltz, are largely ineffective because other 
states refuse to accept the increased insecurity inherent in one state’s drive for 
dominance. Waltz argued that successful seeking for power is ultimately futile, for no 
state will allow a great power to achieve hegemony if it can help it.76 Yet state leaders 
fail to appreciate this and continue to grasp for power for fear of being dominated or 
destroyed.
Structural realism reinvigorated IR theory by invigorating tired debates about the 
primacy of states and the security-power dilemma. It also provided new opportunities for 
empirical and statistical analysis of the international system. Waltz’ restatement of realist 
assumptions and emphasis on behavioral logic brought about a resurgence of realist 
discussion that ensured the school’s domination of international relations theory in 
general and American international scholarship in particular through the rest of the 
twentieth century. 77 It had profound effects on the level of sophistication of the 
American realist approach and its appeal to those who make American grand strategy.
76 Ibid, Ch. 6.
77 Waltz has retained his position as a dominant figure in discussions of 
international relations theory throughout his six decades of scholarship. Waltz’ critique 
of globalization in the Spring 2000 issue of The National Interest and spirited defense of
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A central concept to modem structural realism remains its exploration of 
balancing behavior.78 Glen Snyder elaborated on this by specifying two pathologies 
inherent in balancing behavior: abandonment and entrapment.79 Thomas Christensen 
and Jack Snyder incorporated the role of defense dominance into predictions about these 
types of behavior.80 Comprehensive descriptions of some alternatives to balancing 
behavior appeared, including bandwagoning and hiding. Bandwagoning refers to a 
policy of purposeful realignment with the source of the threat, or, more commonly, “if 
you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em.”81 It is associated most often with the behavior of smaller 
powers.82 Hiding consists of opting out of the game of international politics. It is 
generally associated with isolationism, neutrality, assuming a purely defensive position, 
or purposefully ignoring a threat in the hopes that it will not materialize. These behaviors
realism in the Summer 2000 issue of International Security demonstrate not only the 
typical longevity of structural realism, but also of realist scholars.
78 Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, Ch. 6; Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging 
Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), 73; 
Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, Ch. 11-14; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins o f  
Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
79 Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, 
no. 3 (July 1984), 466-67.
80 Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: 
Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 
(Spring 1990), 137-68.
81 Walt, Origins o f Alliances, 17. See also Robert G. Kaufman, “To Balance or 
Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe,” Security Studies 1, no. 3 (Spring 
1992), 417-47; Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist 
State Back In,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994), 72-107.
82 Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality v. Neo-realist Theory,” International 
Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994), 117; Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); and Eric J. Labs, “Do Weak States 
Bandwagon?” Security Studies 1, no. 4 (Spring 1992), 383-416.
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also are generally not considered options for great powers, although from time to time 
great powers have exhibited hiding behavior.83
The other aspect of Waltz’ research that held enormous consequences for the 
development of IR theory literature was his underlying assertion that wars represent 
irrational outcomes in international politics. Waltz argued the formulation of 
shortsighted policies and persistent miscalculations of the ease and benefits of aggression 
drive states into wars they often do not really desire. The idea that international 
aggression is so difficult and yields so few results grew into a literature on the offense- 
defense balance that for a while showed bias in favor of the power of defensive positions.
Scholars whose research moved in this direction became known as defensive 
realists. Defensive realists believe security is plentiful in the international 
environment.84 Robert Jervis, Jack Snyder, and Stephen van Evera, among others, write 
extensively on the virtues of defensive power and the various results of systems that 
exhibit various offense-defense balances. They argue the balance of power in a struggle
83 One example of a great power pursuing the hiding strategy is the United States’ 
reluctance to get involved in the internal and external conflicts of the former Serbian 
states during the 1990s. In this case the world’s preeminent power had a vital interest in 
ensuring the stability of Europe, but chose not to get involved until after the European 
Union had demonstrated it was incapable of dealing with the issue.
84 Robert Jervis and Kenneth Waltz described the underpinnings of defensive 
realism in, respectively, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, 
no. 2, (January 1978) and Theory o f International Politics. For examples of defensive 
realism see Charles L. Glaser, “Correspondence: Current Gains and Future Outcomes,” 
International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997), 186-93; Stephen van Evera, “Primed for 
Peace: Europe after the Cold War,” in The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, ed. 
Sean Lynn-Jones (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 193-245; Walt, Origins o f 
Alliances, and Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.”
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between offensive forms of power (first-strike capabilities, lightning attack capabilities, 
etc.) and defensive forms of power (second-strike capabilities, fortifications, etc.) is 
almost always weighted toward the defense. It thus takes a powerful systemic incentive 
to force states to choose to mount an attack, for prospects of winning an offensive war 
and gaining anything of value are usually dim. States want to take these kinds of steps to 
increase their power only if their actions do not threaten to destabilize the system and 
thereby their own security.
Defensive realists generally seek to identify the conditions under which security 
can become scarce. Their efforts can be classified according to the sources of 
international insecurity they identify, although it is important to note that many IR 
scholars themselves do not always fit neatly into these categories. Those who examine 
situations in which misperceptions threaten the peace include Stephen van Evera and 
Robert Jervis.85 Those who study the ways in which economic trends influence 
prospects for peace include Dale Copeland in his theory of trade expectations.86 Glenn 
Snyder describes other variables that bring about the same effect.87
Defensive realists thus recognize many potential areas in which attack is a 
plausible course of action. Their work finds, however, that such situations are the 
exception more often than the rule. They maintain the offense-defense balance usually
85 Stephen van Evera, Causes o f War: Power and the Roots o f Conflict (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
86 Dale Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade 
Expectations,” International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), 5-41.
87 Glenn Snyder, “Process Variables in Neorealist Theory,” Security Studies 5, 
no. 3 (Spring 1996), 167-92.
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lies squarely on the defense side of the spectrum.88 One consequence of this view is that 
it engenders a widespread belief that potentially destabilizing actions such as the 
acquisition of military power are not as threatening as generally perceived, for the 
incentive to begin major power wars is low.89 Furthermore, changes in overall relative 
national power and the systemic pressures they exert according to the logic of structural 
realism are less important to prospects for lasting security.90 This view surfaces
88 The offense-defense literature is voluminous and grows steadily with each 
innovation on either side and numerous shifts in perceptions regarding the value of 
existing factors. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); George Quester, Offense and 
Defense in the International System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977); Thomas 
Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Bernard 
Brodie, “Technological Change, Strategic Doctrine, and Political Outcomes,” in 
Historical Dimensions o f National Strategy Problems, ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 1975), 262-306; Stephen van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and 
the Causes of War,” International Security 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998), 5-43. Many are 
unsure the value the offense-defense debate contributes to the field. See Jack Levy, “The 
Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical 
Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 2 (June 1984), 219-38; Charles L. 
Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We 
Measure It?” International Security 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998), 44-82; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 
“Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995), 660- 
94; and, for a criticism of the field’s focus on the issue, see Stephen van Evera, 
“Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory,” International Security 
23, no. 3 (Winter 1998/1999).
89 Stephen Walt writes that in such situations, states have “little intrinsic interest 
in military conquest.” Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many 
Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 110 (Spring 1998), 37.
90 See Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique 
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 
1998), 485-507; Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gain in International Relations 
Theory,” American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (December 1991), 1303-320; and 
John Matthews, III, “Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative 
Gains Matter,” International Security 21, no. 1 (Summer 1996), 112-46.
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periodically in international relations and never fails to draw criticism, yet has shown 
remarkable lasting power in American views of international relations.91
This belief, combined with expectations of systemic balancing to protect states 
that might not successfully defend themselves, demonstrates that defensive realism 
describes a very peaceful system of international relations. This drew vehement dissent 
from scholars who agreed with the logic of structural realism but disagreed with the bias 
it was showing in favor of defensive power. They eventually formed a competing strain 
of structural realism, offensive realism.92
First specified in 1991 by Jack Snyder, this divide parsed structural realist ideas 
into two rather indistinct and not very useful camps, based largely on the degree to which 
their proponents believed power acquisition by one nation translates into potential 
insecurity for its neighbors.93 Offensive realists began to argue that there is not much 
security in the international environment.94 States must vie for it relentlessly or suffer
91 Similar views between the two world wars put great faith in the effectiveness 
of defensive systems such as radar as deterrents to aggression. Debate over the degree of 
naivete informing this view continues today.
92 See Barry R. Posen, The Sources o f Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and 
German between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Benjamin 
Frankel, “Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction,” Security Studies 5, no. 3 (Spring 
1996), xv-xviii; Eric J. Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and Expansion of War 
Aims,” Security Studies 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997), 1-49; Walt, “One World, Many 
Theories”; Brooks, “Dueling Realisms”; Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: 
Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19, no. 2 (Winter 1994/95), 50-90.
93 Jack Snyder, Myths o f Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 11-2.
94 For examples of offensive realism see Famed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: 
The Unusual Origins o f America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1998); Eric J. Labs, “Beyond Victory;” Randall L. Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status Quo
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systemic punishment ranging from minor humiliation to complete annihilation. This 
viewpoint maintains that pervasive uncertainty about the future requires states to engage 
in an energetic struggle for increases in sources of power. The most sought-after of these 
are the fungible attributes of physical size, population, industrial output, and military 
output and less directly fungible sources of power such as international leadership and 
creditability.
The most succinct statement of offensive realism can be found in the work of 
longtime American critic of both liberalism and defensive realism John Mearsheimer.
His adherence to the logic of systemic pressure and belief in the power it holds over state 
action came to the fore after the end of the Cold War.95 Promulgating his brand of 
offensive realism while most IR scholars were looking for new paradigms and orders 
after the end of the Cold War, Mearsheimer argued the configuration of power in world 
politics had changed somewhat after the collapse of the Soviet empire. The system of 
international politics itself, however, remained entirely intact. Therefore the same forces 
and rules that influenced behavior in the 1950s and 1970s would continue to do so 
throughout the 1990s and into the next millennium.
Bias: What Security Dilemma?” Security Studies 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996), 90-121; 
Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” 
International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993), 5-51; John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the 
Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 1 
(Summer 1990), 5-56.
95 Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future.” Mearsheimer’s investigation followed 
hard on the heels of a piece addressing similar questions by Jack Snyder entitled 
“Averting Anarchy in the New Europe,” International Security 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990), 
5-41.
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Mearsheimer’s stalwart defense of realist ideals and systemically driven behavior 
brought a variety of criticisms and counterarguments.96 His unapologetic embrace of 
structural realism and argument that state behavior had not and would not change its 
nature energized IR scholars. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism posed a strong challenge 
to the field of IR scholarship as a whole and the area defensive realism in particular. He 
molded his ideas into a general theory of international relations along the lines of the 
emerging area offensive realism, expressed by his publication of Tragedy o f Great Power 
Politics. Beginning with assumptions common to structural realism, Mearsheimer 
concludes that an anarchical international system is inherently dangerous and the modem 
world is no exception.97
Lacking any overarching emergency rescue mechanism in case of aggression, 
states, especially great powers, anticipate continuing peril and regard one another with 
strong suspicion. Mearsheimer elaborates: “States quickly understand that the best way
96 Critics of Mearsheimer’s approach submitted to the journal almost 
immediately. See Bruce M. Russett and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Correspondence, Back 
to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European Security,” International 
Security 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990/91), 216-18 and 218-19, respectively. Lengthier 
critiques and alternatives to Mearsheimer’s conclusions appeared afterward, including 
Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the 
Future of Europe, International Security 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), 114-61, and Thomas 
Risse-Kappen, “Did ‘Peace through Strength’ End the Cold War?” Lessons from INF,” 
International Security 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), 162-88. Robert Jervis addressed this as 
well in “The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?” International Security 
16, no. 3 (Winter 1991-92), 39-73.
97 The assumptions are: (1) the international system is anarchic; (2) great powers 
inherently possess some offensive military capability; (3) states can never be certain 
about other states’ intentions; (4) survival is the primary goal of great powers; and (5) 
great powers are rational actors.
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to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system. The stronger a 
state is relative to its potential rivals, the less likely it is that any of those rivals will attack 
it and threaten its survival.”98
One of the most persistent and threatening dangers of international politics is the 
penchants states develop for monitoring relative power closely and taking action to 
prevent negative trends. Mearsheimer in particular argues that great powers always pay 
attention to the power distribution in an anarchical international system and seek to 
maximize their relative power. Great powers pursue grand strategies that seek to 
“eliminate any possibility of challenge by another great power” because the best way to 
ensure their survival is to achieve hegemony as soon as possible.
Mearsheimer’s forays into strategy are effective when he argues war, blackmail, 
bait and bleed, and bloodletting are ways in which states seek to increase power, while 
balancing and buck-passing are strategies for checking aggressors. Where his work loses 
some credibility is in his attempt to demonstrate how systemic pressures translate into 
relative power based not on policy makers’ own perceptions, but instead according to his 
own predefined indices. Mearsheimer believes relative power is based on population size 
and the level of wealth -  the “main building blocks of military power” and what 
Mearsheimer calls the “sinews of military power.”99 He measures wealth according to a 
new composite indicator that combines a state’s iron and steel production with its energy
98 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2001), 33-5.
99 Ibid, 43 and 60, respectively.
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consumption until 1970. After 1970, he uses the GNP as the indicator of latent power. 
Unfortunately for the applicability of Mearsheimer’s ideas, there is no recorded instance 
of a policy maker using his indicators and making decisions based on them. This is the 
same drawback of other attempts to make theorizing more “scientific” by quantifying 
power without reference to perception, including the Correlates of War project.
Offensive and defense realists, in general, do not disagree much about the veracity 
of the traditional realist view that relative power gains influence behavior. Both schools 
of thought subscribe to the structural realist argument regarding the overriding influence 
of anarchy in the international system. They identify states as the prime actors in global 
politics and agree that states are security maximizers. The two competing areas even 
agree that states have a rationality based on the assumption that acquiring power is the 
best means of achieving it.
They differ, however, on two very fundamental issues: the severity of relative 
change that must occur before their influence becomes an overriding factor in decision 
making and the value of power as a guarantor of security. Offensive realists believe very 
little change must occur or be predicted to have dramatic effects on behavior, while 
defensive realists believe the superiority of defenses reduce the opportunities and dangers 
inherent in relative power trends. They hold similar disagreement over the utility of 
power acquisition for short and long-term security. These two divergences, however, 
have not prevented the two strands from producing a unified body of research with 
tremendous influence on American policy.
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American Realism and Mathematical Approaches 
The power of structural realist logic shows most clearly in illustrations of relative 
power over time. In mathematical terms, the power of the United States according to its 
own perceptions can be expressed as “x” and the time variable expressed as “y”. The 
change in American international power over time -  mathematically speaking, dx/dy -  is 
the velocity (speed and direction) of American power. Changes in the velocity of power 
over time -  dx2/d2y -  display the acceleration or deceleration of American power, or 
changes in the velocity of power over time.
These terms are entirely based on perceptions at the moment they examine. 
Instantaneous perception can best be understood as a hypothetically-taken poll of all 
figures influential on strategic thinking, to which each view is assigned some sense of 
relative influence in a nation’s strategic apparatus.100 The sum of all these views, 
multiplied by their influence, is the aggregate perceived view of a nation. Looking 
backward provides that nation’s view of its past -  taken at that moment -  and looking 
forward provides that nation’s expectations for its future, unless changes are made to 
prevent that future from becoming reality.
A nation’s perception of its past can change as easily as that of its present or 
future. Therefore, the most effective means of demonstrating perceived power over time 
is to use available materials to identify an instantaneous perception, usually at some point
100 This is, of course, often highly contentious. Again, it is not meant to be 
reduced to specific numbers or individuals -  there is no objective way of measuring how 
much influence any particular person has on any national view at any specific time.
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in history at which decisions are made. These sources are culled to find information 
about what the people involved believe was the past, present, and future level of power 
held by their nation. The perceptions can vary widely, making illustrations that are very 
near each other in years look very different in trend. Imagine the vast differences in 
illustrations of American perceptions of power and security on Decembers 6th and 7th, 
1941, or Septembers 10th and 11th, 2001.101
Ultimately, there can be no objective standard for measuring the percentage of 
power any nation holds in any particular system. Human perceptions are so uncertain 
and fluctuate so quickly that identification of exact numbers at any given moment would 
be inherently inaccurate and ultimately meaningless. This area of inquiry is not amenable 
to precision. However, generalized understandings of the level and direction of national 
power can be assembled into trends in viewpoint that are very useful.102
States strive relentlessly for positive power velocities. They are compelled by 
structural pressures to change their strategies when trends become negative and are seen 
as correctable. A nation, such as the United States, that perceives itself as undergoing a 
deep decline is experiencing a negative velocity of perceived power. The start (a) and 
finish (b) of the decline are the level of overall decline (b-a). The slope of a line
101 p or this reason structural realists use the kind of mathematical analysis 
described here to examine historical trends, which take place over many years, rather 
than specific policies. Longer historical timelines smooth out anomalous events that do 
not influence grand strategy in any significant way, while still allowing consideration of 
truly momentous events that shake a nation’s overall strategic view.
102 It is for this reason that perceptions of power are illustrated, rather than 
graphed.
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connecting them across a period of time is the degree of decline (h-a / 1). It is the 
nation’s perception of the velocity of its own decline. Degree is very important and will 
become important later in the analysis, for it plays a highly effective role in determining 
the psychology of a nation’s viewpoint and the scope of a nation’s response.
Two strands deserve particular note in the course of this work. Their assumptions 
parallel most closely American views during the period being examined. Their insights, 
therefore, will form the intellectual foundation of the analysis of that period. The first of 
these began nearly twenty-five years ago when Charles Doran and Wes Parsons used 
graphical techniques to track the appearance of relative power cycles.103
Doran and Parsons began by defining relative capability as being composed of 
two principal dimensions; ‘size,’ which is most often indexed by territory, armed forces, 
military spending, and population, and ‘development,’ which includes such variables as 
per capita income, urbanization, and technological sophistication. Plotting these factors 
over time, they identified historically repetitive power situations and examined them to 
determine if similarity of situation brought about similarity of outcome. They 
investigated whether expectations of the members of the system determine a nation’s 
role. Specifically, they examined mathematically defined critical points to discover 
whether these coincided with initiation of extensive warfare by a major power in the 
system.
103 Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, “War and the Cycle of Relative Power,” 
American Political Science Review 74, no. 4 (December 1980), 947-65.
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Doran and Parsons’ loosely-defined ‘theory of relative capability’ holds that the 
propensity for a state to undertake major war should show a strong correlation with that 
state’s proximity to mathematically-important points along a graph of its relative power. 
A state’s total relative power score is the average of its relative power on each of five 
power indicators. An inevitability of decline in the rate and level of relative power, 
respectively, often generates a sense of insecurity, defensiveness, and vulnerability to 
chauvinism as real growth falls below linear projections. Alarmed by its continuing real 
decline in relative power, the government is subject to foreign policy overreaction and 
misperception regarding the intent and scope of its adversaries’ actions. These 
tendencies are strongest when the velocity and acceleration of decline is most severe. 
States undergoing this type of decline may be expected to suffer from feelings of shock, 
frustration, and impatience, for their fixtures are at stake. Their leaders can be expected to 
react aggressively, taking strong measures to prevent their dismal projections of fixture 
power position and the threats inherent therein. They often become paranoid, assxxming 
their slippage in relative or absolute power is the result of their adversaries’ deliberate 
attempts to weaken them.104
Doran and Parsons understood that the decision to use force in such situations 
would be the result of many factors beyond structural pressures. They concluded that 
relative power velocity at critical points in a cxxrve, although highly informative, is not a 
consistent indicator of the frequency of war initiation. Rather, it is relative power
104 Ibid, 952.
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acceleration that, when it changes from positive or negative or vice-versa, that most 
heavily influences the decision for violence. Furthermore, at certain inflection points 
forecasting is pointless, for instantaneous linear projection is mathematically impossible. 
According to the logic of power cycle theory, grand strategy often is as well, for one 
cannot make traditional linear projection of power trends when the acceleration or 
deceleration of power cannot be calculated mathematically. Doran and Parsons found a 
strong correlation between these critical points and the decision for war by major powers. 
Subsequently they concluded that the view that relative capability is an important factor 
of major power behavior deserves the widespread acceptance it already enjoyed thanks to 
the predominance of realism.105
The theory of relative capability as presently constituted is subject to two 
common limitations of theoretical work. The first is in methodology. Doran and Parson 
subscribed to the fallacy that definition of variables should take place independently of 
the subjects and situations being studied. They defined power according to their own 
beliefs, which were largely influenced by the precepts of realism, rather than those of the 
players involved, which could be influenced by other ideas. The inclusion of players who 
do not view relative capability as a combination of size and development would have 
demonstrated this flaw quite starkly.
The second requirement is a limitation of scope. Their study of relative capability 
never intended to encompass the whole of behavior nor produce a deterministic
105 Ibid, 948.
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model.106 Its application was intended to indicate areas of potential discord and forces 
driving state action, but discord and state action can take a variety of forms. Major 
powers seek to overturn unfavorable trends and preserve favorable ones through a variety 
of means that include but are not limited to war. War being one of the most predominant, 
there is a statistically significant correlation between unfavorable situations and the 
initiation of war to overturn them. Yet frequently situations arise in which military 
confrontation will not be chosen. For example, a state empowered economically but 
weak militarily might be much more effective using trade embargoes than outright war.
It follows that mathematically significant situations should correlate more strongly with 
drastic changes in grand strategy than with extensive war alone, an assumption that will 
be tested below. Doran and Parsons limited their field of study to specific, testable 
segments of international behavior to demonstrate the efficacy of their theory. They 
recognize the ideas driving their theory can and should be used more broadly.107
Equally significant to the development of this understand was Charles Doran’s 
continued study of the effects of changing perceptions of systemic pressures on the 
decision making process. Doran and Parsons found that major powers are likely to 
initiate more extensive wars at the critical inflection and turning points on the curve of 
relative capability where the linear role perception held by government and society
106 Charles Doran, interview by author, 14 December 1999, Nitze School of 
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC.
107 Ibid.
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change pervasively.108 In other words, while situations may change drastically, it is the 
drastic change of perceptions that can more easily bring about these broad turns of grand 
strategy.
Doran noted in his 1971 study that the capacity of a state to influence 
international politics and to adopt a principal foreign policy role is determined in large 
part by its position on the relative capability cycle.109 Developing a favorite them of 
Clause witz’s writings, Doran asserted significant adjustments are required of government 
and society as the cycle evolves and the role changes.110 His and Parsons’ theory further 
asserted that the trauma of role change is most severe for state leaders at each of the four 
critical points on the cycle where an abrupt and ineluctable inversion occurs within the 
dynamics.
A suzerain may feel it has the strength to impose its will upon a vassal that does 
not accept this same view of their power discrepancies. Nations of equal strength may 
each overestimate the strength of their contemporaries for a variety of reasons. There 
may be acquiescence for power-building by an uninformed population (e.g. the “missile 
gap”), the general tendency to give an adversary too much credit for safety’s sake 
(Shakespeare-Henry V), errant calculations of the utility of certain aspects of national
108 Doran and Parsons, “War and the Cycle of Relative Power,” 947-65.
109 Charles F. Doran, The Politics o f Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 193-94,210.
110 In times of rapid change, there is often a “fog of peace” in which the absence 
of precise, reliable information allows fear and insecurity to play a larger role in the 
making policy. It contributes to miscalculation, misinformation, and poor policy choices. 
See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (London: Penguin, 1982 reprint), 
Ch. 7.
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power in which an adversary has an advantage (tanks, men in uniform, etc,), or electoral 
utility. Calculations of relative power are entirely a matter of perception, leaving ample 
room for dispute, conflict, and war.
An important contribution at this stage of their analysis was the recognition that 
relative capability is never measured as precisely as many theories expect. Relative 
capability theory does not require careful power calculations, since the practice of day-to- 
day diplomacy provides signals regarding the degree of a government’s relative 
ascendancy or decline.111 The inexactitude of measuring perceived power makes exact 
percentages or numbers impossible. The promulgation of such figures is inadvertently 
misleading, for it implies more accuracy than the research could possibly achieve.
Rather, the illustrations of these forces show general trends, intuitions, and perceptions 
for conceptual purposes only.
One of these effects prominent in power cycle theory is the idea of oversteer. 
Using an analogy of a motorist on a slippery road, Doran argued at such times policy 
makers are susceptible to “oversteer.” Just as a driver will often overcompensate missing 
the early part of a turn by swinging the steering wheel too sharply, so a nation’s policy 
makers will often implement stronger corrective policies than normally expected. 
Misperceptions tend to loom larger when power trends change rapidly, leading to 
corrections that can overshoot the mark in much the same way a vehicle swerves to and 
fro as its driver attempts to regain control. At this point states are most likely to commit
111 Doran and Parsons, “War and the Cycle of Relative Power,” 949.
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grave mistakes in foreign policy, assuming roles and taking actions that are out of 
balance with their respective places in the power structure.
Oversteer is largely a phenomenon that affects perception, rather than a force 
driving the action itself. It falls into the category of misperception, a corruptive influence 
on the effectiveness of a nation’s foreign policy. “It is our belief that most major powers 
are similarly constrained regarding early identification of critical points, similarly 
sensitive to their imminent arrival, and similarly subject to abrupt over-reaction.”112 
Thus the decision for war is often the result of misperceptions about trends and roles in 
the international system.
Following upon the work of Doran and Parsons, Doran’s former student Dale 
Copeland pursued the idea that initiation of major power war in mathematically 
significant situations, while affected by miscalculation and irrationality, remains the 
result of extensive calculation and assured rationality. Copeland believed the work of his 
predecessors, while recognizing the primacy of power, rested on the liberal notion that 
peace is the natural state of the system and war an aberration.
Furthermore while perceptive effects such as oversteer may be a corrupting 
influence on rationality, they are important insofar as they affect projections of power. 
Copeland’s work coincides nicely with that of Doran and Parsons, for decisions of grand 
strategic import are made according to perception. While his theory of economic 
interdependence is associated with defensive realism, in his broader theorizing Copeland
112 Ibid, 951.
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purposefully uses insights from both areas of scholarship to build a predictive theory of 
major war. From offensive realism he takes an emphasis on the use of hard-line policies 
to maintain relative power as a bulwark against future threats, usually demonstrated in 
terms of relative decline vis-a-vis another great power or alliance of smaller powers that 
performs the same function.113 He combines this with defensive realists’ concern for the 
possibility such policies can be destabilizing and increase the likelihood of inadvertent 
war.114
Copeland’s rationale is straightforward: “The rational security-seeking state must 
constantly grapple with profound least-of-many-evils choices.”115 Another way of 
putting it would be that states seek continuously to maximize their power positions in as 
many areas and spheres as possible. Copeland develops his idea, essentially the same as 
that put forth by Morgenthau, into a model of behavior that attempts to explain the 
probability of major war over periods of time that explains the severity of state policy, 
and therefore the likelihood of major war. The treatment of the concept of severity of 
state policy and its results has varied widely. Those who concentrate on crises argue the
113 Copeland clarified the theoretical derivation of the model he put forth in The 
Origins o f Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000) in a follow-up piece, 
“Theory and History in the Study of Major War,” Security Studies 10, no. 4 (Summer 
2001), 212. For reviews of his synthesis of these two logical threads, see also Jeffrey W. 
Taliaferro, “Realism, Power Shifts, and Major War,” Security Studies 10, no. 4 (Summer 
2001), 145-78 and Robert G. Kaufman, “On the Uses and Abuses of History in 
International Relations Theory: Dale Copeland’s, “The Origins of Major War,” Security 
Studies 10, no. 4 (Summer 2001), 179-211.
114 Copeland, “Theory and History,” 212.
115 Copeland, Origins o f Major War, 36.
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acceptance of high risks is natural to a state facing certain long-term decline in the 
absence of drastic changes in policy.116
Dynamic differentials theory integrates his perspectives to build a model of war 
by showing how rational states use both sets of insights in their cost-benefit analysis 
regarding war. Copeland’s theory demonstrates that when relative decline appears both 
severe and inevitable, enough so to outweigh the risks of inadvertent war inherent in 
pursuing hard-line policies, a great power will choose the types of grand strategies that 
could bring about systemic war. His model illustrates the choice for major war by a 
declining great power, as well as the choice to enact a grand strategy that makes such a 
war more likely.
The timing of war initiation depends greatly on the state’s estimation of the 
inevitability and extent of the relative decline; the higher the expectation of an inevitable 
and deep decline, the more the state will be inclined to launch preventative war for purely 
security reasons. Copeland derived a set of criteria to estimate the “time lag” between 
perception of such a decline, general acceptance of its certitude in the absence of 
preventative war, and the relative economic and potential power of each state in the 
system, particularly the one that is declining.
116 See especially Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 11-2, 342-47,363-68; Richard Ned 
Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 61- 
2; and Zeev Maoz, Paths to Conflict (Boulder, CO.: Westview, 1982), 2-3, 89-90. See 
also van Evera, Causes o f War, 79-80.
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In his investigation of such strategies Copeland wisely chooses not to attempt to 
build a universal theory of war initiation. He argues instead that when an international 
system parallels the assumptions of his theory, the system is more likely to move toward 
major war. This all-too-uncommon admittance of theoretical limitation lends credence to 
his search for effective explanations of international phenomena through theorizing. 
Historical cases that demonstrate a theory does not work in all places at all times are easy 
to find; scholarship that instead seeks explanation of phenomena only when 
corresponding to the assumptions of the logic rest on more unassailable foundations.
The greatest success of the dynamic differentials approach lay in converting a 
traditionally dichotomous dependent variable, the occurrence or absence of major war, 
into a continuous variable describing the probability of major war. Furthermore, by 
completing the theoretical work prior to the application of history, Copeland avoided the 
common charge that systemic theory is created by reading certain periods of international 
history and then tested on those same periods. He also sidestepped neatly the criticism 
Robert Keohane leveled against Waltz concerning the “smuggling in” of hidden unit- 
level variables to make systemic theory work.117 These advances are of great importance 
to the success of a combined structural and mathematical approach to understanding 
grand strategy.
However, several criticisms can be leveled at the present use of dynamic 
differentials as an approach. These debilitate the promise of combining the structural and
117 Robert O. Keohane, ’’Theory of World Politics,” in Neo-realism and Its 
Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 158-203.
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mathematical approaches and must be addressed. To begin, current uses of this approach 
are too often seduced by the power of their own logic into defining variables with more 
precision than can be justified. Copeland, for example, defines economic power as a 
state’s total relative economic activity, while his potential power includes all the capital 
and resources, both physical and human, that could be eventually translated into 
measurable economic output, but have not yet been done for whatever reasons. This 
includes, but is not limited to, population size, raw material reserves, technological 
levels, educational development, unused fertile territory, etc.118
Such variables are very precise, but also incorrect when one considers that 
decisions for war are made on perceptions, not facts. The validity of Copeland’s theory, 
like most systemic approaches, was tested against several periods of history to determine 
not only if it was correct in its prediction of major war. However, Copeland took the 
extra and vital step of examining whether the individuals involved made such choices for 
the reasons hypothesized by his model. In this he explicitly rejected the approach most 
closely associated with Milton Friedman, which argues only the correlation needs to be 
tested. As Copeland noted, such an approach allows one to be “right,” but for the wrong
118 Dale Copeland, “Realism and the Origins of Major Power War” 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia, [1998]), 7. He noted collection of statistics by 
the Correlates of War project includes data for “demographic” power, but points out the 
lack of any realist theory that uses such information for deductively-derived predictions, 
except one attempt by Charles Doran to consider the difference between “latent” and 
“manifest” power in his cycle theory. See Charles F. Doran, Systems in Crisis: New 
Imperatives o f High Politics at Century’s End (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), Ch. 2.
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reasons.119 Only by examining historical documents that reflect the rationale behind the 
decision for or against major war, as well as the timing of such wars, can the theory be 
tested for true descriptiveness.
Yet Copeland, and indeed all those who seek this theoretical path, allow for far 
greater descriptiveness than warranted by data that is speculative at best. Indicators of 
international power remain precisely that -  indicators, not listings. Power remains a 
wooly concept, fluctuating between and within the minds of individuals. The actual 
differentials in state power and the actual trends of those differentials are far less useful 
than the perceptions regarding both held by decision makers. Precise numbers only 
matter if policy makers use them as the primary source in forming their perceptions.120
The unfinished nature of the approach described above displays most clearly 
when its authors’ general models of international behavior are examined side-by-side. 
Copeland argues the dominant and declining state will be the one most driven to initiate 
major war to prevent what its leaders believe will be an otherwise inevitable and 
unacceptable future. Whereas Charles Doran argued uncertainty about the future 
contributes to the tendency to act irrationally, Copeland believed the greater a state’s 
certainty about future power, the greater the likelihood that it will initiate major war.
Despite its recurrent difficulties, the techniques described by Doran, Parsons, and 
Copeland describe very well the thought processes of modem realism in American
119 Copeland, “Realism and the Origins of Major Power War,” 27.
120 Consider, for example, ongoing disparities between leading economic 
indicators and consumer confidence, and the roles each play in influencing economic 
strategy.
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foreign policy circles. Almost without exception its adherents hold sacrosanct the 
insights of Carl von Clausewitz, most especially his formulation that war is a mere 
continuation of policy by other means.121 They argue war should not be viewed as an 
isolated act and cannot be understood without reference to the aims of larger national 
interests. Their concern with relative power, in both its bilateral and multilateral sense, 
fits the model’s assumptions. So does their conclusion about the primary motivator for 
behavior: power tomorrow depends on what one does with power today.
Structural realists who use the mathematical, power differential approach 
understand that the systemic pressures they identify and the ways in which they govern 
behavior are not always deterministic. Doran’s theory shows very little faith in policy 
makers. Copeland’s theory may show too much. They do believe, however, that they are 
more important in general than other factors and must not be neglected in explanations of 
outcomes in international relations.
For structural realists, both offensive and defensive, the concept of opportunity 
costs plays an important role in the creation of grand strategy and pursuit of national 
policy. States are opportunistic, but cannot pursue every prospect, for not even a 
“hyperpower” such as the United States today has unlimited resources. Strategies evolve 
under constraints of domestic politics, budget and, most importantly, the number and 
quality of man-hours to invest in national security. The question for grand strategy is not, 
“Is the cost-benefit analysis of this policy show the venture to increase power?” as often
121 von Clausewitz, On War, 119 and elsewhere.
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as it is, “Which combination of strategies and policies will yield the greatest power 
increases?” States weigh their options carefully and choose those situations in which 
their leaders believe their efforts will yield the greatest gain in relative power. Areas of 
interest that offer lesser gains Eire ‘nice-to-have’s, usually neglected in favor of more 
profitable enterprises.
The behavioral logic underlying international relations theory can be used to 
describe many systems beyond the actions of states in the international system. It applies 
equally well to the behavior of molecules of air inside a balloon, animals in the 
wilderness, or billiard balls on a table. It even tells us much about the development of the 
international relations literature itself. If one replaces realist specification of ‘states’ and 
‘international system’ with specifications o f ‘theoretical schools’ and ‘the field of 
international relations theory’, behavioral logic applies equally well. It argues for 
realism’s emergence as a school and depicts very well the subsequent development of 
international theory. Attempts to debunk the logic of realism have shown a remarkable 
degree of parallel with the assumptions of realism. Surprisingly, this characteristic of the 
literature has not been noticed by those most involved in creating it.
Much like states in an international system, theories in a system of scholarly 
debate exhibit many characteristics similar to those attributed to states by structural 
realism. Recognition of the presence of a dominant school of thought exerts pressure on 
other approaches to engage in the intellectual equivalents of systemic response: banding 
together non-realist theories into a competing school of thought (alliance formation), 
asserting previously separate ideas fall under the realist umbrella (bandwagoning), or 
declaring neutrality in the theoretical debates (hiding).
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The first of these behaviors, alliance formation, has been the hallmark of recent 
scholarly attempts to work outside realist models. This approach tries to balance realist 
dominance by unifying non-realist theories into a separate and competing school of 
thought. One such school is constructivism, for it emerged from the start as a critique of 
structural realism. However, to view constructivist theory is an IR paradigm in the 
manner of realism and liberalism is misleading -  it is more of a methodology than a 
model.122 A number of constructivists agree power matters in international relations.123 
Where they part company with realists is in their idea of power as a social rather than a 
material concept.
Understanding constructivism begins somewhat ironically with the words of 
realist father-figure Hans Morgenthau, who reminded readers that a “nation as such is 
obviously not an empirical thing. A nation as such cannot be seen.”124 The term 
“nation” refers to a group of people and organizations that makes foreign policy.125 
Alexander Wendt used this caution as the starting point for a new way of looking at 
international relations that did not accept all realist assumptions. What matters, 
according to Wendt, are not the raw facts of material distributions of one kind or another,
122 J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” International Studies Review 5, 
no. 3 (September 2003), 325.
123 See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge, 
NY: New York University Press, 1999), 13-4.
124 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 117.
125 The set of actors obviously varies among states and ideological systems. In 
international relations theory in general and rational actor models in particular, the term 
“nation” refers to those inside a state that affect foreign policy choices. Realist and 
neorealist models eliminate differences in internal process by using this aggregate term.
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but their interpretation and signification by each state in the international system. He 
developed Morgenthau’s reminder into a school of thought based on the view that actors 
“act on the basis of the meanings that objects have for them, and meanings are socially 
constructed.”126 Wendt stated what emerged from this foundation directly, if not entirely 
clearly:
Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes 
the following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for 
international political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are 
intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests 
are an important part constructed by these social structures, rather than 
given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.127
Wendt remains a state-centric scholar of international relations, but he urges us 
not to take states and their interests for granted. Restated for clarity, Wendt’s key 
assumptions are: (1) realists get it right when they concentrate on the state as the primary 
actor, but should be careful not to forget that there are a variety of other important actors; 
(2) it is not ‘the real world’ that matters in understanding behavior so much as how policy 
makers define it; and (3) the groups and views that form identity and interest are decided 
by the actors themselves, not by biology or political processes.
Unfortunately for Wendt’s insights, the language of constructivism, rooted in the 
formidable vocabulary of the philosophy underlying social sciences, can be off-putting to 
even the most learned scholar. J. Samuel Barkin noted, “Part of the reason so many
126 Alexander Wendt, “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics,” 
in The Return o f Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrick 
Kratochwil (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 50.
127 Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 
American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1984), 359.
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scholars in the field talk past each other when discussing issues of paradigm and 
epistemology is terminological confusion.”128 This drawback is especially true of 
constructivism, for how many scholars can honestly admit they were able to understand 
the material it has produced? It is little wonder, though, that constructivism has been 
understood little and misunderstood more. Its grounding in the language of metaphysics 
condemns constructivist ideas to the periphery of international relations theory, especially 
among those more likely to create foreign policy than publish scholarly papers.129
This is highly unfortunate for both fields, for constructivism confronts structural 
realism in a novel and sophisticated way by calling into question its underlying 
assumptions regarding the irresistible nature of anarchy and its profound effects on state 
behavior. Wendt postulates the violence or peacefulness of a system is not determined by 
anarchy, but by the members of the system and ways in which they choose to relate to 
one another. States that do not identify closely will be inherently combative in their 
relations while those that share culture and goals will be generally peaceful. In other 
words, as Wendt states, “anarchy is what states make of it.”130
128 Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” 326.
129 Wendt’s major works related to this topic are “The Agent-Structure Problem 
in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41, no. 3 (Spring 1987), 
335-70; “Bridging the Theory/Meta-Theory Gap in International Relations,” Review o f  
International Studies 17,1991, 383-92; “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), 391-426; 
and “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer1995), 
71-81.
130 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It, 391-425.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121
Constructivism brings both interest and condemnation from IR scholars.
Structural realists such as Dale Copeland counter that future uncertainty dims the 
prospect for building trust and cooperation. Wendt’s offered possibility of a peaceful 
outcome based on shared identity and security interests is shattered by the fear and 
insecurity inherent in an uncertain future.131 Yet many structural realists show a 
tendency to explain anomalies in their concept of international relations in ways that look 
very much like constructivism. The debate between structural realism and constructivism 
appears to have much to offer the development of American international relations 
scholarship.
Struggling to deal with their traditions of exceptionalism and realism, American 
scholarship appears to have closed the twentieth century where it began—with 
incomplete understandings of both concepts and the ways in which they inform the 
making of U.S. foreign policy. This attitude would be highly misleading and a discredit 
to the field. IR scholars confront issues flowing from the implacability of man’s nature 
and the ways in which it infuses the world of international politics. Insecurity, fear, 
uncertainty, pride, and such have been issues studied by humanity’s best thinkers 
throughout history and will continue to fascinate and confound social sciences.
131 Dale Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A 
Review Essay,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), 187-212.
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Conclusion
The study of U.S. grand strategy offers a rich area from which to draw on both IR 
theory and cultural distinctiveness. While some scholars, such as those developing 
structural realism, continue to make progress toward understanding the forces that 
influence state behavior, they will not be able to write a truly comprehensive and 
predictive model of international relations theory. No model predicts a Napoleon, a Mao, 
or a Gandhi. Neither does it specify religious belief, political preference, or cultural 
identification. On the other hand, those who understand the concept of American 
exceptionalism cannot frilly explain American actions. The United States, in pursuit of 
foreign policy goals, contravenes its fundamental ideals on numerous occasions and often 
in flagrant manner. Yet the research done is of great importance for those who analyze 
American behavior in international relations.
Seldom do foreign policy decision makers have quiet, reflective moments in 
which they may grapple with the larger implications of the world they create. 
Consequences of foreign behavior that may arise six months later can feel as remote to 
these harried souls as those arising six decades later. Yet philosophical and ideational 
beliefs about humanity, goodness, and preferred outcomes underlie even the most 
mundane decisions. It is these underpinnings that form the most reliable guide to 
mapping any nation’s grand strategies, decisions, and policies. They can and must be 
found and identified if one wishes to truly understand the decisions made.
In any realm of decision-making there are the things one wants to accomplish and 
developments to which one must react. A recurring pattern during presidencies is that 
proactive approaches are overtaken by reactive modes of crisis response. The pursuit of
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larger aims proclaimed so assuredly during campaigns is usually subsumed by a series of 
calamities that must be addressed, especially in the area of international politics. When 
one of these types of situations provides decision makers with an opportunity for 
addressing the other type is the time when the intellectual underpinnings that help us 
understand grand strategy will beckon scholarly investigation most invitingly. Deeply 
held desires react with ingrained perceptions of foreign policy requirements and offer 
many angles from which one may glimpse the thoughts behind the decisions that came 
afterward.
This kind of moral scrutiny usually generates a fascinating body of speeches, 
writings, discussions, and memoirs detailing the feelings and discussions of those 
involved in charting their nation’s strategic course. Participants feel a need to set down 
for posterity their justifications for their positions. These documents provide a solid basis 
for examining the beliefs underlying national policy. The strategies of the last years of 
the Cold War are likely the most extensively documented in history and thus some of the 
most accessible for foreign policy analysts. They are therefore very useful for the 
demonstration of this work’s methodology for bringing theoretical insights to the 
understanding of grand strategy.
In the 1950s George Kennan provided a realist understanding of the nature of the 
developing international situation and the mentality required of American strategists to 
meet it. Paul Nitze modified this strategy by globalizing it. In the 1960s and early 1970s 
Henry Kissinger modified it again by seeking to increase the number of players and 
decrease tensions. Their understanding of America’s international situation and beliefs 
about the world shaped their strategic choices in ways that made sense at the time.
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However, by 1976 the United States had become so embroiled in the complexities of its 
own superpower responsibilities that its people longed for philosophical reassurance.
Americans had become somewhat adept at the uses of power in the two hundred 
years since the Declaration of Independence set forth American values and resolve.
Faced with their first real international threat since 1812, Americans were no longer 
confident in their ability to remain true to their cherished ideas about the purposes of 
power. The world had changed, American views had changed, and the United States 
showed signs of preparing for a shift in its grand strategy. Applying the methodology 
described above will demonstrate the ways in which using scholarly approaches would 
have helped foresee the significant strategic reorientation that was about to take place.
Historical Review: American Power Perceptions 
Americans are unique in the history of international relations. Their perceptions 
and beliefs are unlike those belonging to any other nation that assumed great power 
status. The American military experience by itself, as John Shy illustrated, has been most 
unusual.132 Successes from the Seven Years War of 1756-1763 through the Second 
World War vastly outnumbered failures in both number and memory. Cultural legacies 
of geographic insularity from the affairs of truly serious world powers, the presence of 
non-threatening neighbors on all borders, the conquering and integration of its frontier, 
the pervasiveness of fundamentalist religion, and the strategic meaning of constituting a
132 John Shy, “The American Military Experience: History and Learning,” 
Journal o f Interdisciplinary History 1, no. 2 (Winter 1971), 205-28.
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nation of immigrants combined to form a most unusual Union.133 Several dominant 
beliefs about international relations emerged from the American experience.
First is an enduring preoccupation with good and evil. The United States has a 
cherished legacy of injecting as much justice in systems of human organization as they 
can hold. American political culture cannot accept the idea that the United States must 
act abroad in ways that contravene enduring American ideals of justice. Second, 
Americans are unremittingly confident. After two centuries of remarkable success in 
their efforts at creating a new society, Americans had a justifiably optimistic ideology 
and, in Sir Denis Brogan’s phrase, an “illusion of omnipotence.”134 They had survived 
serious, but not overly dangerous threats from displaced natives and foreign imperial 
powers. The only serious threat to American security after 1814 had been internal, and 
the tenacity of the American Confederacy became a source of national pride.135
Emerging triumphant and virtually unscathed from two global conflicts in the 
early twentieth century seemed to further justify American self-assurance. They do not 
often acknowledge that American military might arrived in Europe after its powers were 
exhausted from years of relentless struggle. Similarly, the Pacific theater was
133 Colin S. Gray, “National Style in Strategy,” International Security 6, no. 2 
(Fall 1981), 23-4. See also Jack P. Greene, The Intellectual Construction o f America: 
Exceptionalism and Identity from 1492 to 1800 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1993) and Robert Dallek, The American Style o f Foreign Policy: Cultural 
Style and Foreign Affairs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
134 Sir Denis Brogan, American Aspects (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), Ch.
2 .
135 Robert E. Lee and “Stonewall” Jackson are regarded today as genuinely 
national heroes, praised by American historians for their ideals, battlefield tactics, and 
valor in their defeated cause.
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asymmetrical warfare between a desperate Japanese empire that had little faith in its 
chances of success and an emerging superpower. The United States had never competed 
directly with an equivalent nation that had focuses its entire attention on the rivalry, nor 
faced the ignominy of losing a fair fight.
These “soft” conditions were not advantageous for the development of American 
strategic thought. Nor were did they challenge the United States to produce strategic 
thinkers. As Henry Kissinger lamented, Americans do not think geopolitically and tend 
to be unwilling to sacrifice their nearest and dearest for concepts like international 
equilibrium -  even if American security rests upon the preservation, or restoration of 
such a balance, or equilibrium. This is not acceptable language in American political 
culture.136
This is not to say the United States never had grand strategies before George 
Kennan; all nations and their leaders have them, regardless of the degree of sophistication 
and articulation involved in their formulation and pursuit. Indeed, the earliest American 
leaders were quite capable analysts of the distribution of international power.137 
However, nearly two centuries of unchallenged growth and success created an 
environment in which this kind of thinking was not required. The United States did not
136 Most notably in Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), Ch. 1 and Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 914. See also Gray, “National Style in Strategy,” 33.
137 See John Lamberton Harper, American Machiavelli: Alexander Hamilton and 
the Origins o f U.S. Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
esp. Ch. 17, “Hamilton’s ‘Grand Plan’.”
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produce great strategists or sophisticated grand strategies prior to the 1950s because it did 
not want or need them enough to create them.
After Germany failed to achieve mastery of Europe in the 1940s, American 
strategists turned to preventing the Soviet Union from doing the same. For thirty years 
the United States followed a grand strategy dominated by Cold War concerns and hopes 
for peaceful relations between the two superpowers. To achieve these it implemented a 
strategy of containment that sought to preserve the status quo of bilateral relations while 
buttressing its position by building the power of democracies in general and Western 
allies in particular.
At the conclusion of the Second World War the United States believed it was 
destined to emerge as the world’s most advanced nation in every important realm of 
power. In the political realm it was the most representative, in military matters it held a 
monopoly on nuclear devastation, in economic competition it was most productive, and 
in the moral contest it was the most protective of individual rights and freedoms of any 
system yet devised. As other recent belligerents rebuilt and reclaimed some of their 
relative power, the United States expected it would descend gracefully from temporary 
preponderance to enduring preeminence. The United States’ postwar objective was thus 
deceptively simple: prevent any disruption of this optimistic and expected future.
Postwar settlements were concluded with the understanding that any concessions 
made by allies would be far outweighed by the benefits of lasting peace and security. 
Efforts along these lines continued until 1947, at which point the Truman administration 
ceased its efforts to negotiate a formal end to the Second World War. Disturbingly 
hostile developments in Europe and the start of war in Korea cultivated a growing
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opinion in the United States that the Soviet Union desired worldwide acceptance of its 
ideology and, whenever expedient, would threaten international order to get it.138 
American leaders concentrated their efforts on finding ways to prevent Soviet leaders 
from achieving their ambitions of instability and revolution—goals that threatened to 
disrupt the optimistic future Americans believed was their just inheritance after rescuing 
the rest of the world from its self-destructive tendencies.
The security of the United States required both its physical defense from the 
growing might of the Soviet Union and the frustration of Soviet designs on other strategic 
areas of the globe. To this end the United States’ first truly strategic figure of the 
twentieth century, George Kennan, argued convincingly that the Soviet Union would 
benefit more from the psychological malaise that afflicted states bordering the Soviet 
Union than either the strength of the Soviet military or the appeal of international 
communism.139 He viewed these societies as temporarily weakened but essentially 
healthy. As such his proposed strategy centered on the idea of rebuilding these states into 
stable and democratic partners in the international order. This would be accomplished by
138 Robert Osgood reminded historical observers in 1986, “It took overwhelming 
evidence that Moscow was the opponent, not the supporter, of this new international 
order to transform the American post-war role from regional partner and impartial 
mediator of Soviet-British differences to major antagonist in a bilateral power struggle.” 
Robert E. Osgood, “Reagan’s Foreign Policy in a Postwar Perspective,” in Reagan’s 
Leadership and the Atlantic Alliance: Views from Europe and America, ed. Walter 
Goldstein (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), 13.
139 See George Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” available at 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1 /kennan.htm, accessed 30 
January 2005 and John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f  
Postwar American National Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 32-3.
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substantial economic assistance and political support, rather than military commitments, 
to shore up those states in greatest peril of descent into totalitarianism.
Of particular value to American grand strategy would be the United States’ 
reputation as an “arsenal of democracy,” able and willing to assist those states under 
threat of Soviet domination. This strategy was based on unswerving American belief in 
the preference of most of these societies for the American model, rather than that of the 
Soviet Union. It projected the Soviets would lose influence as the world in general and 
Europe in particular rebuilt from the devastation of war. By playing the twin roles of 
shining exemplar of democratic ideals and active sponsor of efforts to secure them 
elsewhere the United States would achieve its goal of a stable and hospitable 
international order, comprised largely of democratic states, in which it would be the 
lasting preeminent power.
According to this view the Soviet Union would amount to no more than a 
temporary danger. It was destined to hold a power that ranked below the United States 
and above the restored European states. Soviet leaders, having lost much of their 
influence and found their desires for expansion frustrated by a string of failures, would 
discover a need to ease their hostility and negotiate with the United States. Kennan 
believed containment of Soviet expansionism at vital strong points of democracy would 
force upon the Soviets acceptance perhaps not of their eventual relegation to a secondary 
role, but at the very least a peaceful coexistence that is a prerequisite of stable 
international order.
The purpose of containment was to prevent the Soviet domination of the industrial 
centers of Eurasia. The goal was not destruction of Soviet power, as it had been against
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Germany, but preventing its growth beyond the abilities of the United States to defeat it, 
if necessary.140 Kennan summarized the logic of containment in these terms:
It [is] essential to us, as it was to Britain, that no single Continental land 
power should come to dominate the entire Eurasian land mass. Our 
interest has lain rather in the maintenance of some sort of stable balance 
among the powers of the interior, in order that none of them should effect 
the subjugation of the others, conquer the seafaring fringes of the land 
mass, become a great sea power as well as land power, shatter the position 
of England, and enter -  as in these circumstances it certainly would -  on 
an overseas expansion hostile to ourselves and supported by the immense 
resources of the interior of Europe and Asia.141
Kennan argued this future would come about only if the United States succeeded 
in forming, strengthening, and maintaining its alliance of democracies to counter the 
growing strength of the international communist movement. If the United States failed in 
this, then other possibilities for the course of international relations existed. The 
establishment and spread of communist ideals throughout Europe would tip the balance, 
placing the relative power of the United States and its remaining allies below the power 
of the Soviet Union and its international communist movement. The United States 
accepted Kennan’s view of things. It adopted his strategy of containment and 
implemented its policy of rebuilding the Western world.
NSC 20/4 and its successor, NSC-68, put forth the goal of producing “A Rapid 
Build-up of Political, Economic, and Military Strength in the Free World.”142 The basic
140 Barry R. Posen and Stephen van Evera, “Defense Policy and the Reagan 
Administration,” International Security 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983), 7.
141 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New York: New 
American Library, 1951), 10.
142 This phrase is from the table of contents of NSC-68.
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aim of containment, as framed by George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and other 
strategists in the 1940s was to prevent the industrial power of Eurasia from falling under 
the control of any single state.143 Any state controlling this area could threaten the 
security of the United States, since the total power of Europe and Asia would far exceed 
that of the United States. The economy of such an area could produce a war potential 
that the United States could not match. Thus the United States must not allow such a 
superstate to arise.
Containment was perhaps the United States’ first truly geopolitical grand strategy. 
It opposed the uncontrolled growth of the Soviet state, rather than communism, although 
the two purposes were often called upon to justify the each other. As Barry R. Posen and 
Stephen Van Evera noted, the logic of containment would have identified the Soviet 
Union as America’s adversary even if it had abandoned communism for democracy, as 
long as it remained strong and aggressive.144
Ideas, events, and personalities intervened to challenge the sufficiency of 
Kennan’s approach. The Berlin blockade, the Czech coup, the successful test of a Soviet 
atomic bomb, and Chiang’s defeat in China provided support for those in the Truman 
administration who suspected that the Soviet Union was both a revolutionary state bent 
on world domination and the director of a unified, international Communist movement.
143 See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment, 873-87; George F. 
Kennan, Realities o f American Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1966); and 
Walter Lippmann, The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1947).
144 Posen and van Evera, “Defense Policy,” 7.
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This fear translated quickly to the American public: A Gallup poll taken in 1948 
revealed that 77 percent of Americans had become convinced that the Soviet Union 
sought to be “the ruling power of the world.”145
Facing a more direct Soviet threat than anticipated, the United States altered 
Kennan’s original plan for containment. Instead of holding back Soviet expansion in 
vital areas of American interest -  Kennan’s “strong points” -  it sought to repel 
communism and Soviet influence wherever it appeared in the world. This represented a 
significant shift in the manner in which this American grand strategy would function, 
raising considerably the strategy’s cost in effort and treasure. Yet its fundamental 
premise remained constant: the United States would react defensively to Russian 
attempts to gain power in what columnist Walter Lippmann popularized as a “cold war.” 
Throughout the myriad superpower confrontations of the next three decades the 
American grand strategy of containment remained one designed to prevent Soviet leaders 
from gaining the power they needed to threaten the stability of the international order 
and, in turn, the projected long-term preeminence of American power.146
In 1960-61, the United States almost certainly could have won a war against the 
Soviet Union, under most probable conditions: not a war of attrition, with both sides 
taking comparably damage and then the more resilient side staying the course longer, but
145 George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971, 3 vols. (New 
York: Random House, 1972), 1721. Quoted in Ernest R. May, “Introduction: NSC 68: 
The Theory and Politics of Strategy,” in American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 
68, ed. Ernest R. May (Boston: Bedford Books, 1993), 2.
146 Taken from the text of NSC 20/4, 1948, which served as a model for NSC 68 
and the containment strategy as a whole.
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a war of annihilation.147 The Soviet Union, unwilling to live with this knowledge, 
aggressively sought parity. By the late 1960s it became clear that this would be 
incompatible with long-term American security. American decline, Soviet growth, and 
the increasingly complex nature of the broader spectrum of international relations 
convinced American strategists they needed a new approach.
American strategic planners abandoned the strategy of achieving and sustaining 
meaningful superiority. The American defense community decided it was too expensive, 
probably impossible, and unnecessary for American security. The sought deterrent 
sufficiency, rather than equivalence or superiority. What would prevent the steady 
concession of power to the Soviet Union? At this point Henry Kissinger supplied an 
answer that sprang from his uniquely complex and historical perspective.
Kissinger, the second major strategic thinker the United States produced in this 
conflict, brought two major modifications to the strategy of containment. The first was 
the idea that the United States did not have to do all the heavy lifting of containing Soviet 
growth. To this end he brought the offshore balancing strategy of nineteenth century 
Great Britain to twentieth century American grand strategy. Kissinger sought the 
assistance of other powers, including non-democratic states such as China, to help sustain 
the balance of power. The second idea was that the risks of the Cold War could be 
ameliorated by lowering tensions in the bilateral relationship. By making finding areas in 
which agreements and concessions could ease the adversarial excesses of interaction, the
147 Gray, “National Style in Strategy,” 36. By “win” the author referred to 
achieving political objectives.
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danger that the situation would escalate into a war that threatened America’s optimistic 
future would be lessened significantly.
One observer quipped with great insight, “The Cold War went on for half a 
century because the Americans refused to win and the Russians refused to lose.”148 The 
Nixon-Kissinger modification of detente was ultimately more a holding operation than a 
settled strategy.149 It proved successful but not sufficient. American power continued to 
decline while the rest of the world -  especially the Soviet Union -  grew stronger and 
more assertive. American strategists came to understand what they needed was not 
further modification of their strategy to make it work better, but replacement of it with a 
strategy better suited to the situation.
In the three decades following the Second World War the sense of fear and 
revulsion created by the international behavior of the Soviet Union had given rise to more 
traditional, power-based American approaches to international politics. It is clear that by 
1976 that feeling had been largely supplanted in the hearts of many Americans and others 
around the world by fear and revulsion at the behavior of the United States.150 The
148 A gentleman from Yugoslavia in the audience at one of Alexander Haig’s 
public lectures made this statement to him. Alexander Haig, Jr., Inner Circles: How 
America Changed the World (New York: Warner Books, 1992), 554.
149 Robert W. Tucker, “America in Decline: The Foreign Policy of “Maturity,” 
Foreign Affairs 58, no. 3 (Spring 1980), 456.
150 Kissingerian is a term that brings to the minds of foreign policy scholars a 
milieu of wide-ranging policies, but one central theme of the importance of achieving 
stability in international relations, whether achieved through nuclear standoff, a balance 
of conventional forces, or short-term policies of instability to trigger a process that would 
ultimately become stable. The development of his worldview can be traced by examining 
his voluminous writings over the course of his career, specifically his doctoral
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retreat from Vietnam was not merely a disavowal of Wilsonianism as a foreign policy, 
but a disavowal of Wilsonianism as a metaphor. 151
Deceitful maneuvers such as invasion of the Bay of Pigs in 1961, continuation of 
a costly and unjust conflict in Southeast Asia to protect interests few believed were 
strategic, and a multitude of other major and minor choices combined to disillusion and 
dishearten the American populace. “The anti-war movement of the Vietnam era was a 
thoroughly American phenomenon. The United States of Lyndon Johnson and Richard 
Nixon was judged, and found wanting, in terms of American values.” 152 After thirty 
years of a Cold War with no battles, few victories, and no apparent end, the American 
people were tired of making moral compromises, especially when they so often appeared 
to bring the United States no closer to peace and security. By the mid-1970s many 
American citizens felt their nation had sacrificed too much of its exceptionalism in favor 
of the false expediency of realpolitik.
At the same time many observers of international relations had good reasons for 
believing the balance of power had begun to shift dramatically away from the United 
States. The American media broadcast almost daily scenes of protest over issues such as 
the Vietnam War, energy policy, nuclear disarmament, and human rights that indicated 
the United States suffered internal turmoil and dissatisfaction with the policies of its own
dissertation, A World Restored; Nuclear Weapons; White House Years (Kissinger’s 
memoirs covering November 1968-January 1973) and his memoirs covering January 
1973 to the resignation of President Nixon, Years o f Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown, 
1982). A summary analysis of his worldview can be found in Robert D. Schulzinger, 
Henry Kissinger: Doctor o f Diplomacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).
151 See William F. Buckley, Jr., “Human Rights and Foreign Policy,” Foreign 
Affairs 58, no. 1 (Fall 1979), 781.
152 Gray, “National Style in Strategy,” 26-7.
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government. Of the last three chief executives the first declined to run again, the second 
left office under threat of removal for his crimes, and the third, having never been elected 
by the American people, was summarily rejected by the electorate at its first opportunity.
Congress had been uprooted in a similar fashion by an energetic freshman class in 
1974 that used its unique mandate from the voters to demand and get shake-ups of 
traditional power structures and hierarchies, a compelling indicator of the growing storm 
of popular discontent with the performance of the government. 153 This new class of 
politician stoked existing discontent with media savvy to make this discontent larger. By 
the time they completed their first year in office many had taken prominent seats of 
power and changed the long-standing traditions built by the old order.
All this happened while worrisome trends appeared to be plaguing American 
economic power. The 1970s opened with a recession, a railway strike, and the first mass 
work stoppage ever by the U.S. postal service. The following year two strikes by 
longshoremen on all three coasts shut down shipping. Memories of the Great Depression 
made policy makers unwilling to risk increasing unemployment by using restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policy to contain inflation. 1 5 4  Instead, wage and price controls were 
introduced in August 1971. President Nixon had to take the American dollar off the gold 
standard. The American economy had been shown to be highly vulnerable to the whims
153 A tremendously insightful account of the election of and changes by the 
tumultuous Congressional freshman class of 1974 can be found in Hedrick Smith, The 
Power Game: How Washington Works (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989).
1 5 4  Albert E. Schwent, “Compensation in the 1970s,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
January 30, 2003, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20030124ar05pl.htm, 
accessed 7 November 2004.
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of foreign oil merchants during the Arab oil embargo of 1973, which led to rapid inflation 
and another recession. In 1975 80,000 employees of the state of Pennsylvania conducted 
the first legal strike by state workers. Finally unemployment rose dramatically 
throughout the early 1970s and especially during the year preceding the 1976 campaign 
(Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Seasonal Adjusted Unemployment Level, in Thousands, Aged 16 Years
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Source: Bureau o f Labor Statistics, Series ID: LNS13000000, Public Data 
Query, available at http://data.bls.gov, accessed 7 November 2004.
Coincident with rising unemployment were rises in the cost of goods. The 
Consumer Price Index rose steadily during the inflationary cycle of the 1970s, so that by 
1977 the American consumer saw prices on goods more than double from what they were 
just one decade earlier (Fig. 2). American economic woes translated to broader
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
conceptions of American power. The psychological effect of inflation contributed to 
what Carter would later describe as a crisis of confidence in the American spirit. 155  This 
crisis of confidence appeared to allies and enemies alike.
Fig, 2. Seasonally Adjusted Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers
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Source: Bureau o f Labor Statistics, Series ID: CUSR0000SA0, Public Data 
Query, available at http://data.bls.gov, accessed 7 November 2004.
At the same time trends in military power were similarly disheartening. The U.S. 
military suffered both a lack of strength and maneuverability. Military morale and
155  Televised speech delivered July 15, 1979. Text is available in Public Papers 
o f the Presidents o f the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1979, Book II (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1980), 1235-241.
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preparedness were at unprecedented Cold War lows. 156  The Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe (SACEUR) had been warned not to go below decks in one of his 
own ships for fear of violence from the crewmen. 157  Massive bureaucratic entrenchment 
prevented research and development in key areas of short and long term strategic 
competition, specifically high technology such as cruise missile technology and stealth 
systems. An increasingly common belief among many academics and policy makers held 
that the Soviet Union had caught the United States in the military sphere of power.
Exacerbating the demoralization of the American military was the fact that it was 
coming off its first big “loss” since 1812. Americans were embarrassed that their modem 
soldiers, weapons, strategies, and tactics had proved no match for the medieval methods 
the Vietnamese had been using since the time of Tran Hung Dao. 158  The American
156 jn 1 9 7 4  the SACEUR, Alexander Haig, conducted a personal inspection of 
American forces in Europe. He later wrote, “I was appalled by what I found among the 
American units. Alcoholism and drug abuse were serious and widespread, as they were 
nearly everywhere else in the armed forces in the early post-Vietnam period. The war in 
Southeast Asia had drained the armed forces of manpower, morale, and materiel. Our 
state of readiness was way below acceptable standards.” Haig, Inner Circles, 521-22. 
On his inspection tour of the Sixth Fleet he found “ill-disciplined, ill-trained, sometimes 
disoriented sailors operating some of the most sensitive and powerful technology in the 
American arsenal.” Haig concluded, “If the Soviets had attacked, the American force 
that I found would have been hard-pressed to hold them off.”
1 5 7  Haig recalled that he wanted to go below decks during his tour of the Sixth 
Fleet in 1974. A Navy officer advised him not to do it. “Officers don’t go down there, 
General,” he said. “You’re likely to get a knife in the ribs.” Ibid, 521.
158  A figure of almost legendary proportions in Vietnamese history, Tran Hung 
Dao was a brilliant military strategist who defeated two Mongol invasions (in 1284 and 
1287) and became a cultural hero among modem Vietnamese. His strategy of national 
defiance through the tactics of guerrilla warfare enabled the Vietnamese to repel 
invasions by some of the greatest empires in history, including the Mongolian, Chinese, 
French, and American.
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public appeared reluctant to send its sons and daughters to areas of minor interest. It was
quick to characterize any foreign adventure as being in danger of becoming “another
Vietnam.” The Church committee investigations into CIA activities were so defamatory
and crippling to the foreign intelligence services that President Ford complained openly
about them in his State of the Union address:
The crippling of our foreign intelligence services increases the danger of 
American involvement in direct armed conflict Our adversaries are 
encouraged to attempt new adventures while our own ability to monitor 
events and to influence events short of military action is undermined. 
Without effective intelligence capability, the United States stands 
blindfolded and hobbled. 159
In contrast, the Soviet defense apparatus appeared to be enjoying a long-term rise 
vis-a-vis the United States. 160 Andrew Cockbum concluded that by the 1970s, 
“American strategists’ view of the Soviet intentions became progressively gloomier. . .  
Analyses of both Soviet military literature and intelligence data on the increasing 
accuracy of Soviet missiles have produced the widespread impression that the Soviets are
159 President Gerald R. Ford's Address before a Joint Session o f the Congress 
Reporting on the State o f the Union, January 19,1976. The firll text of his speech is 
available at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, http://www.ford.utexas.edu, 
accessed 7 November 2004.
1 6 0  Benjamin S. Lambeth wrote in 1979, “There is little doubt in the minds of 
most observers that whatever their ultimate strategic calculations and goals might be, the 
Soviets were resolutely bent on catching up with the United States in all significant 
aspects of strategic power and regarded the attainment of numerical equality as an 
indispensable precondition for the initial SALT accords that were signed in 1972.” See 
Benjamin S. Lambeth, “The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence,” International 
Security 4, no. 2 (Fall 1979), 22-3.
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indeed thinking of a preemptive first strike that could win a nuclear war.” 161 Meanwhile, 
Americans seemed neither willing nor able to commit forces and accept substantial 
sacrifices to counter Soviet initiatives and its allies began to question the staying power 
and resolve of the United States. 162
These developments point to an American leadership class about to lose power. 
Internal dissatisfaction ran higher than at any time since the Civil War and 
Reconstruction. Numerous American students sought contacts with socialist 
organizations and spoke the language of social revolutionaries, cheering controversial 
counterculture figures such as Che Guevara and Abbie Hoffmann. In the minds of many 
who monitored the sources of American power, the moral and historical strength of the 
United States appeared to be crumbling.
In structural realist terms, the United States was in the midst of unavoidable long­
term decline after its post-World War II peak. The military, economic, and reputation 
relative positions the United States held in 1945 could not be maintained indefinitely.
161 Andrew Cockbum, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New 
York: Random House, 1983).
1 6 2  Christopher M. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence 
and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins, 
1995), 408. Edward A. Koldziej noted in 1980, “Supplementing these images of 
American loss of power and control is what Europeans perceive to be a strategically 
ascendant and expansionist Soviet Union.” See Edward A. Koldziej, “Europe: The 
Partial Partner,” International Security 5, no. 3 (Winter 1980/81), 109. Benjamin S. 
Lambeth echoed this sentiment: “Whether or not the Soviet Union is indeed engaged in a 
concerted effort to achieve some form of strategic superiority over the United States 
within the limits of SALT and detente, its persistently robust force improvement 
activities have sparked increasing concern in the minds of many observers.” Lambeth, 
“Soviet Equivalence,” 23.
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Some sort of decline was to be expected as nations ruined by war recovered from their 
devastation and began to compete again. From 1945 onward it faced a steady decline in 
the percentage of total world power, a situation that successive American administrations 
foresaw easily. This gentle waning seemed inevitable and was accepted by American 
leaders without overwhelming anxiety (111. 4).
Ill 4. American Long Term Power Trends 
(1945-1975 Viewpoint)
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The pressure of the bilateral confrontation with the Soviets had been a driving 
factor in the deterioration of American exceptionalism. As the world had settled into its 
peacetime structure and the fault lines of postwar conflict became clear, the United States 
had become increasingly concerned about the rise of its closest possible challenger, the 
Soviet Union with its growing list of communist allies. The American postwar grand 
strategy of containment had flowed from a preoccupation with the east-west conflict, a
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viewpoint that once held widespread consensus among foreign policy elites, American 
political leaders, and the American people generally.
Increasing Soviet military and economic power had been a growing concern since 
well before the end of the Second World War. No administration could afford to be seen, 
internally or publicly, as failing to match Soviet expansionism. Vance noted, “The 
alliance needed a comprehensive effort to strengthen its political cohesion and its 
defensive capabilities. For a decade there had been disturbing trends in the East-West 
military balance which could eventually threaten Western security.” 163  The Soviets were 
expanding and modernizing their conventional capabilities in Eastern Europe. They were 
gaining new allies in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Taken together these 
indicators helped paint a picture of a Soviet bilateral power trend that was about to meet 
and soon surpass the level of the United States (111. 5) . 164
The decline in American international power began long before anyone became 
seriously alarmed by it. It was only during the late 1960s and 1970s -  when many 
viewed bilateral power trends as intersecting and crossing -  that the larger foreign policy
163 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in American’s Foreign Policy 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 64.
1 6 4  Seyom Brown noted a few years later, “The prevailing consensus in the policy 
community used to be that the Soviets were engaged basically in a drive to pull equal 
with the United States in die strategic arms race . . . the generally accepted assessment 
today is that the Russians, having caught up with the United States in gross strategic 
power, are bent on achieving a sophisticated and highly versatile arsenal. Whether Soviet 
planners truly expect to achieve strategic dominance over the United States is hotly 
debated, but only a minority in the Washington policy community now seriously believe 
that the Russians accept elegant Western views on the desirability of “stable mutual 
deterrence.” See “An End to Grand Strategy,” Foreign Policy, no. 32 (Fall 1978), 23-4.
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community began to identify the problem as unacceptable. As late as 1980 experts were 
trying to make the case for what many had already recognized as a true “window of 
vulnerability” in the early 1980s.165 They immediately pointed to the recent past as the 
cause and sparked a distracting debate that largely ignored the importance of the various 
attempts to form a new paradigm and strategy to address it.
I1L 5. American Long-Term Bilateral Power Trends 
(1945-1975 Viewpoint)
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Henry Kissinger, the principal architect of detente and its most articulate 
defender, became its harshest critic. Although defended by the Secretary of State until 
mid-1975, this modification of containment had clearly failed. Although he focused 
predictably on what detente became after he left office rather than what it had originally
165 Gray, “National Style in Strategy,” 40.
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been, the consequences were not what he hoped them to be. Kissinger tacitly 
acknowledged detente’s failure during his last year in office. He did so by his effort to 
equate detente with the prevention of nuclear war between the superpowers. This failing 
to persuade, he was left reiterating, “The problem of our age is how to manage the 
emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower.” 1 6 6  This was the problem the United 
States had faced since the 1940s -  the growth of Soviet power -  and not solved with 
containment in its various forms.
Conclusions
The American intellectual tradition has been characterized by the struggle among 
its people to make two complex and often contradictory principles -  exceptionalism and 
realism -  part of one single approach to international relations. The United States, bom 
of unique circumstances and imbued with unprecedented power, has never forgotten the 
imperatives of its international and historical situation. Unprecedented opportunity leads 
to uncommonly high expectations, both from its own citizens and observers elsewhere. 
Americans have always accepted as an article of faith that the unique circumstances of 
their historical situation provide them with the moral authority to remake the world in 
their image.
The unprecedented growth of U.S. power in the past century has been 
accompanied by unus ual ly complex investigation of the purposes of it. Its philosophical
166  Tucker, “America in Decline,” 460-61.
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and scholarly traditions reflect a deep-seated discomfort with the possibility that the 
United States might someday relinquish its status as the example by which other nations 
will rebuild themselves. A preoccupation with the morality and embrace of idealist 
notions led to a grand strategy in which exceptionalism that has never been entirely 
absent.
At the same time, Americans have always been profoundly practical people.
They cling to their idealism, but from their earliest days have backed it with a 
surprisingly sophisticated understanding of the requirements of power. They eschewed 
accepting these responsibilities and the corruptions that can come with them for as many 
years as possible, until the realities of American superpower status could no longer be 
denied. American respond with hardheaded calculation when faced with serious 
challenges to their optimistic visions of their own future. They do this because they lack 
neither the courage of their convictions, nor the confidence of their purposes.
American approaches to international relations shows clearly in the development 
of international relations scholarship. Many of its intellectual models and insights apply 
quite well to the study of American behavior, usually more so than the behavior of states 
that do not reflect American values. This is clearly the case during the last decade of the 
Cold War, in which the logic of structural realism and preoccupation with moral authority 
combined to define a readily identifiable American grand strategy that lends itself well to 
scholarly interpretation and analysis.
This work began with explanation of a proto-theoretical approach to the grand 
strategy analysis. It then proposed to demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach by 
examining the strategic behavior of the United States during the last decade of the Cold
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War. Beginning in a pre-theory state, it identified the general themes of an American 
approach to international relations. It examined the philosophical and situational 
conditions underlying American views as they evolved throughout the nation’s history. 
This study then identified the areas of scholarship that will be most useful for analysis of 
U.S. grand strategy in during the latter days of the Cold War. The preceding section 
traced the major themes that would appear in the development of the U.S. view of its 
position in international relations directly preceding the shift in grand strategy witnessed 
preceding the American victory over its Soviet rival. The next section culminates this 
process by presenting an examination of American grand strategy that applies these 
scholarly insights in a flexible and effective way to create a solid understanding of the 
strategic maneuvers they undertook to achieve their goal of becoming its preeminent 
nation.
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CHAPTER III
EXAMINING AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1976-1985
Introduction
As events of the twentieth century retired into history, they left behind numinous 
wonder and respectful awe, initially concerning all that was demolished and later all that 
was built in its place. The century’s first half was defined by unyielding multi-polarity 
and deep-rooted nationalism, the consequences of which were the destruction of the 
existing European order, the transformation of the Asian order, and the emergence of new 
states from former colonial empires. Its second half was defined by bipolar confrontation 
and supranational]' sm, the results of which were a dangerous war between superpowers 
with no cataclysmic battles but a decisive winner nonetheless. It also brought 
tremendous proliferation of coincident political, economic, and social interests, binding 
states ever closer in an increasingly confined geopolitical space.
The ground-shaki ng events of the twentieth century were the consequences of a 
number of sometimes successful, sometimes failed grand strategies. Each statesman and 
strategist had his or her own idea of how things should have happened; very few got what 
was expected, and none in quite the way predicted. The vocation, task, and joy of those 
who define and employ international relations theory and historical research is to craft the 
lenses through which humanity will understand and remember those forces, great and 
small, that shaped the world in precisely the way they did.
The matters of when and why the United States chose to redefine its grand 
strategy in the second half of the twentieth century, while of vital interest to this
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particular study, are not as important as the inability of academic circles at the time to 
foresee these changes. Changes in strategic orientation neither happen overnight nor 
occur without sufficient harbingers that foreshadow their arrival. Why were these shifts 
not obvious to all observers at the time, and, more importantly, why do shifts in grand 
strategy continue to surprise our best observers? The answers are many, but above all the 
problem remains: the discipline of international relations lacks a methodology for 
applying its own best insights. This study will apply the methodology described above in 
the hopes of validating its approach to better understanding of the reasons behind great 
forces on the move.
As the field of international relations searches for the defining strategies and 
events of the next half-century, some may question the relevance of a work dependent on 
political thought deriving largely from a conflict that no longer exists. 1 Why analyze the 
strategies and policies of competing superpowers at a time when another such situation 
seems unlikely to arise for a very long time? The answer lies in the human beliefs, 
perceptions, and interests that motivated such behavior -  the long struggle of the Cold 
War ended, but the competition of grand strategies continues. The inescapable 
responsibility of leading a nation of one’s fellow citizens continues. The danger inherent 
in poorly chosen courses of action continues. The need for guided foreign policy
1 The struggle for recognition continues, despite assertions that the issue has been 
solved by the triumph of democracy. For more information on the idea that history, 
defined as the struggle to achieve a form of government that solves the recognition 
dilemma, has ended, see Francis Fukuyama, The End o f  History and the Last Man (New 
York: Free Press, 1992).
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decisions continues. In sum, the recognized victoiy of one superpower over another at 
the end of the twentieth century did not mean the end of the human struggle that inspires 
political activity.
Conflict arises as a result of differing perceptions—what and who count to each 
decision maker, what defines good and bad outcomes, what is happening and likely to 
happen, and in what ways events should be anticipated, plotted, and manipulated. 
Everyone forms goals, whether regarding one’s personal future or collective progress, 
and produces strategies that they each hope will allow them to happen. People ask 
questions to that end. Where do I want to be in ten years? Will a position with one 
company get me closer to that place than a position with another? What should the world 
look like in ten years? Will support of the House of Sa’ud make the world more secure 
for American interests than American encouragement of revolution?
These questions are posed by the complicated and little-understood vicissitudes of 
the human psyche and its concept of its biological and environmental stimuli.2  Strategy 
and policy are the result of uncounted and amalgamated components of the human mind, 
including rationality, logic, and emotion. As each individual is unique, so is each psyche, 
the views of the world they produce, and the subsequent decisions they make. Common
2  For an entertaining and informative discussion of the degree to which these 
variables are determinants of behavior, see the debate raised by the works of Richard 
Dawkins, including The Selfish Gene (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), and 
Stephen Jay Gould, including The Structure o f Evolutionary Theory (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002) and Dinosaur in a Haystack: Reflections in Natural 
History (New York: Harmony Books, 1995).
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themes, nevertheless, can be detected in human behavior. Each of us deals with the 
results of our insecurity, uncertainty, and defensiveness.
Political behavior, whether by individuals or the entities they form, must be 
examined and understood in the context of human perceptions and the ways in which 
they inform the world. Perhaps at another time the present tempts, the fixture confuses, 
and the past frightens. Situations and people change but politics remains the same 
confluence of different and shifting aspects of the human condition. Identifying and 
examining relevant forces motivating behavior fosters greater understanding of past, 
present, and future scenarios.
The international system remakes itself in violent bursts and continuous 
evolution, but forces underlying political behavior remain constant. These forces 
produced a particular order of societies in the first half of the twentieth century and 
another in the second. That order passed as well, leaving behind its own peculiar 
legacies, but this order’s successor has yet to be identified in any matter drawing general 
agreement. Ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet empire cannot be said to have ushered 
in a new era of international relations, for it is not yet established. Rather, this incredible 
alteration in the structure of geopolitics reminded us that long periods of peace (or 
impasse) are historic anomalies.
The resulting miasma of Cold War remnants and historically contiguous forces 
has not achieved any sort of definable form, yet the international system itself is in fact 
quite sturdy. It deserves examination by any who would seek to understand current and 
future trends in world politics. Therefore the case study chosen for this work is the set of 
foreign policy traditions and values is that which is most definable and recent -  namely,
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the grand strategy of the United States during the last decade of the Cold War. Only by 
analyzing the grand strategies and policies of the most influential state at the close of 
twentieth century can one begin to understand the geopolitics of the twenty-first.
Defining a New American Grand Strategy 
After twenty-five years of containment and patience the United States was ready 
for a new strategic vision. President Gerald Ford tried a few unenthusiastic attempts at 
defining one, but was unable to appear very credible about it.3 Of the United States’ two 
chief international experiences since 1945, the Vietnam War had ended and the Cold War 
appeared stagnant. The national security apparatus was largely comprised, at all but its 
most senior levels, by people who had no substantive memory of either the misplaced 
optimism of Munich or the costs of the Second World War. Formation of their views on 
international relations was more likely to have been influenced by memories of the Gulf 
of Tonkin incident, the Tet Offensive, and the MyLai Massacre, leaving them less likely 
to show much appreciation for the logic of the containment of Kennan and Nitze or the 
practicality of Kissinger’s realpolitik.
3 Ford occasionally touched on the importance of regaining the United States’ 
moral standing, but was tainted by his pardon of Richard Nixon and did not have the 
standing to lead a crusade for the return of morality to American policy making. His 
strongest statement came in his 1976 State of the Union Address, in which he proclaimed, 
“The time has now come for a fundamentally different approach—for a new realism that 
is true to the great principles upon which this Nation was founded.” The full text of his 
speech is available at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, 
http://www.ford.utexas.edu, accessed 7 November 2004.
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During his second televised debate with Governor Jimmy Carter American 
viewers became convinced that their current administration did not possess the strategic 
vision necessary to create and implement a new course for the United States. Fresh from 
extensive briefings by Harvard professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Governor Carter showed 
a deft familiarity with obscure mechanisms for the protection of citizens living under 
Soviet domination. In the same debate President Ford tried to convince an astonished 
American public that Eastern Europe was free of Soviet domination. An incredulous 
questioner, Max Frankel of The New York Times, believing Ford to have misspoken, 
asked, “Did I understand you to say, sir, that the Russians are not using Eastern Europe as 
their own sphere of influence in occupying most of the countries there and making sure 
with their troops that it is a communist zone?” President Ford answered with an 
emphatic, “I don’t believe, Mr. Frankel. . .  that (people such as the) Poles consider 
themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. ” 4
Carter emerged from this exchange with enormous political credibility regarding 
his ability to define a new strategic vision for the United States. Yet his views were 
based on much more than high-level advisement and shrewd politicking. Carter’s ideas 
reflected convictions developed by the future president throughout a long career of 
regional political leadership, a deeply held religious faith, a rare belief in the 
inseparability of personal and governmental morality, and a recent series of efforts to
4  Commission on Presidential Debates, The Second Carter-Ford Presidential 
Debate, 6 October 1976, available at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans76b.html, 
accessed 20 February 2005.
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develop his own awareness of international politics. They also resonated powerfully with 
American voters, who sense their nation needed his idealism to fuel an American 
resurgence.
Carter began to get his first real sense of geopolitics during his initial campaign 
efforts in 1972. He was invited to serve on the Trilateral Commission, a group of 
experts, business leaders, and foreign policy elites seeking to strengthen ties between the 
United States, Europe, and Japan. Carter later recalled, “Those Trilateral Commission 
meetings for me were like classes in foreign policy -  reading papers produced on every 
conceivable subject, hearing experienced leaders debate international issues and 
problems, and meeting the big names like Cy Vance and Harold Brown and Zbig.” 5  
Zbigniew Brzezinski was the staff director of the Commission and became Carter’s 
principal tutor in foreign affairs, providing him with research materials, briefings, and 
draft speeches. As the election cycle demanded increasingly sophisticated views of 
foreign policy issues, Carter instructed his staff to run his campaign positions by 
Brzezinski with increasing frequency.6
Much of the Jimmy Carter’s new outlook has been ascribed to the emergence of 
“world order” thinking that characterized academic circles during the 1970s.7 Brzezinski
5 Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year o f the Carter Presidency (New York: 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1982), 45.
6  Ibid, 45-6.
7 World order literature has grown to encompass an entire subfield of 
international relations. See Stanley Hoffman, Primacy or World Order: American 
Foreign Policy since the Cold War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). For current 
interpretations of its ideas see Rob Kroes, “American Empire and Cultural Imperialism:
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in particular was known -  and sometimes criticized -  for his embrace of new propositions 
and concepts in international relations scholarship. 8 On many ideas being bandied about 
during this period it is not hard to quote Brzezinski against Brzezinski. However, the 
essentially structural realist nature of his worldview shows far more forcefully in the 
actual strategies he pushed to implement than in his oftentimes-ambiguous intellectual 
explorations.9  Seyom Brown argued it was not long after Carter took office that 
Washington saw “Brzezinski appearing once again in his 1960s incarnation as the 
aggressive Russophobe, rather than as the 1970s expert on the international order.” 10
The new outlook seen initially among many members of the Carter administration 
was a natural result of political requirements stemming from years of strategic dominance 
by Kissinger and some very real ideational changes in the composition of American 
foreign policy circles. Carter immersed himself in international politics at a time when
A Yiew from the Receiving End,” in Conference (Washington, DC: German Historical 
Institute, 1999), available online at http://www.ghi-
dc.org/conpotweb/westempapers/fcoes.pdf, accessed 22 November 2004; Philip S. 
Golub, The American Hegemonic Cycle and System Wide Crisis, Issues in Regulation 
Theory no. 46 (Paris: Institut d’etudes Europeennes, October 2003); Robert Cooper, The 
Breaking o f Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century (London: Atlantic 
Books, 2003).
8 Simon Serfaty, “Brzezinski: Play It Again, Zbig,” Foreign Policy, no. 32 (Fall 
1978), 3-21.
9  Brzezinski summed his views: “The emerging American-Soviet relationship 
involves a potentially fatal incompatibility between the emerging balance of forces and 
the structure of the international system. Two rather homogenous blocs were led 
respectively by a relatively status-quo-oriented superior nuclear power and by an anti- 
status-quo-oriented inferior nuclear power, with the rest of the world by and large 
quiescent. We are now moving into a setting in which the two blocs are beginning to 
dissolve, in which during the next decade the inferior and essentially apocalyptic nuclear 
power will also become militarily (though not yet in other respects) a global power, and 
in which the Third World threatens to dissolve into sporadic violence and international 
anarchy.” Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Peace and Power: Looking Toward the 1970s,” 
Encounter (November 1968), 7-8.
10 Seyom Brown, “An End to Grand Strategy,” 29.
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this search for alternative approaches was popular among academic elites, many of whom 
imparted this idea to him in the years immediately prior to his campaign. However, 
politics are much more than personality. The worldviews and pressures of the moment 
combined with individual ideas in unique ways to produce a new direction in U.S. grand 
strategy.
Through a combination of adherence to strong ethical values and his rigorous 
absorption of data and views Carter developed his own conception of American power 
and its uses. Carter called early on his old Annapolis classmate Admiral Stansfield 
Turner for an assessment of American military strength and areas for improvement. 1 1 
Several times during the campaign and the transition period, then-director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency George Bush traveled to Carter’s home in Plains to brief him. He 
found the president-elect “all concentration, soaking up data” but with “his guard up.” “I 
felt,” wrote Bush, “that beneath his surface cool he harbored a deep antipathy to the 
CIA.” 12 This is hardly surprising given that it had been the instrument for many of the 
dealings that Carter felt had undermined the moral foundation of America’s foreign 
policy.
11 Turner was President of the Naval War College at the time and described his 
first advisory meeting at the Governor’s mansion in 1975: “I was barely seated when he 
shot his first question at me about the state of the U.S. military. What were its strengths 
and weaknesses? What were the merits and liabilities of the way we made defense 
decisions? . . .  The questions continued—tough, intelligent, relentless. I felt mentally 
drained.” Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 14.
12 George H.W. Bush, Looking Forward (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1987).
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Carter spoke openly on this subject in a November interview, unfortunately 
remembered more often for its personal statements than its deeper philosophical 
underpinnings:
Our Government should justify the character and moral principles of the 
American people, and our foreign policy should not short-circuit that for 
temporary advantage. I think that in every instance we’ve done that it’s 
been counterproductive. When the CIA undertakes covert activities that 
might be justified if they were peaceful, we always suffer when they’re 
revealed..  , 13
This view had been growing in the mind of Carter since his immersion in international 
affairs began during his involvement in the Trilateral Commission. He had written in 
1975,
As it has related to such areas as Pakistan, Chile, Cambodia, and Vietnam, 
our government’s foreign policy has not exemplified any commitment to 
moral principles.. .it has become apparent that our leaders have often 
departed from the more honest inclinations of the American people. This 
has required varying degrees of secrecy and outright lying. 14
The energetic and critical Jimmy Carter with whom Bush met throughout the fall 
of 1976 foreshadowed a presidency that would make its campaign themes of moral and 
idealistic behavior its policies once in office. His choice of Walter Mondale as his 
running mate signaled a desire to make ethical oversight a continuing theme of his 
presidency. Mondale had been one of the most active and best-informed senators on the
13 The Playboy Interview, ed. G. Barry Golson (New York: Wideview Books, 
1981), 478-79. This is the same interview in which Carter confessed he had “lust in my 
heart,” an admission that obscured the content of the international relations portions, 
including any statements of the role of morality in international political behavior.
14 Jimmy Carter, Why Not the Best? (New York: Baptist Sunday School Board, 
1975), 141.
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Church committee investigations of intelligence activities. His priorities in the years 
before the election were regulation of CIA activities and protection of civil liberties. 15
During the process of forming a cabinet, Carter’s choice of his foreign policy 
mentor came very naturally. While Carter admired Vance’s easy familiarity with the 
corridors of power, he had come to rely on Brzezinski for advice. However Vance’s 
popularity among the foreign policy establishment made his selection a clear choice as 
well. Carter attempted to ameliorate the discrepancy between the two men’s worldviews 
by letting their assignments keep those differences apart. Carter’s chief of staff Hamilton 
Jordan noted, “The roles were clear to him: Zbig would be the thinker, Cy would be the 
doer, and Jimmy Carter would be the decider.” 16
Brzezinski brought to Carter’s worldview grounding in the then-traditional 
American foreign policy outlook regarding the dangerous nature of Soviet power and 
importance of achieving stability, but combined it with lively speculation regarding 
newer concepts such as the emergence of global international elites. He had been an 
outspoken critic of Kissinger’s myopia regarding the importance of the American-Soviet- 
Chinese strategic situation and unrelenting advocate of the importance of American ties 
to Europe and Japan. His hostility toward the Soviet Union meshed well with Carter’s 
distaste of Soviet internal and international policies and found an outlet in Carter’s 
crusade to bring human rights to the fore of international relations. Brzezinski shaped
15 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs o f the National Security 
Advisor (New York: Farrar-Straus-Giroux, 1983), 34-5.
16 Jordan, Crisis, 47.
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Carter’s belief that morality could be made to serve the goal of increasing relative 
national power into the instrument of grand strategy that it became.
Vance brought to his post a star-studded resume, including his legal experience in 
New York, important posts in the defense department, and a recurring role as mediator 
general for the Johnson administration. 17 Vance had a lawyer’s talent for finding areas 
of common interest and a diplomat’s skill at reducing conflict. Most interested in nuclear 
arms control, he argued strenuously against provocative actions (which destabilize), 
broad condemnations (which inflame), and policies of linkage among areas of negotiation 
(which prevent progress).
Despite numerous warnings that Brzezinski and Vance would engage in a fierce 
struggle for control of foreign policy, Carter felt they matched the roles he had chosen for 
them. 18 He sought to strike a balance between the two men’s compelling viewpoints and 
maintained it surprisingly long. His first appraisal of international developments each 
morning came in the form of Vance’s overnight report, waiting for Carter each morning 
when he arrived to sip his coffee. His first scheduled meeting in the Oval Office was 
Brzezinski’s, who brought him the intelligence community’s report, the Presidential
17 Johnson relied on Vance to manage international issues that required an 
exceptionally skilled and detail-oriented negotiator, including in Panama after the anti- 
American riots of 1964, in the Dominican Republic in 1965, in Vietnam in 1966, in 
Detroit following racial violence in 1967, in Cyprus in 1967, in Korea in 1968 after the 
seizure of the Pueblo, and in Paris in 1968-69 for peace talks with the North Vietnamese. 
Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years 
(New York:: Hill and Wang, 1986), 40.
18 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs o f a President (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1982), 54.
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Daily Briefing, and stayed to discuss international affairs. This schedule served Carter’s 
division of labor, giving State the opportunity to tell him what was happening in the 
world and Brzezinski the opportunity to outline what it meant for long-term American 
interests. 19
In its approach to international relations the Carter administration tried harder 
than almost any other to bring its philosophical foundations into the open and examine 
them thoroughly. Its documentation, commentary, and memoirs provide solid evidence, 
especially in the early years, of unusually intense wrangling over precisely what the sum 
of its policies and statements pronounced to the world (and its own members) regarding 
what the United States stands for and the kind of government its people have.
Changing Strategic Situation: Systemic Power and Moral Authority
I was familiar with the arguments that we had to choose between idealism and realism, 
between morality and the exertion of power; but I rejected those claims. To me the 
demonstration of American idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign 
affairs, and moral principles were the best foundation for the exertion of American power 
and influence.
President Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith
Jimmy Carter assumed the Presidency in 1977 with little doubt about the 
worldview he planned to enforce on U.S. grand strategy. The long-shot political 
candidate campaigned very successfully against what he argued were previous 
administrations’ irresponsible and immoral uses of national power. He touched a nerve
19 Ibid, 50-1.
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about this issue in a way not seen in American politics since the Johnson campaign 
shocked television audiences in 1964 with its ‘Daisy’ commercial.2 0  Carter’s rhetoric 
emphasized that the biggest threat came not from what the Soviet Union did to the United 
States, but what the United States was doing to itself out of fear of losing. He felt too 
often compromises of American values had been made in favor of pragmatism, damaging 
American credibility and thereby the overall international power of the United States.
The worldview of the Carter administration, as that of the United States, is often
misconceived as the struggle between the opposites of morality and power. It should be
understood instead as a struggle among its members to define to what extent a reputation
for moral rectitude provided power in international politics. Carter’s inaugural address
affirmed the great international political and strategic value he placed on moral stature
and the role this would play in his grand strategy:
“Let our recent mistakes bring a resurgent commitment to the basic 
principles of our Nation, for we know that if we despise our own 
government, we have no future.”
“And we know that the best way to enhance freedom in other lands is to 
demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation.
“To be true to ourselves, we must be true to others. We will not behave in 
foreign places so as to violate our rules and standards here at home, for we 
know that the trust which our Nation earns is essential to our strength.”
2 0  The Johnson campaign ran a highly successful one-time television 
advertisement featuring a little girl counting daisy petals that morphed into a nuclear 
launch countdown and detonation. It sought to ingrain an unforgettable image of the 
consequences of irresponsible uses of power; consequences the commercial implied 
would be more likely should the supposedly more hawkish Barry Goldwater win the 
presidency.
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“I would hope that die nations of the world might say that we had built a 
lasting peace, based not on weapons of war but on international policies 
which reflect our own most precious values.” 21
Despite harsh critiques of the Carter administration’s romanticism, the President’s
embrace of moral issues such as human rights were not proof that he was incapable of
dealing with the harsher realities of international relations. 2 2  On May 22, 1977 President
Carter gave his first major foreign policy address at the University of Notre Dame. He
affirmed his pledge to reclaim American exceptionalism “does not mean we can conduct
our foreign policy by rigid maxims . . .  I understand fully the limits of moral suasion . . . ”
Yet this limitation would not prevent Carter from implementing his broad strategy to
rebuild American power in large measure by restoring American moral authority:
I also believe that it is a mistake to undervalue the power of words and of 
the ideas that words embody.... For us to ignore this trend would be to 
lose influence and moral authority in the world. To lead it will be to 
regain the moral stature that we once had.
This direct and public nod to the importance of American exceptionalism signaled
Carter’s intention to let his distinctive foreign policy ideas guide his strategies.
2 1  Inaugural Address o f President Jimmy Carter, available at 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/inaugadd.phtml, accessed 7 
November 2004.
2 2  Carter had not always pressed the issue of human rights. As late as 1975, he 
criticized the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which imposed economic sanctions against
Moscow for not allowing Soviet Jews to emigrate, on the grounds that it interfered with 
the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. He soon changed his mind, however, when 
human rights offered a means of uniting a Democratic Party bitterly divided by the 1968 
and 1972 presidential campaigns. It gave liberal Democrats a reason to attack right-wing 
governments and conservative members of the party an excuse to level charges against 
the Soviet Union. Moreover, Carter came to see a close link between human rights and 
his own born-again Christian background. Victor S. Kaufman, “The Bureau of Human
Rights during the Carter Administration,” Historian 61, no. 1 (Fall 1998), 51-66.
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Thus what distinguished the new American view of international relations, as 
championed by the Carter administration’s worldview, was the uniquely high value it 
initially placed on a reputation for morality in its calculation of relative international 
power. Carter himself was the driving force behind this worldview and missed no 
opportunity to try to convince others of its legitimacy. Echoing the impressions given to 
George Bush, he reiterated, “For too many years, we’ve been willing to adopt the flawed 
and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own 
values for theirs.” For Carter this translated to a palpable and dangerous loss of power in 
the international system.
The worldview of the members of the Carter administration, sometimes more so 
than that of the public it led, embraced enthusiastically the less traditional concepts 
emerging at the time in academic discussions about foreign affairs. Ted Szulc observed, 
“The president and his advisers have eschewed the Nixon-Kissinger “grand design” 
approach to foreign policy (there is no talk of “structures of peace” and the like) to which 
the world had become accustomed in the previous eight years.” There was a sense of 
renewal in the administration and an expectation that Carter would change course in 
many areas of government, particularly in the conduct of foreign affairs. This meant use 
of non-traditional definitions and emphases when talking about national interest. Carter 
and his advisors held a view of international relations in which calculations of interest, to
2 3  Tad Szulc, “Washington Dateline: Springtime for Carter,” Foreign Policy, no.
26 (Spring 1977), 178.
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remain applicable, must be updated to serve the United States in ways that upheld its 
unique status as a ‘moral’ superpower.
In much the same way a long view of U.S. history shows periodic vicissitudes 
between exceptionalist and realist traditions, the Carter administration is often criticized 
for its seeming ambiguity about expressing preferences between the two models in its 
strategic approach. Simon Serfaty, writing in 1978, reminded observers, “Late in 1968, 
looking to ward the 1970s, Brzezinski perceived the future strictly in terms of the East- 
West conflict,” and could not have been expected to have abandoned these roots entirely 
in his embrace of nascent ideas. 2 4  Ted Szulc complained early on that Carter and his 
advisors were “acting as if he were inventing a wholly new policy with no continuum 
with the past.” 2 5  Thomas Hughes saw the approach as “maximum democracy and 
minimum Machiavelli.” 26 This may appear to make understanding the sources of its 
grand strategy in the early administration very difficult.
Carter, however, solved the dilemma neatly for theorists, if not for foreign policy 
experts on and outside his own team, by combining them to form a view of the world that 
corresponds well with structural realism. His faith and personal morality combined with 
an appreciation for the importance of structural pressures in decision making, largely 
fostered by Brzezinski and applied initially to understand the maneuvers of other states. 
At first Carter resisted consciously applying this way of thinking to his own policy, but
2 4  Serfaty, “Play It Again, Zbig,” 3.
2 5  Szulc, “Springtime for Carter,” 179.
2 6  Thomas L. Hughes, “Carter and the Management of Contradictions,” Foreign 
Policy, no. 31 (Summer 1978), 53.
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the influence of the behavioral logic underlying structural realism remained present in his 
administration’s actions.
The logic of the structural realism, therefore, is insufficient to explain the entire 
foundation of American attitudes about grand strategy at this time. Variables must be 
redefined to account for this new emphasis on moral power. This requires supplementing 
traditional structural approaches with a constructivist approach. The United States began 
to view international reputation, morality, and integrity as tremendously significant 
sources of relative power in both the bilateral (U.S.-Soviet) and multilateral international 
systems -  more so than at any point during the previous decades of the Cold War. They 
factor strongly into both his administration’s perception of power trends and the grand 
strategies that would be composed in response.
Before drawing the curve of American systemic power over time, therefore, it is 
important to take into account the way in which Carter and his associates defined power. 
Carter’s personal ethics and their nearly flawless transfer to political moralism brought to 
the fore his conviction, encouraged by Brzezinski, that moral authority could be a potent 
source of international power.2 7  This meant that in many cases being idealistic was one
2 7  “America still provides to most people in the world the most attractive social 
condition (even if not the model) and that remains America’s special strength. The 
Soviet Union is not even a rival in this respect. But that strength can only be applied if 
American foreign policy is sympathetically sensitive to this significant shift in global 
emphasis toward a value which has not been central to the American experience (reform 
of international structure).” Zbigniew Brzezinski, “America in a Hostile World,” Foreign 
Policy, no. 23 (Summer 1976), 95.
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way of being pragmatic. In this conception increases to or loss of moral authority often
translated directly to relative power levels.2 8
Carter argued the nation’s loss of moral authority had placed it squarely in the
midst of a deep and inevitable moral decline.
Our country has been strongest and most effective when morality and a 
commitment to freedom and democracy have been most clearly 
emphasized in our foreign policy.... However, since Truman’s days in the 
White House, persistent support of such a foreign policy has often been 
lacking. Much of the time we failed to exhibit as an American 
characteristic the idealism of Jefferson or Wilson.
Carter made clear in his televised foreign policy debate with President Ford on October 7,
1976 that he viewed this lack of morality as a serious loss. In response to a question from
NBC correspondent Richard Valeriani on his idea of the national interest, Carter replied:
What we were formerly so proud of, the strength of our country, its moral 
integrity, the representation in foreign affairs of what our people or what 
our Constitution stands for—has been gone. And in the secrecy that has 
surrounded our foreign policy in the last few years, the American [people] 
and Congress have been excluded.2 9
To a later question from Valeriani on the strength of the United States, Carter answered,
“.. .as far as strength derives from doing what’s right, caring for the poor, providing food,
becoming the breadbasket of the world, instead of the arms merchant of the world—in
those respects we’re not strong.
2 8  The danger inherent in this situation was not limited to American interests. 
Brzezinski argued in 1976, “An America that ceased to project a constructive sense of 
direction would hence contribute directly to major global and economic disruptions.” 
Ibid, 94.
2 9  Commission on Presidential Debates, The Second Carter-Ford Presidential 
Dehate, available at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans76b.html, accessed 20 February 
2005.
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Carter, echoing Brzezinski’s criticisms during the early to mid-1970s, identified
as the source of this loss of morality a myopic concentration on east-west relations.
Because of the heavy emphasis that was placed on Soviet-American 
competition, a dominant factor in our dealings with foreign countries 
became whether they espoused an anti-communist line.
Thus one of the chief causes of American decline was its undue preoccupation with its
Soviet adversary. The United States had neglected to nourish its sense of exceptionalism,
ceased to act morally in its international conduct, and cost itself a great deal of
international power. Viewed this way, American power had declined even further than
had been perceived (111. 6 ).
IE 6. American Long Term Power Trends 
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Another factor that must be taken into consideration is that the Carter 
administration’s particular value system presaged a more sharply pessimistic view of 
current American systemic power trends, but also a more robust optimism that the
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situation could be reversed successfully if proper steps were taken immediately. He 
believed that, over the long term, American doctrinal creativity and technical ingenuity 
could be harnessed to make the United States military more modem and effective than 
anything the Soviets could match. Fostering this advantage would address currently 
unfavorable trends in relative military power both vis-a-vis the Soviets and the rest of the 
world.
Carter also viewed morality arguments as one of the most devastating to the 
opponents of the United States, particularly the Soviet Union. The United States had a 
grand tradition of integrity and benevolence that had been tarnished by decades of 
neglect. He argued that in the process of sacrificing moral credibility, “we forfeited one 
of our most effective ways to meet threats from totalitarian ideologies and arouse the 
spirit of our own people.” Many Americans agreed with this view, many of whom now 
worked in government. The ascendance of a new generation of foreign policy staff 
brought a number of discontinuities with the worldview that had been in place since the 
Second World War. 3 0
3 0  Carl Gershman, for one, protested near the end of the Carter administration that 
in its total rejection of containment his new foreign policy circle “broke unequivocally 
with thirty years of historical experience” and were “saturating American foreign policy 
with defeatism masquerading as optimism and “maturity” and “restraint,” cravenly 
following international political fashion even if this meant denigrating the interests and 
values of one’s own country, and worrying less about American security than about 
Soviet insecurity, in the nature of which virtually any Soviet action could be condoned or 
blamed on the United States.” Carl Gershman, “The Rise and Fall of the New Foreign- 
Policy Establishment,” Commentary 70, no. 1 (July 1980), 24.
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To Carter and many in his administration, the superpower confrontation was the 
primary but not necessarily hegemonic factor that defined the position in the United 
States in the world. Preoccupation with the Soviet Union had led policy makers to 
neglect the larger strategic dimensions of American behavior. Under the Carter 
administration the United States would shift some of its heretofore almost unidirectional 
attentiveness to areas of the world too long outside the core of American attention, such 
as Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. The overall decline of American systemic 
power had a great deal to do with the loss of American prestige and influence in these 
areas. 31
The most important indicator of American power at the beginning of the Carter 
administration was therefore not the trend in bilateral power, but the overall trend of 
American power in the world as a whole. A graph of overall systemic power trends is, of 
course, very different than a graph of its bilateral power trends. The more Carter and his 
advisors inclined toward viewing the world in broader systemic terms, the more 
appropriate it is to give prominence to the theoretical insights that flow from systemic 
power trends. It follows that perceptions, grand strategies, and policies will change to 
follow this new emphasis in political thinking.
The most effective way to do this would be to stimulate a desire to among 
members of the administration to end the United States’ preoccupation with east-west
31  “The global distribution of power is beginning to favor political systems 
remote philosophically, culturally, ethnically, and racially from American antecedents, 
while the process of redistribution of that power is threatening new forms of violence.” 
Brzezinski, “America in a Hostile World,” 65.
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conflict and focus on its neglected role as a preeminent power in the world. Increased 
attention to international developments outside the context of the Cold War did not mean 
bilateral comparisons were no longer important to the Carter administration. Brzezinski 
in particular would never have allowed the superpower rivalry to fall by the wayside. 
However the bilateral view from the White House during the Carter years was not the 
same as when Kissinger had run foreign policy. Illustrations of perceived bilateral power 
differentials also must account for the specific beliefs of those who held power (111. 7).
IE 7. American Long Term Bilateral Power Trends 
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As the illustrations show, the depth and speed of American decline, multilaterally 
and bilaterally, are more prominent to those who share Carter’s view that the loss of 
moral authority translates directly to a loss of American power. Both the instantaneous 
and aggregate slope of American power during the past two decades appear much more
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alarming to those in the Carter administration than to those who came before it and 
believed a reputation for morality does not contribute much to overall power.
Scholarly Insights: Growing Insecurity
The evolving international system in 1977, combined with a change in the 
composition of the American decision making apparatus, parallels very closely the causal 
logic of structural realism and belief-definition aspects of constructivism. The most 
salient realist and constructivist models for examining this situation are Charles Doran 
and Wes Parson’s power cycle theory, which points to the dangers of paranoia and policy 
oversteer, Dale Copeland’s theory of dynamic differentials, which demonstrates 
behavioral tendencies flowing from pressures for decline reversal, and Alexander 
Wendt’s constructivist contributions regarding identity and structure.3 2
Modifying structural realism so it encompasses the United States’ reassertion of 
morality’s role in creating international power allows one to make very penetrating 
statements about what the United States’ grand strategy could be expected to look like 
during this period. Changing American views directly prior to and in a large part because 
of Carter’s election meant that American perceptions of long-term power trends became 
suddenly more negative in absolute and relative terms. Americans believed they held a 
lower percentage of total bilateral and international power. At the same time these trends
3 2  The best representations of each author’s work used here are, respectively, 
Doran and Parsons, “War and the Cycle of Relative Power”; Copeland, The Origins o f 
Major War, specifically 39-46; and Wendt, “Identity and Structural Change,” 50.
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became more dramatic in that they showed a more rapid velocity of change and 
acceleration of change.
Increasing the downward speed of the already negative power differential
increases fear and insecurity. This tends to increase the scope of the response, as well as
the risks to stability one will take to achieve a trend reversal before the power differential
become too threatening to accept. This fear was ameliorated somewhat by Carter’s
confidence that the sources of American power were renewable and could be used as part
of a long-term approach toward turning the tide of bilateral competition. He affirmed in
Presidential Directive 18:
Military aspects aside, the United States continues to enjoy a number of 
critical advantages: it has a more creative technological and economic 
system, its political structure can adapt more easily to popular demands 
and relies on freely given popular support, and it is supported 
internationally by allies and friends who genuinely share similar 
aspirations. In contrast, though successfully acquiring military power 
matching that of the United States, the Soviet Union continues to face 
major internal economic and national difficulties, and externally it has few 
genuinely committed allies while lately suffering setbacks in its relations 
with China, parts of Africa, and India.33
Despite Carter’s quiet optimism about the long-term prospects of American 
victory in the Cold War, in 1977 the United States found itself in a situation between 
serious concern and outright alarm. Looking at the past few decades, the emerging 
consensus among Americans -  the same consensus that propelled Jimmy Carter to the
3 3  “U.S. National Strategy,” available at 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives/pdl 8 .pdf, accessed 7 
November 2004.
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White House -  had shifted from the previous view of an unavoidable and steady decline 
to a new perception of a dangerously negative trend in overall American power (111. 8 ).
At the same time, the bilateral situation was similarly negative and increasingly so 
as the nation shifted its perceptions of its past, present, and future. Consequent with a 
realization of the United States’ loss of moral authority in the world at large was an 
increasingly negative perception of the United States was performance in the bilateral 
confrontation. Detente and containment had failed to preserve the strategic balance and 
the United States was in danger of becoming equal to and then falling below the power 
levels of its Soviet adversary.
I1L 8 . Contrasting Views of U.S. International Power
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There is another factor, similar in effect to an acceleration of decline, which 
brought a sense of urgency to the desire to reverse trends. Rather than a gradual change
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in perceptions among policy makers and subsequent changes in long-term strategy, the 
United States had a dramatic change in the orientation of its strategic leadership. Carter 
and his advisors had views that were very different from the views of those who occupied 
their positions in years past. It was their expression of these views that resonated so 
powerfully with the electorate and brought them to power. Their very different 
understanding of American power translated into a sudden shift to the U.S. view of the 
situation. Theoretically speaking, an instantaneous deceleration of power is represented 
by a break in the trend line. An illustration of perceived American multilateral power, 
therefore, jumps in 1977 to one that is simultaneously more seriously negative and more 
important in the overall calculation of policy (111. 9). Such dramatic breaks in continuity 
are represented in mathematical terms as an instantaneous slope (acceleration) of infinity.
IE 9. Transition Shock ca. 1976
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Charles Doran and Wes Parsons demonstrate how this kind of sudden shock to a 
nation’s expectations regarding long-term power, whether through changes in situation or 
administration, create immense discord in strategic thinking and can lead to exceptionally 
strong corrective measures. These measures are usually stronger than the situation 
appears to require, as leaders seek to make up for the time lost between inception and 
perception of a problem. As discussed in the literature review, these kinds of dramatic 
corrections are moments of mathematical irrationality, often expressed as strategic 
irrationality in such ways as policy oversteer.3 4  Strategists seek to compensate for lost 
time and end up overshooting their mark. In 1977, for the United States this mark was 
long-term U.S. security achieved through the revitalization of American international 
power and restoration of a small measure of American preeminence in the Cold War. 
Their work on policy oversteer points to an American response to these trends that will 
be stronger than the situation requires for realization of their strategic goals, causing the 
U.S. to implement strategies that overshoot these goals.
Daniel Yankelovich and Larry Kaagan once pointed out that, among the many 
forms of loss of control felt by a population, “none has more serious foreign policy 
implications than the concern that the nation has grown “weaker.” 3 5  The enhanced sense 
of alarm about their multilateral and bilateral power situations experienced by those
3 4  Charles Doran, interview by author, 14 December 1999.
3 5  Daniel Yankelovich and Larry Kaagan, “Assertive America,” in The Reagan 
Foreign Policy, ed. William G. Hyland (New York: New American Library, 1987), 6 .
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Americans who shared Carter’s viewpoint could be expected to have important 
influences on its subsequent grand strategy.
To summarize, the members of the Carter administration brought to office a set of 
beliefs that followed in the traditions and values of American grand strategy, but in a way 
substantially different from the Kissingerian outlook of recent administrations. Thomas 
Hughes called it a “Cultural Revolution in foreign policy.” 36 Carter did not subscribe to 
preoccupation with the triangle of American-Soviet-Chinese power and believed relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union were consuming more attention and 
effort than necessary. This single-mindedness in strategic thinking had importance 
consequences for American interests, especially the United States’ abdicated role in 
bringing about greater world order and international security.
According to classic dynamic differentials theory, the probability of major power 
war in this situation is high. American strategists, applying American ideational beliefs 
to Soviet strategy, believed the danger of Soviet aggression during the temporary 
ascendance was increasing. At this point realist logic points to a strong likelihood of the 
United States readying its armed forces and launching a preventative war while its 
leaders felt they still had the greater capacity.3 7  Why then would one not expect the 
United States to choose a strategy of preventative war with the Soviet Union?
3 6  Hughes, “Carter and the Management of Contradictions,” 38.
3 7  The distinction between preventative war and preemptive war is almost always 
a temporal one. Preventative wars generally are associated with grand strategy and 
initiated to counter long-term threats. Preemptive wars generally are associated with 
imminent threats and are initiated to gain the battlefield advantages of being the first to
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The answer is that in many senses it did. However, the massive military 
capabilities of the two superpowers, especially the nuclear deterrent, make the choice of 
full-scale preventative war highly unlikely. Richard Ned Lebow points out structural 
arguments are insufficient. States rarely start wars because one side believes it has a 
military advantage. Rather, they occur when leaders become convinced that force is 
necessary to achieve important goals. Relative military advantage is merely one 
component of any decision regarding war. He argues, “Window of vulnerability 
arguments also tend to ignore the host of non-military factors which can influence leaders 
in the direction of peace.” 3 8
By expanding dynamic differentials theory from its original focus on relative 
military power to relative international power, one can account for wider possibilities and 
policy responses than major power war. There are many ways to bring an enemy to its 
knees and the best of them do not involve military force alone. Opponents surrender after 
they have been weakened; it matters not how they weaken so much as that they do to the 
point that continuing the struggle appears to them an unwanted policy, whether because 
of futility or lack of desire.
The United States behaved in the manner indicated by the unfavorable 
differentials it perceived, as defined according to its own reconstructed view of power 
and the role morality plays in defining it. Declining states must take action to reverse the 
situation or face certain peril at a point later in time, a point at which it would have a
strike. The exception to this is Stephen van Evera, who according to the manner in which 
the advantage would be gained. See van Evera, Causes o f War. This work uses 
preventative war according to its temporal distinction from preemptive war.
3 8  Richard Ned Lebow, “Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump through 
Them,” International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984), 149.
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lesser chance of meeting it successfully. The Carter administration showed remarkable 
confidence that the problems it faced could be surmounted and this period could be 
temporary. Decline was not inevitable if drastic steps were taken to rebuild American 
power, from military to economic strength, and especially in the realm in which it had 
eroded so severely; namely, moral authority.
Changing Grand Strategy: From Coexistence to American Preeminence
The preceding text identified the American view of its international position and 
applied the insights of appropriate scholarship describing these views. At this point a 
picture emerges of a likely shift in U.S. grand strategy that could be expected to have 
begun in the mid-1970s. American strategists had accepted that continuation of detente 
and containment would result in a sustained and deep U.S. decline, both in terms of its 
overall power position and its competition with the Soviet Union. This was unacceptable 
to them and the source of deep-seated insecurity. U.S. strategic views at this moment can 
be summarized as follows:
• The gravest threat to American interests lay in the continuation of unfavorable 
trends in relative international power and relative bilateral power.
• The major causes of American weakness are the decline of moral decency 
underlying American domestic and international behavior and unfavorable 
trends in the balance of military forces.
• The decline is deeper and more pervasive than previous administrations had 
realized and was worsening rapidly.
• The nature of American international power, especially its economic and 
technical prowess, provided prospects for eventually reversing this decline.
• This temporary bubble provides the Soviets at best a temporary advantage in 
bilateral relations.
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• Strong measures must be taken to reverse these trends quickly before the 
situation further endangers U.S. security.
These problems could be corrected if the United States put in place a strategy designed to
rebuild American power quickly by rebuilding the sources of national power, beginning
with moral authority.
Faced with what it perceived as a deep and inevitable relative decline in power in 
both multilateral and bilateral relations, as well as the shock of transition to a more 
dramatic view of the situation in January 1977, one would expect the United States to 
pursue an aggressive, sometimes overly so, grand strategy of American renewal aimed at 
reversing current power trends before the situation deteriorated further. The strategy 
enacted would likely be stronger than necessary to restore parity, largely because the 
American policy making community underwent a transformation of opinion due to both 
international events and the arrival of a new administration with its unique worldview. 
This transformation brought with it a shock of being both behind the curve and late in 
understanding this fact. The policies flowing from this strategic shift could be expected 
to be more vigorous than necessary to restore a modicum of American preeminence in the 
bilateral confrontation and American predominance in the multilateral system.
The logical centerpiece of its grand strategy could be described as a series of 
strong measures aimed at rebuilding quickly what it viewed to be the most important and 
depleted sources of American international power. American strategists in the early 
Carter administration regarded the moral authority deriving from its unique tradition o f  
exceptionalism as the most neglected, abused, and thereby faltering component of U.S. 
international power.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
180
Carter believed the United States could not continue to be a great and respected 
nation unless it resinned being moral.3 9  American strategists, therefore, could have been 
expected to seize issues that offered opportunities to demonstrate the United States had 
resumed its place as the “good” superpower -  a nation worthy of international leadership 
and a model of government worthy of emulation. This meant abandoning acts of foreign 
policy that cast the United States in an unfavorable light, especially the kind of ethical 
compromises for minor gains in power that had been chipping away at America’s 
reputation since the start of the Cold War.
U.S. grand strategy now viewed most of these transactions as net power losses. 
U.S. foreign policy must be conducted under the strictest guidelines of moral rectitude. 
Given Carter’s particular belief that clandestine policy is inherently immoral, covert 
activities could be expected to receive increased scrutiny and far less administrative 
support than in previous years. Foreign leaders must demonstrate political integrity and 
responsible governance or lose Washington’s support.
The moral front of American grand strategy also could be expected to include 
sincere efforts toward significant accomplishments in the area of making the world as a 
whole more peaceful and secure through leadership on issues such as arms control,
3 9  This view of the sources of American power lay squarely in the quality of 
American exceptionalism described most succinctly in a quote often attributed incorrectly 
to Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America'. “America is great because America is 
good, and if America ever ceases to be good, America will cease to be great.” Presidents 
from Eisenhower, Reagan, and Clinton have used this quote to describe American 
exceptionalism, even though it has never been found in de Tocqueville’s writings. Carter 
did more than supplement his speeches with it; he made this idea the cornerstone of his 
view of American power.
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human rights, and international peace and security. As the Soviets grew both more 
powerful and more aggressive, traditionally applied structural realism argues the United 
States would feel increasing insecurity. It would respond with steps to bolster its military 
capabilities, preferring war as soon as it is ready to long-term decline.4 0
Ideationally speaking this held true as well, for while Carter and his advisors 
brought unprecedented emphasis on the role of moral authority, they were never blind to 
the larger realities of tangible power. They understood that concurrent with the loss of 
American moral stature had been a weakening of its military power and reputation. The 
balance of conventional and nuclear forces, especially in Europe, left the Carter 
administration deeply troubled about American security. Years of unsuccessful combat 
operations in Vietnam left the American military unpopular and demoralized.
Declining military power contributed significantly to the overall loss of American 
power and would become a far more dangerous trend if not addressed quickly. Therefore 
the second component of American power viewed as neglected and in need of immediate 
rebuilding was its armed forces. Looking at the situation from this view, one could 
expect the United States to seek an increase in both overall spending and targeted 
spending that would provide an advantage.
In 1977 only one nation possessed the ability to inflict crippling damage on the 
United States. American strategists, however, did not believe they were under much 
threat of immediate attack by the Soviet Union. A rising nation that has not yet achieved
4 0  See Copeland, Origins o f Major War.
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its peak relative power vis-a-vis its adversary is generally viewed as a highly unlikely 
agitator for war, for the rising state almost always stands to achieve greater gains by 
simply waiting patiently for the balance to continue to shift in its favor.4 1  However, 
rising nations do tend to become more assertive as they seek to exercise their newfound 
strength. It is a contradictory urge felt by any nation whose leaders see themselves in this 
situation in which they can finally be more aggressive in their daily pursuits, while being 
overly aggressive could disrupt their expected future ascendance by starting a war they 
are not yet able to win 4 2
Classical structural realism in fact parallels very well Soviet thinking and predicts 
quite accurately Soviet behavior. Its logic predicts a high probability of war initiated by
4 1  Copeland demonstrated in Origins o f Major War that this was an area of 
structural realism that had traditionally been mistaken in its analysis. Rising states were 
viewed as increasingly aggressive because they would seek to remake the international 
structure in ways that recognize their newly acquired status, while declining states hoped 
to maintain a status quo based their over-inflated position. Copeland showed how rising 
states actually have a greater incentive to remain patient and allow favorable trends to 
continue developing, while declining states have a strong incentive to pursue preventative 
war before the rising state acquires sufficient power to win a confrontation.
4 2  Theoretical insights about preemptive war -  usually understood in terms of the 
timing of an attack -  are in general not very useful for studying grand strategy. Rather, 
theoretical insights about preventative war -  usually understood in terms of the decision 
to pursue a course of action that will likely lead to war -  are at the very heart of the 
subject. It is important to keep this distinction in mind when considering the strategic 
implications of scholarly efforts as defining the spiral model and conducting 
investigations into the offense-defense balance. It is important to explicate whether these 
insights describe the pursuit of short-term solutions (preemptive) or decisions regarding 
long-term objectives (preventative). For more information on spiral models see Jervis, 
Perception and Misperception and Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military 
Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models,” World Politics 44, 
no. 4 (July 1992), 497-538. For more information on offense-defense balances and the 
manner in which they contribute to preemptive war, see Schelling, Arms and Influence 
and Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory.”
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the rising Soviet Union. Its leaders would be expected to choose a strategy that reflects 
its struggle for recognition of the Soviet Union’s more prominent position in international 
relations. This is, in fact, a very good description of Soviet adventurism in the 1970s.
According to classic dynamic differentials theory, the probability of major power 
war in this situation is high for another reason. American strategists, applying American 
ideational beliefs to their expectations of Soviet strategy, believed the danger of Soviet 
aggression during the temporary ascendance was increasing. Bilateral and multilateral 
trends were increasing negative. Changes in government made this realization come 
about abruptly, increasing the picture of fear among policy makers by increasing the 
number and prominence of those policy makers who held the more fearful view. They 
commanded a formidable military alliance and possessed significant capability to destroy 
Soviet forces. At this point structural realist logic points to a strong likelihood of the 
United States readying its armed forces and launching a preventative war while its 
leaders felt they still had the greater capacity.
Why then would one not expect the United States to choose a strategy of violent 
preventative war with the Soviet Union? Taking the proto-theoretical approach helps 
identify where the assumptions of a theoretical model no longer correspond with the 
views of strategists and, therefore, helps the analyst avoid this erroneous assumption.
The particular traditions and values of American grand strategy render the assumptions 
underlying these predictions invalid. Primary was the American character -  the United 
States is not the kind of nation that will choose to annihilate a rival with a peacetime 
nuclear sneak attack, nor will it deliberately choose a course of action that leads to major 
war.
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One unavoidably salient factor affected the mindset of the closely, but not 
entirely, structural realist orientation of the United States at this point in history. This 
aberrant factor is the restraining presence of annihilative capability by both sides in the 
Cold War. Second-strike capabilities reduce this probability to nearly zero. The United 
States as a nation did not consider the major war option to be a viable solution to fears of 
relative decline, even deep and irreversible decline, so long as that option meant the 
destruction of the populations of both nations.
Nuclear parity has dramatic effects on structural approaches, for it renders the war 
option very unlikely. It removes incentives for escalating hostilities to the point beyond 
which total war can no longer be avoided. Precisely where that point lies has been a 
matter of debate for deterrence in American and Soviet circles since 1949.43 What is not 
contested is fact that this ameliorated the United States’ strategic orientation, channeling 
the response scenarios outside traditional areas of structural response.
U.S. views parallel very closely the assumptions of dynamic differentials theory, 
but it is in the translation from tendency to prediction that the divergences become clear. 
Dynamic differentials theory examines major power war, but American leaders have a 
wider range of strategic responses to the influences than major power war. By expanding 
the possibilities of dynamic differentials theory beyond its original scope of war into the
4 3  A few thorough treatments of this topic are Richard Smoke, National Security 
and the Nuclear Dilemma: An Introduction to the American Experience in the Cold War, 
3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); Erik Beukel, American Perceptions o f the 
Soviet Union as a Nuclear Adversary: From Kennedy to Bush (New York: Pinter 
Publishers, 1989); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987); and Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons.
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realm of wider competition, a vast range of strategic options becomes available. A nation 
in the position of the United States can choose to challenge the rising power in other 
battlegrounds, such as economic might or moral authority, on which it holds the greatest 
advantages. Any other strategy would ran counter to every worldview that ever held 
enough popular support to take the United States’ highest offices.
Henry Kissinger noted in 1957, “Many familiar assumptions about war, 
diplomacy, and the nature of peace will have to be modified before we have developed a 
theory adequate to the perils and opportunities of the nuclear age.” 4 4  A number of 
prominent scholars had been exploring these avenues of inquiry. Thomas Schelling 
wrote in 1966 of using nuclear brinksmanship as a policy tool.4 5  As late as 1987 Richard 
Betts wrote of the various means of using “nuclear blackmail” for policy ends.4 6  Yet it is 
quite significant that none of these ideas found their way into major foreign policy 
addresses.4 7  Although they occasionally used the nuclear threat to protect vital interests, 
American leaders never wavered in their belief that the consequences of a deep and
4 4  Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons, xi-xii.
4 5  Schelling, Arms and Influence.
4 6  Betts, Nuclear Blackmail.
4 7  Erik Beukel contributed a useful distinction in the area by dividing nuclear 
policy into several overlapping facets: declaratory policy (public pronouncements on 
nuclear weapons made by senior administration officials);/brce development policy 
(decisions on the size and capabilities of American nuclear forces); arms control 
negotiation policy (guidelines as to goals and tactics to be pursued in negotiations on 
nuclear issues with other countries); operational policy (guidelines for such activities as 
alert rates or patrol practices for various types of nuclear forces); and force employment 
policy (the actual war-fighting plans that the United States would adopt in a nuclear war). 
See Beukel, American Perceptions, 27. Outside of these facets is the realm of scholarly 
investigation of nuclear issues, for while they overlap all of these at various points, the 
constraints under which they are made are considerably and purposefully different.
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inevitable American decline were preferable to the immediate devastation of a Soviet 
nuclear response.4 8
As Kissinger noted, President Eisenhower had already decided nuclear weapons 
had created a world in which there was no longer any alternative to peace 4 9  The 
devastation of a Soviet retaliatory strike, whether in the 1960s or the 1980s, rendered 
forcing a nuclear confrontation far too costly to seriously tempt even the most hawkish of 
policy makers. Even if purposeful pursuit of nuclear war had been possible -  and the 
American public had been uncharacteristically willing to support it -  the idea of gaining 
anything useful by it became increasingly remote. Richard Smoke reminded historians in 
1993 that, as the nuclear confrontation progressed into the Carter years, “at each turn of 
the wheel the relative position of the United States was less advantageous than before.” 5 0
4 8  On the evolution of American policy and the role of nuclear weapons, see 
Smoke, Nuclear Dilemma. Also informative for its historical value into the development 
of policies other than mutual assured destruction is Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons. For in- 
depth coverage of an incident in which this choice was examined at length, see Ernest R. 
May and Philip D. Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the 
Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997) and Aleksandr 
Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell o f a Gamble: Khrushchev, Kennedy, and 
Castro, 1958-1964 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997).
4 0  Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons, 3.
5 0  Smoke, Nuclear Dilemma, 318. Zbigniew Brzezinski agreed: “The political 
change is accompanied by a gradual shift in the American-Soviet strategic balance. A 
mere six years ago (i.e., during the Cuban missile crisis of 1972) the Soviet Union 
already had second-strike capacity to inflict on the U.S.A. the loss of several tens of 
millions lives -  but at the cost of its national existence. Today, though the U.S. still 
possesses the capacity to inflict on the Soviet Union the ultimate penalty of national 
extinction, the Soviet Union can destroy a hundred million Americans. Thus, in effect, 
parity in non-survivability almost exists and, as Soviet missile strength reaches U.S. 
levels, it will shortly be attained.” See “Peace and Power,” 7.
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If the Soviets believed major war inevitable or even advantageous, this temporary 
bubble of ascendance would seem the best time for it. If Soviet strategists viewed the 
world through the same beliefs as their American counterparts, then they would perceive 
a long-term decline vis-a-vis the Americans and move to start a preventative war before 
American power resurged. However, Soviet ideology dictated that socialism would 
eventually triumph over capitalism because it was a more just system of political and 
economic organization. Its long-term outlook is always favorable. Any strategist who 
predicted otherwise would have been accused of doubting the state’s ideology. Therefore 
Soviet strategy must contain the belief that a preventative war would only be necessary if 
the Soviet Union was certain of an impending annihilative attack from the United States. 
In all other cases the avoidance of major war would serve Soviet interests in the long 
term.
Benjamin S. Lambeth noted in 1979 that there was little disagreement over this 
issue. Regardless of what Soviet military doctrine held “regarding the value of superior 
forces and the necessity for a strategy oriented toward war waging and victory, the Soviet 
leadership regards deterrence of nuclear war as its overriding security priority and seeks 
the maintenance of a strategic balance conducive to minimizing the likelihood of such a 
war.” 51 The distinctive ideational qualities of the Soviet system convert structural 
realism’s usual prediction of a Soviet strategy favoring major war initiation to prediction 
of a Soviet strategy of war avoidance.
51 Lambeth, “Soviet Equivalence,” 23.
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Instead of choosing preventative war with the Soviet Union, the United States
chose rebuilding and confrontation of Soviet power. As a first step, Carter enunciated
five principles that would serve as guidelines for foreign policy according to his
administration’s grand strategy.
The United States has a legal right and responsibility under the Charter of 
the United Nations to speak out against human rights violations.
The notion of “linkage” put forth by Kissinger was no longer valid. The 
United States will pursue human rights objectives simultaneously and 
independently of its other foreign policy goals.
Bilateral relations will not prevent the United States from pursuing its 
human rights objectives.
The notion that increased emphasis on human rights will lead to increased 
repression is not valid.
An American policy based on fundamental American values would best 
serve its security interests.
Carter sought to establish immediate credibility for these objectives by appointing 
several noted civil rights activists to key positions in the new human rights machinery 
emerging in the state department. 52  He also needed to find an issue that would delineate 
the differences between the American and Soviet positions in this area. In the end he 
seized upon several. Carter made his “Deep Cuts” proposals in the SALT II negotiations.
5 2  These appointments included Mississippi civil rights leader and former deputy 
campaign manager Patricia Derian as head of the new Bureau of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs. In April 1977 Brzezinski tapped her for the Interagency Group on 
Human Rights and Foreign Assistance (the “Christopher group”). Soon thereafter her 
position was elevated to Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights to increase the 
authority of her voice in foreign policy. See Kaufman, “The Bureau of Human Rights,” 
51-66.
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He called for a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing, rebuked the West Germans for 
selling nuclear material to Brazil, explored the possibility of normalizing relations with 
Cuba, consented to Vietnam’s admittance to the U.N., spoke in favor of a “Palestinian 
homeland,” and sent Vance to Moscow with a comprehensive plan for limiting strategic 
arms. 53
Shortly thereafter, Carter received a letter from Soviet Nobel Peace Prize winner 
Andrei Sakharov, who praised Carter for his commitment to human rights and drew 
attention to human-rights problems in the Soviet Union. He felt he had the moral high 
ground and pushed relentlessly to reiterate his administration’s stand on this issue.5 4  
According to Brzezinski, "We all felt that the President had to reply. The prestige of the 
author was such that failure to do so would invite adverse comparisons with the widely 
criticized refusal by President Ford to meet with Solzhenitsyn."5 5
5 3  George W. Breslauer finds that new American presidents have been far more 
likely to test their Soviet counterparts. See “Do Soviet Leaders Test New Presidents?” 
International Security 8 , no. 3, (Winter 1983/1984), 83-108. Carter announced before his 
inauguration that he would send Vance to Moscow to reopen the SALT II negotiations. 
The ill-prepared trip did little more than convey his sincerity on arms limitation and 
frustrate the Soviets with inept way in which the proposals were made. Anatoly 
Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents (New 
York: Random House, 1995), 392-96.
5 4  Translations from Russian archives of the exchanges between Carter and 
Brezhnev and the newly declassified instructions provided to Ambassador Dobrynin can 
be found in “The Path to Disagreement: U.S.-Soviet Communications Leading to Vance's 
March 1977 Trip to Moscow,” in Cold War International History Project Bulletin no. 5: 
Cold War Crises, Cold War International History Project, available at 
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=26, 
accessed 7 November 7, 2004.
5 5  Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 156.
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By August 1977 the principles underlying these actions translated formally into
American doctrine. Carter signed Presidential Directive 18 (PD 18), which codified
American grand strategy as follows:
“U.S. national strategy will he to take advantage of our relative advantages 
in economic strength, technological superiority and popular political 
support to:
Counterbalance, together with our allies and friends, by a combination of 
military forces, political efforts, and economic programs, Soviet military 
power and adverse influence in key areas, particularly Europe, the Middle 
East, and East Asia.
Compete politically with the Soviet Union by pursuing the basic American 
commitment to human rights and national independence.
Seek Soviet cooperation in resolving regional conflicts and reducing areas 
of tension that could lead to confrontation between the United States and 
the Soviet Union.
Advance American security interests through negotiations with the Soviet 
Union of adequately verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements 
that enhance stability and curb arms competition.
Seek to involve die Soviet Union constructively in global activities, such 
as economic and social developments and peaceful non-strategic trade.5 6
These points expressed very clearly the grand strategy the United States attempted to 
implement in 1977. They also parallel almost precisely the expectations that flow from 
the methodology described above for using scholarly insights to discern tendencies in 
grand strategy formulation.
56 “U.S. National Strategy,” available at 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives/pdl 8 .pdf, accessed 7 
November 2004.
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The United States made the demonstration of political integrity a prerequisite for 
the continued receipt of American support. Carter took extraordinary steps that did much 
to restore America’s credibility on issues of world leadership. He allowed the Panama 
Canal, one of most militarily significant territories under U.S. jurisdiction, to revert to 
Panamanian control as specified by the original canal agreement. He brought the leaders 
of Israel and Egypt to Camp David and kept them there with them until they agreed to 
accept peace, a significant step toward solving one of the most enduring problem of 
international relations since 1949. With each of the actions the United States spent 
considerable political and strategic capital in the expectation that these investments 
would pay off with restoration of U.S. moral credibility and, by direct translation, 
increases in U.S. power. One of the areas where this showed through clearly was in the 
United States’ refusal to take the violent and potentially destabilizing steps necessary to 
win its proxy conflict with the Soviet Union on the Horn of Africa.
Case Study: Horn of Africa 
The Soviets understood that something fundamental to U.S. strategy was going on 
in Washington. They misinterpreted, however, the significance of the rebuilding strategy 
as an aberration that did not having the ultimate goal of abandoning the long-standing 
American commitment to containment.57  Rather, they viewed the Carter administration’
5 7  Ambassador Dobrynin wrote to his superiors in 1978, “Insofar as it is possible 
to judge on the basis of information which the embassy has at its disposal, the Carter 
Administration has come to its own variety of a selective, half-hearted conception of
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apparent ambiguity about power as a temporary development, the result of naivete and 
confusion. Carter’s decision that the United States would not become militarily involved 
in third world countries just because the Soviets were there seemed justification that U.S. 
could not afford to compete. 5 8  It was not until later in the Carter administration that 
Moscow understood that the redefinition of worldviews in Washington was the harbinger 
of a new American Cold War strategy.
Stephen David concluded in 1979, “It is hard to avoid the central political lesson 
that has emerged: alignment with the Soviet Union proved demonstrably superior to 
alignment with the United States.” 5 9  This criticism fell hard on the Carter 
administration, which was hoping to fulfill its pledge to restore integrity in ways that did 
not cost it quite so much of its reputation in other areas. Commitment to states that had 
long-standing arrangements with the United States was one area that would pay the price 
of this new direction in American strategy. Nowhere was this demonstrated more clearly 
than on the Horn of Africa in the late 1970s.
The situation in the Horn of Africa was one of the typically complex situations 
that great powers face in areas that are little known, but nonetheless of sufficient strategic 
interest to gamer extensive engagement. The principal nations involved showed strong
detente (of which Brzezinski himself first accused us).” See “Soviet American Relations 
in the Contemporary Era,” in Political Letter o f Soviet Ambassador to the United States 
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, 11 July 1978, to the USSR Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Com. 
Gromyko, A. A. Secret, Copy no. 2,11 July 1978, Attachment to the Issue no. 667. Cold 
War International History Project, available at
http://wwics.si .edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=23, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
5 8  Colin Legum, “The African Crisis,” Foreign Affairs 57, no. 3 (Spring 1979),
633-51.
5 9  Steven David, “Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet Advantage,” 
International Security 4, no. 2 (Fall 1979), 70.
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similarities. Both were poor and possessed no known petroleum fields or strategic 
minerals. There were no major sources of foreign investment and no booming trade in 
tourism. What brought these disputants to superpower attention was their strategic 
location. Both nations sit on a longstanding bridge between the African subcontinent and 
the Middle East.
The differences between Ethiopia and Somalia were equally stark. Ethiopia was 
about twice the size of Somalia and held approximately nine times its population.
Ethiopia has a rich heritage as Africa’s oldest independent nation, while Somalia did not 
gain its independence until 1960. Ethiopian leaders shared a continual fear of invasion, 
being in their perception a Christian nation in a sea of Islam. They also faced threats of 
internal unrest due to its multiethnic population. Since 1962 they had been in open 
conflict with the province of Eritrea, a thriving former Italian territory they annexed that 
became Ethiopia’s only outlet to the sea.
Somali history consisted largely of attempts to consolidate lands occupied by the 
historic expansion of the nomadic Somali people in search of water, irrespective of 
national borders. Somalis live in Ethiopia, as well as Kenya and Djibouti. Ethiopian 
leaders were thus trying to hold together its many ethnicities, while Somali leaders sought 
to unify their people into one Somali nation. This crossing of purposes met in the 
Ethiopian province of Ogaden. Fully one-fifth of Ethiopia, the nation acquired this 
province in the late nineteenth century. Somalis claimed that the desert province was 
rightfully part of Somalia, as it was inhabited mostly by Somalis.
In 1952, seeking to capitalize on growing U.S. fears of Soviet adventurism, 
Ethiopian leaders requested American aid. They had no domestic communist threat to
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attract American concern, so they offered instead use of a military base at Kagnew (in 
Eritrea). Kagnew offered excellent strategic geography -  its high plain was ideal for 
communications posts.6 0  American leaders jumped at the opportunity and agreed to 
provide Ethiopia with aid for the years 1953-1978. During those 25 years over $300 
million in military aid and $350 million in economic aid made its way to the Ethiopian 
government, making it the largest recipient of U.S. aid in black Africa.61  The 
relationship was stable until 1974, when Emperor Haile Selassie’s reign became unstable.
Eight years after the 1952 American-Somalia accord, the Soviets began making 
their own inroads to Somalia. Unification of Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland 
into the new nation brought with it an exuberant dedication to continuing to unite all 
ethnic Somalis into one nation. Somali leaders tested their plan by initiating several 
border skirmishes with Ethiopia. Ethiopia had little trouble defeating the poorly 
equipped Somali army. In 1962 Somali leaders followed the same logic as Ethiopian 
leaders then years earlier: they requested Western aid.
The United States, West Germany, and Italy offered Somalia $10 million in 
military aid, with the understanding that this aid was to be used for internal security and 
no requests would be made of other nations. Western leaders could go no higher; they 
did not want Somalia using this aid to further their ethnic unification plans by invading
6 0  Mohammed Ayoob, The Horn o f Africa: Regional Conflict and Super Power 
Involvement, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 18 (Canberra: Australian 
National University, 1978), 10.
61  Madan M. Sauldie, Super Powers in the Horn o f Africa (New York: Apt 
Books, 1987), 169.
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Ethiopia and Kenya. This offer did not tempt Somali leaders, as an invasion force was 
precisely what Somalia leaders wanted.
The Soviets seized the opportunity and offered a much larger package, first a loan 
of $32 million they later raised to $55 million. Somali leaders accepted the Soviet 
package and began recruiting, equipping, and training their invasion force. Aid increased 
gradually, as Soviet caution and Somali absorptive capacity placed ceilings on the 
amounts that could flow into the poor nation. In 1969 a military coup brought to power 
Siad Barre, a general in the new Soviet-trained army. Barre promised to bring “scientific 
socialism” to Somalia. The Soviets increased their shipments of aid and advisors.
In July 1974 Somalia became the first black African state to sign a Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Soviets wrote off much of the 
Somali loan and received in exchange a deep-water port in Berbera, an air base near 
Mogadishu. It also consolidated its rights to a communications base at Kismayu.6 2  
Backed by Soviet political power, armed with Soviet weapons, and trained by Soviet 
advisors, Somali leaders resumed efforts to seize the Ogaden region from Ethiopia.
American aid to Ethiopia had not kept pace with Soviet aid to Somalia. By 1975 
the Somalis had more of everything -  tanks, combat aircraft, and armored personnel 
carriers -  and theirs was newer and more advanced. The only advantage Ethiopia still 
held was in the size of its army, but much of that army was engaged in suppressing the 
Eritrean revolt. It was not very successful; guerrilla forces held ninety percent of Eritrea.
6 2  David, “Realignment in the Horn,” 72.
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The Ethiopian government was sitting on a bed of hostility. In a nation that 
regards land as the ultimate indicator of wealth, ninety-five percent of Ethiopia belonged 
to the Royal Family, the feudal nobility, or the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Ethnic 
claims for self-determination appeared throughout the country.6 3  Government 
mishandling of a major famine contributed to the deaths of over a hundred thousand 
Ethiopians. A populace that did not have much confidence that Selassie government 
could prevent dissolution therefore shared Ethiopian officials’ fears of the nation 
breaking apart.
In February 1974 a group of military officers presented Emperor Selassie a list of 
grievances. He either would or could not respond as desired and in September was 
deposed. He died in August 1975 of suspicious circumstances. The military cadre that 
assumed power had little ideological orientation beyond frustration and desires to 
modernize the country and improve the lot of the poor. Intellectuals and the Marxist- 
dominated student movement injected it with ideology.6 4  Its leaders (the Dergue) 
adopted a stridently Marxist platform and killed thousands of “counterrevolutionaries,” 
including many of their early supporters.65
6 3  See Christopher Clapham, “Ethnicity and the National Question in Ethiopia,” 
in Conflict and Peace in the Horn o f Africa: Federalism and its Alternatives, ed. Peter 
Woodward and Murray Forsyth (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1994), 
27-40.
6 4  Gerard Chaliand, “The Horn of Africa’s Dilemma,” Foreign Policy, no. 30 
(Spring 1978), 117.
6 5  Ermias Abebe recalls that the new leaders were so “ignorant in the realm of 
ideology that at one point in the early stage of the revolution delegations were sent to 
Tanzania, Yugoslavia, China, and India to shop for one for Ethiopia.” Ermias Abebe,
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American strategists watched these developments with alarm. Although Emperor 
Haile Selassie had visited the Soviet Union in 1959, 1967, 1970, and in 1973, Ethiopia 
had been a dependable ally and the location of strategic facilities.6 6  The United States 
had a vital interest in keeping open the strait of Bab el Mandeb, the port of Djibouti, and 
the Red Sea for the free flow of international shipping to itself and its allies.6 7
Unwilling to cede Ethiopia to Soviet influence without a struggle, American 
attempted to work with the Dergue. Consequently, in 1975 they provided Ethiopia with 
an enormous sales credit for U.S. arms ($135 million). The Dergue purchased tanks and 
aircraft while the U.S. Congress authorized an additional $53 million over a two-year 
period and transferred a squadron of F-5A aircraft from Iran.6 8
The emerging winner of the Dergue’s internal power struggles did not embrace 
the United States gratefully for its generosity. Although often understood as a strident 
anti-Western socialist, Colonel Mengistu’s priorities were nationalistic 6 9  He adopted 
drastic land reform and continued the Dergue’s terror tactics while denouncing the 
corruption of the West. In a shrewd reading of the political situation, he undercut the
“The Horn, the Cold War, and Documents from the Former East-Bloc: An Ethiopian 
View,” in Cold War International History Project Bulletin no. 8: Anatomy o f a Third 
World Cold War Crisis: New East-Bloc Evidence on the Horn o f Africa, 1977-1978, 
available at http://Cold War International History Project.si.edu/pdf/bull8-9.pdf, accessed 
30 March 2001.
6 6  “Soviet-Ethiopian Relations (Reference),” in Soviet Foreign Ministry 
Background Report on Soviet-Ethiopian Relations, 3 April 1978, Cold War International 
History Project, trans. Svetlana Savranskaya, available at
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm7topic_idH 409&fuseaction=library.document&id=856, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
6 7  Chaliand, “The Horn of Africa’s Dilemma,” 116.
6 8  David, “Realignment in the Horn,” 74.
6 9  Mengistu himself had neither exposure to nor interest in communist ideology 
or the Soviet Union. As he admitted in one interview, his first encounter with Russians 
happened only after the revolution. See Abebe, “The Horn.”
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communism of the Eritrean separatists by building diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, 
while at the same time giving the Soviets a reason to restrain the Somalis. When 
American aid dropped suddenly amidst American concern about the Dergue’s socialist 
leanings and human rights abuses, Mengistu responded coldly to American influence.
In December 1976, one year after the Dergue accepted the enormous American 
aid package, Mengistu went to Moscow and concluded a $385 million arms agreement 
with the Soviets. He also kept the door open to the United States, which had not yet 
delivered some $40 million of the equipment and would be the only source of spare parts 
for its maintenance.7 0  The United States, refusing to abandon its investment, also 
attempted to maintain American-Ethiopian ties and moderate Mengistu’s policies. On 
February 3, 1977, approximately two weeks after Carter took office, Colonel Mengistu 
consolidated his leadership of the Dergue by executing seven of his colleagues, including 
the nominal head of state, Terifi Bante. He announced that henceforth Somalia would 
look exclusively to socialist states for military assistance.
7 0  During a conversation between Political Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in 
Ethiopia Herbert Malin and Soviet Counselor-Minister in Ethiopia S. Sinitsin on 
February 2,1977, Malin noted “that the new Ethiopian administration is pursuing a 
policy of seeking methods of receiving military assistance form other sources as well, 
possibly on terms more advatages (sic) to it, including from the USSR (he is aware of the 
visit by the Ethiopian military delegation to Moscow in December of 1976), as well as 
the PRC (People’s Republic of China), although he doubts that the Chinese are capable of 
supplying Ethiopia with “serious armaments.” Memorandum o f Conversation between 
Soviet Counselor-Minister in Ethiopia S. Sinitsin with Political Counselor o f  the U.S. 
Embassy in Ethiopia Herbert Malin, 2 February 1977, Cold War International History 
Project, trans. Bruce McDonald, available at
http ://wwics. si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=821, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
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Carter’s grand strategy of rebuilding American moral authority played out very 
prominently in the Horn of Africa. His administration’s policy toward the subcontinent, 
as part of the overall grand strategy of displaying moral credibility, called for “African 
solutions to African problems.” 71 On February 24th Carter announced that Ethiopia and 
two other countries were guilty of deplorable human rights violations and removed 
Ethiopian military aid from his 1978 budget proposal. On April 19th American officials 
informed the Dergue that they were halving their personnel involved in military 
assistance to Ethiopia and requested early termination of their lease of the strategic 
Kagnew base.
Four days later Mengistu expelled the entire group of military advisors and gave 
the United States 96 hours to close Kagnew. The United States cut its diplomatic 
personnel in half and stopped all military sales and deliveries to Ethiopia. Mengistu 
ordered the closure of the U.S. communications stations in Asmara, the U.S. Information 
Service (USIS) center, and the American military assistance advisory offices, and 
abrogated the Ethio-U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. 7 2  Mengistu traveled to 
Moscow in May and reached a series of agreements that led to his signing a Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviets in November 1978.
Carter condemned blatant abuses of human rights by a former ally, abandoned 
American military aid to Ethiopia, and accepted Soviet influence over the strategic 
country. Carter turned instead to the Soviet client state of Somalia. Tensions between
71 Legum, “The African Crisis,” 633-51.
72 See Abebe, “The Horn.”
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Siad Barre and the Soviet Union had been mounting. Somali alignment with Arab states 
and acceptance of Chinese aid angered Soviet leaders. Somali leaders, in turn, were 
apprehensive about the Soviet Union’s refusal to build anything beyond military capacity 
for Somalia. It offered a legacy of dependence, rather than grounds for sustainable 
growth.73  Finally, increasing Soviet aid to Somalia and attempts to restrain Somali 
expansion contravened the long-term strategy of Somali unification.
In April 1977, while it was condemning Mengistu’s actions, the Carter 
administration indicated its willingness to consider selling arms to Somalia. This 
escalated in on July 15th when the United States, Britain, and France openly declared 
their willingness to supply defensive weapons for Somalia. The Somalis put the question 
of Soviet backing to the test by invading the Ogaden in July.
The Somalis timed their attack well. Their forces were at peak preparedness, 
while the Ethiopians were caught between suppliers, having lost the United States but not 
yet begun receiving and training on significant quantities of Soviet equipment. Moscow 
hesitated, partly because it did not want the conflict at all and largely because it had yet to 
pick which side to support.7 4  By mid-August Somali forces held nearly all of the 
Ogaden.
73  Edward A. Koldziej noted in 1980 that the Soviet Union had a reputation 
throughout black Africa for this kind of behavior. It was considered a receding force 
once racial equality and national independence had been achieved, while the West 
offered the economic development and liberal political values that could meet long-term 
African needs. See “The Partial Partner,” 122.
7 4  The Third Africa Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry expressed its 
dilemma as follows: “Beginning in the 1960s, in almost every instance of a serious
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In September Mengistu, having not yet received his arms from the Soviets and 
increasingly worried that he had chosen the wrong superpower as an ally, publicly 
accused the Soviets of complicity in the Somali invasion. He sought delivery of the 
American arms that Carter had refused to allow to reach Ethiopia.
At this point traditional realist logic suggests the United States would provide the 
Somalis with sufficient arms to end the conflict and reap the rewards of a successful Cold 
War policy in the Horn of Africa. The United States, however, responded by appearing 
to place itself above the conflict, calling for an end to hostilities and implementing an 
arms embargo on both nations. Rather than provide more arms and accept the sure win 
by Somali forces, Carter pulled back. A spokesman from the State department told an 
incredulous press corps that the United States had decided ending the proxy war was 
more important an American responsibility that winning it. The provision of any more 
arms to the Somalis “would add fuel to the fire we are more interested in putting out.”
aggravation of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, Ethiopia and Somalia have appealed to the 
Soviet government with a request to assert influence on the government of the other 
country with the goal of normalizing the situation. Recently, both Somalia and Ethiopia 
have repeatedly called for more active participation by the Soviet Union in settling their 
bilateral relations. In this regard each of them is counting on the Soviet Union to support 
precisely their position, using for this its authority and friendly relations with the 
opposing side.” The report later concluded, “The position of the Soviet Union on the 
question of the Ethiopia-Somalia territorial dispute, which many times has been brought 
to the attention of the governments of both countries, is that Ethiopia and the SDR must 
take all possible measures to settle their disagreements by means of negotiations and to 
find a way to lessen the tension in Ethiopia-Somalia relations.” “Somalia’s Territorial 
Disagreements with Ethiopia and the Position of the USSR (Brief Information Sheet),” in 
Third African Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, Information Report on Somali- 
Ethiopian Territorial Disputes, 2 February 1977, Cold War International History Project, 
trans. Mark H. Doctoroff, available at
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topicid=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=822, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
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The United States would neither supply any more arms nor approve transfer of U.S. 
military equipment from third countries. 75
The American refusal to sell more arms to Somali and provide its ally with a 
victory of a Soviet-backed and Cuban-led Ethiopian force was a dramatic public 
demonstration of the U.S. commitment to regaining exceptionalism. It was a concrete 
demonstration of the American willingness to forgo Cold War gains taken through the 
blood of proxy fighters in Ethiopia and Somalia. Carter hoped it would be an American 
diplomatic victory, a successful component of prosecution of the strategy of rebuilding 
moral authority that would help his efforts elsewhere, especially the Middle East.7 6  This 
view seemed justified by events when the Somalis acted on their preference for the 
American model. Somali leaders renounced their 1974 Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation with the Soviet Union, expelled over 1,500 Soviet advisors, and denied the 
Soviets further use of Somali facilities.7 7
The end results were not so fortunate for American assertions of the importance 
of exceptionalism at this time. Mengistu, with nowhere else to turn, badly needed aid to 
prevent the Somalis from advancing on the city of Harrar, deep in Ethiopian territory.
The Soviets, wanting to preserve their position in the Horn, rushed arms to Harrar to hold 
off the Somalis’ assault in November. Unfortunately Ethiopian soldiers were trained for
75  Quoted in Ayoob, The Horn o f Africa, 22.
7 6  Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn o f Africa (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1980), 129.
7 7  David, “Realignment in the Horn,” 79.
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American equipment and tactics and would not be able to put the Soviet arms to much 
use.78
Facing the loss of Harrar -  and most likely collapse of the Mengistu government -  
the time had come for the Soviets to bring in the Cubans.7 9  Cuban advisors and soldiers 
had been coming to Ethiopia since the establishment of its ties with the Soviet Union. In 
November 1977 they numbered about 1,000 and were well versed in the use of Soviet 
arms. They assisted the Ethiopian defense of Harrar, repelling Somali forces and pushing 
them back to pre-November positions. 80
The Carter administration, sticking to its strategy of appearing the “moral” 
superpower, refused to rise openly to the challenge of Soviet escalation in Ethiopia.
7 8  A state delegation led by Army General V.I. Petrov had arrived Ethiopia in 
November 1977 on a closed visit. The tasks of the delegation include devising measures 
jointly with the Ethiopian side to assist the PMAC in building the Ethiopian armed 
forces, for faster mastering of the Soviet military equipment by the Ethiopian army, and 
in the planning of military operations in the Ogaden and Eritrea. However, this 
delegation was far from sufficient to train the entire national army in time to save it. . 
“Soviet-Ethiopian Relations.”
7 9  Paul B. Henze, “Moscow, Mengistu, and the Horn: Difficult Choices for the 
Kremlin,” in Cold War International History Project Bulletin no. 8: Anatomy o f a Third 
World Cold War Crisis: New East-Bloc Evidence on the Horn o f Africa, 1977-1978, 
available at http://Cold War International History Project.si.edu/pdf/bull8-9.pdf, accessed 
30 March 2001. Soviet archives show that “the main purpose of the meeting with the 
Cuban envoy was to chastise him for permitting Cuban General Ochoa to promise 
Mengistu that more Cuban technicians would be coming: “The decision to send Cuban 
personnel to Ethiopia does not depend on Havana, but on Moscow.”
80  Despite its commitment and successes, Cuba agreed it would not undertake to 
do anything in Ethiopia without the preliminary agreement of the Soviet Union. “About 
Measures for the Future Strengthening of Soviet-Ethiopian Relations,” in Minutes on 
Meeting o f CPSU CC Politburo, 14 July 1978, Cold War International History Project, 
available at
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topicid=1409&fuseaction=library.Keywords&imageField 
.x~19&imageField.y=l 1, accessed 14 November 2004.
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Carter, keeping with his belief that backdoor efforts contravening his public stances were 
not congruent with moral behavior, did not pursue allied or covert support. Somali pleas 
for more arms went unanswered, while Soviet weapons and Cuban soldiers poured into 
Ethiopia toward the end of 1977.
In mid-January of the next year an Ethiopian counterattack, aided by an estimated 
10,000 Cubans and led by Soviet General Grigory Barislolov, drove the Somalis out of 
the Ogaden. 81 On March 9th Somali leaders, defeated and disheartened, announced their 
final withdrawal and soon began attempting to reestablish ties with the Soviet Union. In 
June this same force suppressed the Eritrean rebellion, much of which had also been 
equipped by Soviets and trained by Cubans. One longtime observer noted, “Although 
overshadowed by its war with Somalia in the Ogaden, the more significant conflict for 
Ethiopia was in Eritrea -  Ethiopia’s only access to the sea. . .  The struggle in Eritrea was 
critical to the survival of the Ethiopian regime.” 82
The United States lost much of its influence by in its refusal to escalate fighting 
over the Ogaden. Its relationship with Somalia soured after implementation of the arms 
embargo. American leaders appeared to abandon a new client state to Soviet domination. 
Arab leaders were angered by Carter’s restraint on any provision of aid they might have 
made. Frostiness extended throughout the whole of U.S.-Soviet relations, affecting 
everything from detente to nuclear arms control. The cost of moral authority seemed
81 David, “Realignment in the Horn,” 80.
8 2  Chaliand, “The Horn of Africa’s Dilemma,” 123.
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very high indeed, a point that would recur as Carter began to reconsider his views of its 
role as a source of international power.
Stephen David, writing in 1979, offered this perspective: “It is not, therefore, the 
Soviet victory in the Horn itself which is cause for alarm but rather it is in the manner 
they have achieved their success and the example it was set for other third world 
countries where the real consequences of recent events in the Horn lie.” 83 While this 
episode demonstrated the administration’s dogged implementation of many nuances of its 
grand strategy, it also served to underscore the continuing ascendance of Soviet 
international power. The United States’ reputation of supporting its allies until victory 
and being on the winning side of history suffered. At the same time Americans became 
even more concerned about their nation’s capacity for restraining Soviet adventurism, 
deepening their overall fears of relative decline. Yet by showing restraint in the Horn of 
Africa the United States demonstrated in a very recognizable way its commitment to 
reestablishing it record of acting for principles, in this case the abhorrence of pointless 
violence, even at the cost of some of its more tangible strategic interests.
Conclusions
A proto-theoretical approach to this period allows an analyst to bring to bear 
relevant and insightful scholarship that offers a more accurate and thorough interpretation 
of American strategy and the shift that occurred in the mid-1970s. It prevents the use of
83 David, “Realignment in the Horn,” 69-70.
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scholarly insights that mislead by ensuring the assumptions of the scholarship chosen are 
in accordance with the views of the strategists involved. The fallacy of viewing early 
Carter administration strategies and policies through structural realism alone, or any other 
lens for that matter, is especially stark in this case. Contemporary and modern-day 
theoretical models of behavior do not include the Carter administration’s belief that a 
reputation for morality is an important component of national and international power. 
Thus none of these models could provide indicators that the United States would choose 
to bolster its international reputation through its actions in the Horn of Africa, even when 
this policy forced it to sacrifice a strategic military position for a gain in ‘soft’ power.
Lacking the perspective of American international relations theory and failing to 
account for the peculiarities of the Carter administration’s worldview, Soviet observers 
were unable to understand the rationale behind Carter’s most controversial maneuvers, 
such as his administration’s decision to relinquish American control of the Panama 
Canal. Moscow filtered the issue through to its own particular set of lenses, which 
included hardheaded realpolitik and the struggle between capitalism and revolutionary 
socialism, but not the precepts of structural realism (in the way Brzezinski described it), 
nor American exceptionalism. The international behavior of one’s own nation can be 
difficult to understand, but that of other nations would be nearly impossible without the 
benefits of international relations scholarship that is based first on an investigation of the 
people and traditions of those nations.
For his part, Carter understood the realities of ‘hard’ power mattered to his Soviet 
rivals, a view he grasped increasingly well under the tutelage of Brzezinski. Carter 
initiated the May 1977 meeting of the leaders of the NATO alliance in London that
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considered specific steps toward reversing perceived negative trends in relative 
conventional and nuclear forces. Imminent deployment of the SS-20 threatened to 
diminish the alliance’s advantage in theater nuclear forces, an advantage upon which it 
had relied since the 1950s to counter an overwhelming Soviet advantage in conventional 
forces. At the same meeting the Carter administration also pushed for and got a 3 percent 
increase in defense spending by each member of the alliance. Suggested by Secretary of 
Defense Harold Brown and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the policy was a reaction to a 
palpable fear Soviet military power in the region would soon end the balance of forces. 84
Soviet leaders could see quite clearly the Carter administration sought to reverse
its perceived negative trend. Brezhnev noted in a speech to the full Politburo, one year
after Carter’s push at the NATO meeting,
We should note with regret, that the work of the session of the Council of 
NATO and its resolutions do not serve detente or the consolidation of 
peace, but the exacerbation of the international situation and the 
intensification of military preparations, the arms race. Urgent calls for the 
increase of allotments, the agitation of the NATO representatives for 
neutron, chemical, bacteriological arms, the forcing through of long-term 
programs for the production of arms of all types-this is the real meaning 
of this session and of that which follows after it. 85
The military buildup that began in the Carter administration could be foreseen 
easily by conventional application of the insights of international relations scholarship.
8 4  Vance, Hard Choices, 65-6.
85 “Speech of Com. L.I. Brezhnev at the Politburo Session of the CC CPSU 
Concerning Several Issues of the International Situation, 8  June 1978,” Cold War 
International History Project, available at
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id:=70, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
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However the grand strategy itself is missed, for conventional models with pre-built 
assumptions about the sources of power do not model very well the views and actions of 
the Carter administration. For this reason much of Carter’s grand strategy does not come 
into full focus through analysis that neglects the perspective of proto-theory. Only by 
refining the assumptions of theoretical models to parallel the particular beliefs and views 
of the members of the Carter administration could one have expected that the centerpiece 
of its grand strategy would be to rebuild American power by reclaiming the moral 
authority the United States had lost since the end of the Second World War.
Having met the preconditions of this proto-theoretically defined scenario, 
American strategy and behavior followed the projected path with a high degree of 
accuracy. Carter expressly sought gains in prestige and trustworthiness by relinquishing 
a longstanding source of strategic and military power. However, Carter was initially 
unable to accept that Soviet leaders did not share his view of moral authority as a source 
of international power. The realities of the evolving bilateral situation demanded a 
different Cold War strategy, one that he adopted later in his administration.
Carter’s initial strategy did not appear to pay off immediately, nor did he expect it 
to do so. Yet signs were already pointing to a successful rebuilding of American moral 
stature. Thomas Hughes lauded this approach in 1978, arguing that Carter “has enhanced 
the American appeal abroad by reviving the liberal, egalitarian, populist, and 
humanitarian elements in the American tradition.” 86 William Bundy echoed, “The Carter
8 6  Hughes, “Management of Contradictions,” 37.
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Administration plainly saw major gains from its decision to make human rights a 
worldwide element in American policy -  in giving the people a renewed sense of 
idealistic purpose and in enhancing the American image abroad. ” 8 7  Richard W. 
Stevenson argued, “Indeed, in retrospect, Carter’s human rights policy seemed to 
function most effectively as a means to rebuild an American moral consensus on foreign 
policy and to reassert American ideological leadership around the world.” 8 8
The Carter administration suffered tremendous political costs by enacting its plans 
to sacrifice immediate strategic losses while increasing defense spending by allies and 
modem U.S. forces. Seyom Brown warned in 1978 that Secretary of Defense Harold 
Brown viewed the military equivalence of the superpowers to be stable but not 
necessarily sustainable. 8 9  Yet within ten years the cruise missiles and stealth technology 
programs pushed by the Carter administration in general and Secretary Brown 
specifically provided a tremendous military advantage. They put the United States at 
least one generation ahead of its Soviet rivals and several generations ahead of much of 
the rest of the world. Realizing this would be the case offered an inviting area in which 
to challenge the Soviets.
8 7  William Bundy, “Who Lost Patagonia? Foreign Policy in the 1980 
Campaign,” Foreign Affairs 58, no. 1 (Fall 1979), 21.
8 8  Richard W. Stevenson, The Rise and Fall o f Detente: Relaxations o f Tension in 
US-Soviet Relations, 1953-1984 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 203.
8 9  “Secretary of Defense Harold Brown remains confident that today, as he put it 
in the Defense Department’s annual report for fiscal year 1979, “Neither country enjoys a 
military advantage . . .  The situation is one of standoff or stalemate.” But Brown is 
concerned over the increasing vulnerability of the U.S. land-based intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to the new generation of Soviet missiles now being deployed -  
the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19.” Seyom Brown, “An End to Grand Strategy,” 24.
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Hughes noted that Carter tried to “put the country on the right side of history in 
places like southern Africa where, by neglect of preference, past administrations have 
displayed their instinct for the losers.” 90 He successfully jettisoned some lost causes and, 
in the process, eroded the artificial anti-American world majority that has organized itself 
around highly vulnerable symbolic issues. Unfortunately, his focus on the global 
situation outstripped the American public’s desire for him to do so and detracted from his 
ability to focus on the superpower rivalry, an inattention the Soviets exploited to increase 
power differentials in their favor more rapidly than ever before.
First Adjustment: Confronting Soviet Expansion
Grand strategies are implemented with the expectation that they are long-term 
programs. This is rarely the case, for changes in administrations, worldviews, and 
situations usually require extensive modification of them after a few years. The next 
section will demonstrate this was again the case with the Carter administration’s attempts 
to rebuild U.S. power, as the need to use it to confront Soviet aggression suddenly 
became overwhelming, both for Carter and his successor.
Robert Tucker, writing in 1980, mused, “One of the many ironies of recent 
American history is that in 1976 an election brought to power an Administration that 
looked either to the recent past or to a policy-irrelevant future, while turning from office
9 0  Hughes, “Management of Contradictions,” 37.
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an Administration that had begun to confront the present.” 91 His statement 
demonstrated the kind of continuity that usually underlies American grand strategy 
during switches in administration. These continuities are usually downplayed for 
political reasons. In this case, the opposite of Tucker’s statement appeared to be true. 
Most critics saw Kissinger as a throwback to an age and a strategy that was no longer a 
model for the pursuit of American interests. Carter, in the meantime, grasped ever more 
firmly the precepts underlying the strategy he had helped put aside.
While Carter was becoming more like Kissinger, Kissinger, no longer burdened 
with the requirements of political continuity, finally allowed himself to become more like 
Carter. He began to argue, tentatively at first, for a new direction in American grand 
strategy. When even the architects of the previous order have started taking a long, 
penetrating look at the current one, the previous age has indeed passed. By this time the 
United States had made significant progress toward restoration of moral credibility in the 
international system. As the realities of Soviet power became even more alarming, this 
resurging strength gave the United States the confidence to move on to a deepened, more 
sophisticated version of its new grand strategy.
Changing Strategic Situation: Perils of Patience 
American grand strategy in the mid-1970s was predicated on a fundamental faith 
that the moral authority gained from acting on ideals will bring more power and security
91 Tucker, “America in Decline,” 462.
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in the long term than the temporary advantages seized by successful maneuvering in a 
realpolitik sense. The Carter administration codified this belief in its national security 
strategy and acted accordingly, even as the costs of doing so mounted. Hughes noted, 
“By any calculation, the costs of the administration’s recent foreign policy showdowns 
on the Panama Canal and the Middle East arms sales were excessive in terms of time,
O'?energy, and political capital.”
Shortly after the new strategy began to take shape the members of the Carter 
administration found that efforts to resurrect American morality had little deterrent effect 
on the behavior of the Soviet Union. The purpose of these new foreign policy moves was 
to expand U.S. influence in the world by helping to pluralize the politics of others and 
disrupt Soviet political structures wherever they existed. It worked only sporadically, 
although one could argue the success of the Camp David Accords eclipsed much of the 
criticism this strategy would have generated. Nevertheless, in the middle years of his 
administration Carter was plagued by his foreign policy failures, chief among them an 
inability to translate his successes in rebuilding U.S. moral credibility into terms his 
Soviet counterparts could appreciate.
Carter had begun his term in office with a belief typical of new presidents -  that 
he could make his adversaries see his view of things.9 3  The affability Brezhnev
9 2  Hughes, “Management of Contradictions,” 38.
9 3  Franklin Roosevelt kept his advisors in fits of frustration with his naive 
insistence that he and “Uncle Joe” Stalin could settle their differences “in the way of 
gentlemen.” It is a rare president who, after the domestic political achievement of
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traditionally shows for equals reinforced Carter’s hope this would be the case.9 4  After
his initial high-level experiences with them in 1979, Carter recorded:
I met President Leonid Brezhnev for the first time at the palace of 
Austrian President Rudolf Kirchschlaeger. . .  [After the formal speeches 
concluded] Brezhnev and I then moved off by ourselves to chat for a few 
minutes as real people.. .He and I agreed that success was necessary for 
ourselves and for the rest of the world, and he startled me by placing his 
hand on my shoulder and saying, “If we do not succeed, God will not 
forgive us.” 95
By the end of 1979 this had changed dramatically. Brezhnev’s adroit politicking could 
not hide the cold facts of Soviet behavior. Carter encountered tremendous frustration 
over his inability to ‘get through’ to Soviet leaders. Ted Szulc commented, “There are 
already indications that the Carter administration is discovering that realities are catching 
up with it after its shakedown cruise.” 96
Samuel Wells noted, “Concern about Soviet military power. . .  is probably as 
great now as at any time since the outbreak of the Korean War..  . ” 9 7  Seyom Brown 
argued the defense establishment needed quick and substantial expansions to prevent the
winning the White House, does not fall victim to overabundant faith in his powers of 
personal persuasion.
9 4  Brezhnev was unusual among Soviet leaders in this trait. Stalin told Mao 
insultingly that he was a turnip -  red on the outside, but white on the inside. See Li 
Zhisui, The Private Life o f Chairman Mao: The Memoirs o f Mao’s Personal Physician, 
Dr. Li Zhisui, trans. Tai Hung-chao (New York: Random House, 1994), 116. 
Khrushchev bullied Kennedy so badly at their first summit that he retired to his villa 
shaking. He predicted to Richard Nixon, “You children will live in communism,” to 
which the ever-feisty Nixon replied, “Your children will live in freedom.”
9 5  Carter, Keeping Faith, 243-45.
9 6  Szulc, “Springtime for Carter,” 179.
9 7  Samuel F. Wells, Jr., “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 6 8  and the Soviet Threat,” 
International Security 4, no. 2 (Fall 1979), 149.
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balance of power from tilting even further away from the United States.9 8  Szulc
described the Carter administration as having “abandoned much of its “zero-budget”
00approach to foreign policy, modifying rather than radically changing past policies.”
The Carter administration moved toward more fully accepting the dangers inherent in this 
temporary bilateral weakness and the necessity of compromising principles in favor of 
interest, as well as the possibility that principles could be separate from interest. 
Correspondingly, the United States began moving away from its heavy emphasis on the 
role of morality in the Cold War confrontation and became more inclined to focus on 
bilateral gains.
There is much debate over exactly when the Carter administration decided it had 
no choice but to escalate its confrontational tactics vis-a-vis Soviet adventurism. 
Brzezinski’s plans for energetic confrontation of the Soviet Union had always had the 
president’s ear, but precisely when they won over his heart (if ever) remains unclear. 
Throughout the administration he pressed the president to adopt tougher stances against 
the Soviets, in concordance with Carter’s idealist principles when possible, but against 
them if necessary.
In a memorandum entitled, “Acquiescence vs. Assertiveness,” Brzezinski stated 
his concerns to Carter directly: “I think that the increasingly pervasive perception here
9 8  “To the geopoliticians, at least, the basic implications for U.S. policy are 
unavoidable: new defense programs to keep the Soviets from achieving military 
dominance at any level and an active diplomacy to counter Kremlin attempts to project 
Soviet power and presence beyond the Warsaw Pact area.” Seyom Brown, “An End to 
Grand Strategy,” 28.
9 9  Szulc, “Springtime for Carter,” 182.
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and abroad is that in U.S.-Soviet relations, the Soviets are increasingly assertive and the 
U.S. more acquiescent.” 1 0 0 Carter agreed with his argument, penciled “Good” in the 
margin of the memorandum, and his administration took another step away from its 
commitment to confronting the Soviets through moral persuasion. 101
This walk was not as unintentional as many may have believed. Detente was a 
failing strategy that needed more than resuscitation -  it needed replacement. Some sort 
of opportunity to demonstrate to the Soviets in a military sense and the rest of the world 
in a moral sense that the United States would not continue to tolerate Soviet misbehavior. 
Dmitri Simes noted in 1980, “In the United States, an influential school of thought clearly 
felt that if the Soviet “fraternal” aggression against Afghanistan had not happened, it 
would have had to been invented to provide the last straw to break detente’s back.” 102  
To this end in December 1979 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown lobbied 
Congress on behalf of the administration’s desire for a defense buildup. The change in 
strategy, Secretary Brown noted, reflected an appreciation that “we are in for a long pull 
in adversary relationships,” and not necessarily with the Soviet Union alone. “We must
100 Quoted in Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 215.
101 If a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step, Carter’s incremental 
abandonment of his naive original expectation that he could make the Soviets see the 
value of a reputation for morality as a source of power is the classic grand strategy 
example. Carter’s failing has been shared by nearly every world leader, who almost 
without exception attain their positions of power at a time when they are overawed by 
their seemingly infallible ability to forge common understandings. World leaders, 
however, rarely fall under their spell and do not, as a rule, throw away their own hard- 
earned worldviews to embrace those of the newcomers.
102 Dmitri K. Simes, “The Death of Detente?” International Security 5, no. 1 
(Summer 1980), 3.
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decide now,” he warned, “whether we intend to remain the strongest nation in the world. 
Or we must accept now that we will let ourselves slip into inferiority, into a position of 
weakness in a harsh world where principles unsupported power are victimized, and that 
we will become a nation with more of a past than a future. ” 103
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan became a touchstone for the new hardness in 
American confrontation of the Soviet Union. Americans began viewing their adversaries 
through more suspicious and watchful eyes. When Carter returned from Camp David to 
deal with the crisis, Brzezinski told him it matters little what “subjective motives” were 
behind Brezhnev’s decision. What counted were the “objective consequences” of Soviet 
military power “so much closer to the Persian Gulf.” Carter agreed. 104
Carter, in an interview with Frank Reynolds of ABC, called Brezhnev a liar for 
his response to Carter’s hot line message of December 27, castigating the Soviets for 
their invasion of a neighbor’s territory. “He claimed that he had been invited by the 
Afghan government to come in and protect Afghanistan from some outside third nation 
threat. This was obviously false. Because the person that he claimed invited him in, 
President Amin, was murdered or assassinated after the Soviets pulled their coup.”
Carter continued ominously, “My opinion of the Russians has changed more drastically 
in the last week that even the previous two and one half years before that. It is only now
103 “Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, December 13,1979,” 
The New York Times, 14 December 1979, A l, 6 . Tucker, “America in Decline,” 468.
104 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 222-23.
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dawning upon the world the magnitude of the action that the Soviets undertook in 
invading Afghanistan.” 105
By the end of 1979 the United States and its president had come to view the 
superpower rivalry once more as the most important U.S. security consideration. 
American strategists conceded the last year of the 1970s confirmed and expanded the 
major trends of decades. 106 The Carter administration became increasingly 
anticommunist and even more strongly in favor of rebuilding all sinews of American 
power, including military and economic, for their confrontation of Soviet initiatives. The 
day before Secretary Brown’s testimony, Carter proposed his five-year expansion of 
American defense forces. Carter justified this buildup in terms of grand strategy and 
warned potential critics of his plan that “not every instance of the firm application of 
power is a potential Vietnam.” 1 0 7  Such a judgment would not have been made by the 
Carter administration in 1977 or, for that matter, in 1978. Carter’s statement was, in fact, 
almost a paraphrase of a statement Henry Kissinger had made in 1976, shortly before 
leaving office.
There was, in fact, no single event that changed American perspectives; 
developments in Africa, the Middle East, Western Europe, and Central Asia merely 
brought to the fore what had already been concluded about the nature of the U.S.-Soviet 
rivalry. Robert Legvold noted, “The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan comes not as an
105 Quoted in Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 223-24.
106  Opening sentence of Tucker, “America in Decline,” 449.
107  “Address to Business Council Executives, Washington, DC, December 12, 
1979,” The New York Times, 13 December 1979, Al, 24.
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isolated whirlwind, battering an otherwise sturdy relationship, but as a watershed in a 
long-deteriorating, deeply distressed relationship. In truth, relations have been in decline 
since before the arrival of the Carter administration.” 108
Scholarly Insights: Differentiated Strategic Views
The international position of the United States in late 1979 presents an interesting 
study in seeming contradictions and potential power. The Carter administration had done 
much in its first two and a half years to restore American moral authority. The 
willingness of Carter to pay the political costs of restructuring the armed forces meant the 
United States was on a path to a resurgence of military power, based on streamlined 
forces and high technology. Through its efforts, especially those of Secretary Brown, to 
root out outdate and entrenched programs, the United States was on a path to refocusing 
its military might to make it more agile, responsive, and useful. Increasing spending 
overall sought to bridge the gap between Soviet and American conventional forces, while 
technological advancement offered opportunities to surpass its primary adversary by one 
level of advancement and all other potential belligerents by at least two.
Buoyed by recent successes in restoring American moral power and, to a lesser 
extent, military power, the view predominant among American strategists in 1979 was 
that the decline in American multilateral power had begun to slow (111. 10). Continuation
1 0 8  Robert Legvold, “Containment without Confrontation,” Foreign Policy, no. 
40 (Fall 1980), 74-5.
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of these strategies would lead to a more favorable future for American security in the 
wider world.
Ill 10. Carter Administration's View of American Intematioml
Power in 1979
IO
Ouo
s0)
40 -
<4-1o<D
35
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
However, consequent with this optimism was a sense that this strategy was 
working for the broader purposes of American grand strategy, but was insufficient for the 
immediate requirements of the Cold War. Much of this was the result of disillusionment 
regarding the behavior and morality of Soviet leaders. Failing to translate the “superior” 
morality of his American foreign policy into greater leverage over Soviet behavior,
Carter came to accept the more blunt aspects of Brzezinski’s strategic vision as it applied 
to the Soviet Union. The United States was not making much headway in the Cold War, 
although the Carter administration believed it was on the right course (111. 11).
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IE 11. Carter Administration's Perception of Relative Power 
Trends ca. 1979
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Carter, however, received very little credit from American voters for his change 
of perspective. The electorate could not have been expected to know the full extent of 
the efforts being made -  especially those undertaken covertly. Americans desired a more 
energetic version of Cold War confrontation that was, in fact, already beginning to take 
shape in 1980. However, they were not convinced the Carter administration was capable 
of confronting the Soviets. Discontent with Carter grew apace with Carter’s commitment 
to the energetic confrontation of soviet power the American electorate wanted to see.
At the same time the United States in general and the Carter administration in 
particular became increasingly preoccupied with dealing with the Soviets. Despite early 
rhetoric about shifting attention from an east-west to a north-south perspective, Carter 
found that countering Soviet aggressiveness required more and more of his time. The 
strategic implication of this focus on bilateral aspects of power is a stronger correlation 
between bilateral gains and losses and overall gains and losses.
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Joel Krieger noted, “Imperial decline means, above all, reduced options and 
riskier consequences. At different points in the arc of decline the range of choices 
available to post-hegemonic powers varies considerably, and the political legerdemain of 
ruling elites reflects the very different options they have left to pursue.” 1 0 9  This 
increases somewhat the United States’ propensity to undertake actions that promise Cold 
War gains, such as covert operations and embrace of unsavory characters whose efforts 
against the Soviet Union translate to net power losses for Moscow.
The systemic pressures described by structural realism continued to influence 
grand strategy in the manner outline for the early years of Carter’s governance, but his 
own view of bilateral relations, as well as that of the American people, gradually and 
continuously deemphasized the power of moral authority in the Cold War. U.S. views, 
when applied to the Soviet Union, began to parallel more closely the original assumptions 
of structural realism regarding the sources of power and began have more of an effect on 
overall power calculation. From 1979 forward American grand strategy could have been 
expected to parallel more closely more traditional structural realist assumptions.
The Carter administration moved toward more fully accepting the structural 
realist view and, despite a continued construction of power in the multilateral sense that 
included a heavy emphasis on the moral component. It embraced, hesitantly at first, the 
necessity of compromising principles in favor of interest for the purposes of the Cold 
War. These changes presaged adjustments in the newly applied American grand strategy.
109  Joel Krieger, Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics o f Decline (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 1986), 109.
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Adjusting Grand Strategy: Confronting Soviet Aggression 
Carter lost faith that the leaders of the Soviet Union could accept peaceful and 
honorable coexistence with the United States at the same time that he lost faith that such 
a coexistence was morally acceptable. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dispelled any 
notion still held by Carter that Brezhnev and his colleagues would not continue the 
aggressive policies predicted by the realists in his administration. He realized the moral 
consistency of his administration meant little to the Politburo, other than making his 
actions somewhat incomprehensible, irresponsible, and therefore, in light of their own 
realist viewpoint, less “rational.”
The change in the Carter administration reflected hardening convictions among 
the American people. These winds of change blowing into Washington had been 
recognized in other capitols around the world. In a remarkable conversation between 
Fidel Castro and Erich Honecker, the two leaders discussed recent developments in the 
American view of the superpower conflict. Honecker recognized that the United States 
“apparently is trying to increase tensions at the international level... they have been 
preparing for a blow against the policy of detente, in order to go over to a policy of 
confrontation.” 1 10
110 Transcript o f Conversation between Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and East 
German leader Erich Honecker, Havana, 25 May 1980, Wednesday, 28 May 1980, Cold 
War International History Project, trans. Carter-Brezhnev Project, available at 
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=739, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
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Honecker noted as evidence of this change the unmistakable ascendance of the 
hard-line viewpoint, its successful pushes for increased NATO spending at the 1978 
NATO Council Meeting in Washington, and the production of new American 
intermediate nuclear forces for deployment in Europe. Fidel Castro responded 
presciently, “If they have some clash with the Soviet Union in a part of the globe where 
the balance of power is unfavorable for the USA, then they should respond in a place 
where the balance of power is favorable for the USA.” He concluded that the issue of 
changing the current course and of finding the way back to detente, if possible, is of 
tremendous importance.
In 1978 Dobrynin submitted a political letter to Gromyko informing the Politburo
of upcoming changes in the Carter administration’s strategic viewpoint. Entitled “Soviet
American Relations in the Contemporary Era,” the letter projected an incipient movement
by the Carter administration away from the spirit of detente.
In the middle of April of this year, Carter, as is well known, conducted in 
his country residence, Camp David, a meeting of the members of his 
cabinet and closest advisors, at which was teken [sic] a decision to carry 
out a regular reevaluation of Soviet-American relations. The initiative for 
this affair came from Brzezinski and several Presidential advisors on 
domestic affairs, who convinced Carter that he could succeed in stopping 
the process of worsening of his position in the country if he would openly 
initiate a harsher course vis a vis [sic] the Soviet Union. 1 11
Dobrynin believed Brzezinski had forged a shrewd alliance of hawkish foreign 
policy advisors within the Carter administration who agreed the United States should 
adopt a tougher stance toward the Soviets and domestic political advisors who believed
111 See “Soviet American Relations in the Contemporary Era.”
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such a stance would be politically beneficial for the 1980 reelection campaign. He 
foresaw this coalition would be successful in pushing on Carter its hard-line views. 
American Cold War strategy would thus shift toward greater hostility in the bilateral 
relationship and increased American confrontation of the Soviet Union in its conduct of 
foreign relations.
The first area in which this shift would become noticeable, the letter argued,
would be Africa. In his analysis Dobrynin came very close to the truth and guessed
correctly the new direction of American strategy. He placed too much emphasis,
however, on the political process as a motivator for grand strategy, an unsurprising error
given the degree to which personal political advantage shaped the foreign policy stances
of his own superiors. 112  Dobrynin used his own beliefs about the ways in which politics
determine foreign policy, rather than those of the Carter administration. He
misunderstood the evolving political situation when he provided the following analysis:
Flirting with the conservative moods in the country (the strength of which 
he at times clearly overestimates), Carter frequently resorts to anti-Soviet 
rhetoric in order to, as they say, win cheap applause. The danger is found 
in the fact that such rhetoric is picked up and amplified by the means of 
mass communication, in Congress, and so forth. Ultimately, as often 
happens in the USA, the rhetoric is transformed, influences policy, and 
sometimes itself becomes policy. 113
112 The United States has a far from perfect record of its leaders keeping 
considerations of personal political expediency separate from issues of national grand 
strategy. It is, however, much more successful at doing so than most great powers in 
history. The Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan, for example, contained a great deal 
of political maneuvering and very little belief that it was, strategically, the best use of 
resources for a gain in Soviet power.
113 “Soviet-American Relations.”
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Dobrynin failed to account for the particular worldviews of the Carter administration and 
emphasis on keeping domestic political concerns separate from the conduct of foreign 
relations that are important traditions for both American administrations in general and 
the Carter administration in particular. He thereby mistook the coming reorientation as 
political maneuvering, rather than honest recalculation of the international situation, and 
thereby underestimated the scope of both the change in Carter’s own viewpoint and the 
degree to which this would affect policy.
Despite his flawed reasoning, Dobymin’s instincts about the direction rhetoric 
from the Carter administration would soon take reflected a very astute sense of changes 
within the administration’s view of bilateral relations. Throughout his term in office 
Carter continuously retreated from his reliance on the power of foreign policy morality in 
the struggle against communism, largely because he came to understand that the Soviets 
themselves did not seem to care much for it and would not be deterred by it.
Reassured by its successes in restoring international moral credibility, the United 
States chose to stay the course it had embraced in the mid-1970s concerning the sources 
and purposes of American power. At the same time it recognized the need to address the 
Soviet threat on more immediate and traditional grounds. At this point a salient question 
posed by structural logic again is, “Why did the United States not go to war with the 
Soviet Union in 1979?” Once again, the probability of confrontation was high, but the 
availability of alternatives was an ameliorating factor. American grand strategy adjusted 
to allow for a more robust confrontation of Soviet power but kept its insistence on the 
maintenance of American exceptionalism as essential to its long-term security.
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The United States, therefore, could be expected to seek means of crippling Soviet 
power outside the major war option. There are many ways to bring an enemy to its knees 
and the best of them usually do not involve military force alone. Opponents surrender 
after they have been weakened; it matters not how they weaken so much as that they do 
to the point that continuing the struggle appears to them an unwanted policy, whether 
because of futility or lack of desire. Once the United States decided that coexistence with 
its adversaries was not acceptable, weakening the Soviet empire became a strategic 
imperative.
The United States lost its aversion to tough stances when it came to Cold War 
strategy. It never relinquished, however, its belief that a reputation for morality would be 
of great importance in the in the multilateral system of world politics. Brzezinski 
successfully pushed the classical and structural realist viewpoint that one should 
disregard information about intentions and focus on relative power distribution.
However, such a focus should not make the mistake of assuming that each player views 
power through the same lens. This meant the differentiated approaches to international 
power as a whole and bilateral power would entail an adjustment to American grand 
strategy. Toleration of the Soviet empire and its aggressions was not consistent with 
American exceptionalism or American realism. The United States needed to take a more 
confrontational stance with its adversary if it wished to remain moral.
One of these areas that would see the most dramatic adjustment would be the use
of covert action to achieve the ends of war. Stansfield Turner recalled sagely,
These were the very kinds of circumstances that have driven most recent 
Presidents to turn to covert action -  circumstances in which resort to 
military force is either not warranted or feasible and in which either 
diplomatic or economic sanctions seem little more than a slap on the wrist
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. . .  There is an old cliche in intelligence that says the place for covert 
action is as an alternative between diplomacy and Avar. 114
Unfortunately for American strategists, there would be a significant lag between strategic
determination and policy implementation. This was especially endemic in the area of
covert operations. Extensive and intrusive Congressional investigations had decimated
the American intelligence community. 1 15 Turner’s memoirs described his frustration
Avith the state of affairs during his tenure.
The professionals were so shook by the Church committee that they 
weren’t bringing much forward. They were protecting the hides and 
weren’t proposing risky things in intelligence collection, let alone covert 
action. It wasn’t till [the Soviet invasion of] Afghanistan that they began 
to get in the Cold War mold. 116
Turner’s views were typical of many who worked in the intelligence community. In the
late 1970s, noted Turner’s assistant William Gates, “The CIA was hunkered doAvn in a
defensive crouch.” 117
As American strategists recovered their assertiveness, Soviet strategists, acting in
accordance with their beliefs about the groAvth of Soviet power perceived situation,
became increasingly bold. Leonid Brezhnev proclaimed in 1979, “The correlation of
forces is shifting against capitalists.” Recent efforts in the international arena had
114 Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Diplomacy, 87.
115 “We didn’t have any assets in the places we most needed them,” recalled one 
CIA official to reporter Peter Schweizer. “We couldn’t have run a covert operation 
against the comer 7-Eleven, much less behind the Iron Curtain.” Quoted in Peter 
Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy that Hastened the 
Collapse o f the Soviet Union (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 11.
1 1 6  Quoted in Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, 431.
1 1 7  Joseph E. Persico, Casey: The Lives and Secrets o f William J. Casey -  From 
the OSS to the CIA (New York: Viking, 1990), 213.
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brought the Soviets a foothold in North Africa, a stronghold in Southeast Asia, and 
potential allies in Central America. Afghanistan was moving toward civil war, offering a 
further opportunity to expand Soviet influence, this time in a region that had been 
coveted by Russian tsars and Soviet premiers alike.
Perhaps stronger substantiation of the Soviet’s belief was its misinterpretation of 
the overriding combination of alarm and defeatism besieging the Soviets primary 
adversary. Literature on Western political, economic, and moral corruption and decline 
abounded. After years of seemingly decisive superiority, the enemies of the Soviet 
Union began to agree that they were losing, a powerful sign that Marxism/Leninism was 
indeed the inevitably rising force of international politics. Gromyko explained the new 
American Cold War strategy to a Communist Party of the Soviet Union Plenum in June 
1980: “Now the American administration has once again begun to veer wildly. The 
underlying cause of the current break in Soviet-American relations is Washington’s 
attempt to do whatever it takes to achieve military superiority over us. 118
Case Study: Afghanistan 
The United States demonstrated its strengthened commitment to confronting 
Soviet aggression with an assortment of initiatives. Among these were a boycott of the 
1980 Olympic games in Moscow, a grain embargo, a tightening of export controls, and
118 CPSU CC Plenum, 23 June 1980, Cold War International History Project, 
available at
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=T409&fuseaction=library.document&id=T15, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
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robust international condemnation. Some of these measures, such as the grain embargo, 
were ephemeral and ineffective. Others, however, created severe difficulties for the 
Soviet empire. Chief among these early programs was the United States’ covert aid 
program to Afghan insurgents prior to and throughout the Soviet occupation.
Western fears of Russian ambitions to gain direct access to the oil-rich Persian 
Gulf predated the Soviet Union. Afghanistan had a long history of fighting for 
independence from the Mongols and Safavids, but was considered no match for the 
emerging superpower on its border. 119  The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan three 
times in six years: it precipitated minor skirmishes in 1925 and 1930 and launched a 
large-scale attempt to overthrow a new Afghan government in 1929.120 As the Second 
World War drew to a close, NATO allies began putting together a defensive band of pro- 
Western and anti-Soviet states to contain part of the Soviet Union’s southern frontier. 
Known as the Baghdad Pact, this coalition included Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, as 
well as British territories. The participation of Afghanistan would have completed the 
West’s defensive arc, so the United States began enticing Afghani leaders with 
development projects. 121 American aid by 1979 totaled $378 million in gifts and $154 
million in loans. 122
119  Maj. Gen. Oleg Sarin and Col. Lev Dvoretsky, The Afghan Syndrome: The 
Soviet Union’s Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 2-3.
1 2 0  Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the 
Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 9.
121 The United States built over 2,500 miles of roads between major cities, the 
Darla Dam (near Kandahar), and large airfields at Bagram and Kandahar. Edgar
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While King Zahir appreciated the assistance, he remained stubbornly neutral.
Over his objections, the United States was strengthening containment of the Soviet 
southern flank by giving military aid to Pakistan. The American decision to arm its 
neighbor was seen as unacceptably threatening, so in 1954 Afghan Prime Minister 
Mohammad Daoud Khan made concrete his nation’s neutrality by also requesting 
economic assistance from the Soviet Union. Between 1954 and 1979 Afghanistan 
received $1.3 billion worth of Soviet aid, almost all of it in the form of loans to be repaid 
in natural gas from fields Soviet engineers had developed in northwestern Afghanistan.
In 1954 Daoud also began conversations with Moscow about military assistance. 
Bulganin and Khrushchev traveled to Kabul in 1955 to solidify the relationship, and a 
Soviet military mission arrived there in 1957. Soon afterward Soviet T-34 tanks, guns, 
military vehicles, field radios, and combat aircraft began arriving in Afghanistan. 123  
Soviet expertise and assistance reoriented their force structure so drastically that Russian 
became the technical language of the Afghan military. By 1979 Soviet military aid had 
reached a total of $1.3 billion and approximately 3,700 Afghan military personnel had 
received training inside the USSR. 124
O’Ballance, Afghan Wars: Battles in a Hostile Land, 1839 to the Present (London: 
Brassey’s, 2002), 76-7.
1 2 2  Henry S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), esp. Ch. 1, “The Problems of Modernization.”
123 O’Ballance, Afghan Wars, 77.
1 2 4  Bradsher, Afghan Communism, esp. 2. See also Joseph J. Collins, The Soviet 
Invasion o f Afghanistan: A Study in the Use o f Force in Soviet Foreign Policy 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986).
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The Afghan government itself had, by 1979, become a roiling hotbed of intrigue 
and hostility. 125  In 1973 former Prime Minister Muhammad Daoud led a successful 
coup against Afghanistan’s longstanding monarchy, headed by his first cousin and 
brother-in-law, King Mohammad Zahir Shah. Daoud instituted a Koran-guided republic 
and continued his predecessor’s Cold War neutrality by requesting aid packages from the 
Soviet Union, Western nations, Iran, Kuwait, and others.
In April 1978 a group of Marxist army officers allied with Afghanistan’s 
communist parties overthrew Daoud and installed Nur Muhammad Taraki as Afghani 
President. Taraki was a strident believer in socialist ideology whose political fortune was 
a long-term Soviet project. 1 2 6  Nonetheless, he initially proclaimed that his Marxist 
orientation, Soviet-style political organization, and years of Soviet backing did not 
necessarily preclude Afghani neutrality. Taraki formed a coalition government of 
Afghanistan’s communist parties to stabilize his rule. He implemented widespread social 
and economic reforms and requested American aid. 127
Meanwhile, the Politburo began to feel more confident of the USSR’s position in 
Afghanistan. The Soviet ambassador reported the Afghan leadership “is not showing
125 J. N. Dixit, An Afghan Diary: Zahir Shah to Taliban (New Delhi: Konark 
Publishers, 2000), 11-2.
1 2 6 Taraki’s plebian background, leftist publications, and penchant for intellectual 
discussion in teahouses marked him as an early Marxist revolutionary figure. He founded 
the first of Afghanistan’s leftist study groups in 1956. He became first Secretary General 
of Afghanistan’s first communist political party, the People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA). Bradsher, Afghan Communism, 3-4; O’Ballance, Afghan Wars, 80.
127 Secretary Vance sent Undersecretary of State David Newsom to discover 
Taraki’s true intentions. Newsom had little praise for the new government but 
recommended token aid as a means of retaining some small leverage.
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haste” in concluding economic agreements with the West, “proceeding from an intention 
to reorient its foreign economic relations primarily towards the USSR and the socialist 
camp.” The new government requested Soviet advisors to help its transition to socialism 
and put together its first five-year plan. The Soviet ambassador in Kabul concluded,
“The overall situation in the country is stabilizing more and more.”
The ambassador’s description of the domestic situation was inaccurate. Taraki’s 
social reforms, which included massive land redistribution, enforcement of women’s 
rights and educational opportunities, and thinly veiled reliance on direction from Moscow 
angered tribal groups throughout Afghanistan. Islamic discontent grew into sporadic 
violence that swelled beyond the new government’s ability to repress. In January 1979 
the Politburo instructed the Soviet ambassador in Kabul to “Say that the Government of 
the USSR, based on the friendly relations between our countries, is rendering assistance, 
with very favorable conditions, aimed at reinforcing the Afghan military.” 128
Exactly when the United States began its covert assistance to the insurgents 
remains a matter of historical dispute. Robert Gates asserts Carter signed the first 
Presidential finding authorizing covert aid in July 1979.129 Transcripts of Politburo 
discussions show its belief that the program was well underway by March. Foreign
128 “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989,” in CPSU CC Politburo 
Decision on Afghanistan, 7 January 1979, Cold War International History Project, trans. 
Daniel Rozas, available at
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fiiseaction:=library.document&id=281, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
1 2 9  Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story o f Five 
Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 
143-46.
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Minister Gromyko complained of “Bands of saboteurs and terrorists, having infiltrated 
from the territory of Pakistan, trained and armed not only with the participation of 
Pakistani forces but also of China, the United States of America and Iran.” These rebels 
had already established an insurgency that had taken control of the city of Herat and other 
areas around the country.
Regardless of precisely when the operation began, it was effective in boosting the 
effectiveness of the Afghan rebels. Taraki appealed to the Soviet Union for help in the 
form of military equipment, ammunition, and rations. He suggested directly that Soviet 
ground and air support of Afghan government forces might be required and implied that 
they were, in fact, expected. Soviet leaders concluded that Taraki’s requests still did not 
encompass the full extent of the insurgency; they should proceed with immediate 
shipments of arms. Gromyko stated the gravity of the situation clearly: “Under no 
circumstances may we lose Afghanistan.” KGB head Yuri Andropov repeated these 
exact words. The prospect of direct Soviet intervention to prevent the fall of Afghanistan 
to the rebels was presented to the Politburo at this time, but Soviet leaders demurred in 
favor of continued indirect support of the Afghan army. 130
Soon thereafter Kosygin reported to the Politburo an allegation by Taraki that Iran 
and Pakistan were supplying arms to the insurgents. Furthermore, the Afghan Muslims 
returning from exile in Iran to join the insurgency were allegedly soldiers of the Iranian
1 3 0 Ponomarev: “Above all, it will be necessary to accomplish everything that is 
necessary with the forces of the Afghan army, and only later, if and when the necessity 
truly arises, to deploy our own forces.”
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army dressed in Afghan clothing. Taraki, whose armed forces were not yet trained on the 
latest equipment and tactics, submitted another request for tanks and armored cars for his 
infantry. When asked by Kosygin who would operate them, the Afghan leader responded 
by asking the Soviet leadership to send him Tajik crews dressed as Afghans. Taraki left 
the impression among the Soviet leadership that he could muster very few military forces 
in his own country.
Kosygin concluded that the political situation in Afghanistan was becoming 
unstable and the military situation untenable. He reported that “manifestos are 
circulating, and crowds of people are massing. Large numbers of persons are flowing 
into Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran, equipped with Iranian and Chinese armaments.” 
The nation of Afghanistan was neither ready for nor desirous of the socialist reforms 
being imposed on it. 131 Brezhnev agreed with Kosygin’s assessment, and the Soviet 
Union tabled the issue of armed intervention.
At this early stage Moscow already perceived the United States to be playing a 
substantial role in fostering the Afghan insurgency. Gromyko argued, “We may assume 
with full justification that all these events, not only in Afghanistan but in the neighboring
131 Andropov concluded, “It’s completely clear to us that Afghanistan is not 
ready at this time to resolve all of the issues it faces through socialism. The economy is 
backward, the Islamic religion predominates, and nearly all of the rural population is 
illiterate. We know Lenin’s teaching about a revolutionary situation. Whatever situation 
we are talking about in Afghanistan, it is not that type of situation. Therefore, I believe 
that we can suppress a revolution in Afghanistan only with the aid of our bayonets, and 
that is for us entirely inadmissible. We cannot take such a risk.” Gromyko agreed: 
“Comrade Andropov correctly noted that indeed the situation in Afghanistan is not ripe 
for a revolution. And all that we have done in recent years with such effort in terms of 
detente, arms reduction, and much more-all that would be thrown back.”
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governments, including those in China, are being directed by the hand of the USA.” 
However, the Soviet leadership did not yet believe the danger posed by the Afghan 
insurgency justified full-scale invasion. 132
The Soviet leadership soon came to understand that Taraki had lost the support of 
nearly all of Afghanistan’s population to the religious uprising. Taraki continued to 
submit requests for presence of Soviet troops, disguised as Afghans, this time to retake 
Herat and sustain his government. Brezhnev complained, “Their army is falling apart, 
and we are supposed to wage the war for them.” The only thing the Politburo was willing 
to offer was release o f460 Afghan military personnel currently stationed in the Soviet 
Union.
In late May the Soviet Union decided to give the Taraki government a three-year 
military assistance package worth 53 million rubles. This took the form of 140 guns and 
mortars, 90 armored personnel carriers (of which 50 will represent an expedited 
delivery), 48,000 machine guns, 1000 grenade throwers, 680 aviation bombs, 100 
incendiary tanks, and 160 single-use bomb cassettes. They also provided an expedited 
delivery in June and July of 50 thousand rubles of medicines and medical aid. 133
1 3 2  Gromyko summarized the larger costs of such a course for his colleagues: 
“We would be largely throwing away everything we achieved with such difficulty, 
particularly detente, the SALT-II negotiations would fly by the wayside, there would be 
no signing of an agreement (and however you look at it that is for us the greatest political 
priority), there would be no meeting of Leonid Ilych with Carter, and it is very doubtful 
that Giscard d’Estang would come to visit us, and our relations with the Western 
countries, particularly the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], would be spoiled.”
133 “On the Situation in Afghanistan,” in CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 15 
September 1979, with Report by Gromyko, Ustinov, and Tsvigun, Cold War International
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In June the Soviet Union followed these efforts by sending to Afghanistan a 
Soviet parachute battalion disguised as an aviation-technical maintenance team. This 
force had the task of protecting the Soviet air squadrons at Bagram airfield. They also 
began preparations to dispatch a special detachment of the KGB (120-150 men) in 
August. They were disguised as Embassy service personnel and given the task of 
defending of the Soviet embassy in Kabul- At the same time a special detachment of the 
GRU of the General Staff prepared to move to Bagram airfield to be used to protect 
important government installations, should the situation deteriorate further. 134
Soviet maneuvers did not go unnoticed by the United States. Carter recalled,
“Since May 1979, we had been observing closely the increased Soviet presence in
Afghanistan, and admonishing the Soviets about their obvious moves toward
intervention.” 135 On March 28, 1979 the National Intelligence Office for the Soviet
Union, Arnold Horelick, wrote to CIA director Turner to alert him of the increasingly
dangerous developments in the region. Robert Gates recalled Horelick’s warning:
He sketched a plausible scenario in which the Taraki regime disintegrated 
to such an extent that: (1) only extensive and direct external military 
assistance could save it; (2) the Soviets would decide to provide such 
assistance; (3) this would evoke overt political and barely disguised covert 
military assistance to the insurgents from Pakistan, Iran, and perhaps even 
China; and (4) this would lead to a sharp deterioration of Soviet relations 
with Pakistan and possibly a call from Islamabad for the United States to 
deter or oppose military intervention in Pakistan and provide military 
assistance to states aiding the insurgency. After describing the possible
History Project, trans. Mark Kramer, available at
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction::=library.document&id:=39, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
134  A. A. Liakhovskii, The Tragedy and Valour o f the Afghani (Moscow: GPI 
“Iskon,” 1995), 76. Liakhovskii notes that this the recommendations made in this 
document were approved during the CPSU CC Politburo meeting of 28 June 1979.
135  Carter, Keeping Faith, 471.
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scenario, Horelick concluded that “the Soviets may well be prepared to 
intervene on behalf of the ruling group.” 136
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan grew apace with Politburo accusations that the 
United States and China were stirring up the rebellion. This accusation was not without 
justification; the CIA had been fomenting discontent with the expectation of that it would 
bring an aggressive Soviet response. Brzezinski later admitted in an interview, “It was 
July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents 
of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in 
which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military 
intervention.” 137
CIA analysts did not agree the situation would induce a Soviet invasion in support 
of the Afghan government. On August 20th the agency issued a classified paper that 
described Soviet involvement as reaching the point of being able to stage a successful 
coup, but concluded, “We see few signs that the Soviets are so wedded to leftist rule in 
Afghanistan that they will undertake an operation of this magnitude. ” 138 Another report
thto key policy makers on August 24 reiterated the position of the majority of analysts that 
“the deteriorating situation does not presage an escalation of Soviet military involvement 
in the form of a direct combat role.”
1 3 6 Gates, From the Shadows, 131.
137 “Interview of Zbigniew Brzezinski,” Le Nouvel Observateur (France), 15-17 
January 1998, 76, trans. Bill Blum, available at
http://www.counterpunch.org/brzezinski.html, accessed 7 November 2004. The 
interview, which was not included in the U.S. distribution of the publication, is taken 
from the French edition.
138 Gates, From the Shadows, 132.
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Throughout the autumn Carter continued to receive conflicting predictions about 
the course of events in Afghanistan. Brzezinski, Horelick, and Turner pointed to the 
increasing likelihood of Soviet invasion while CIA analysts continued to conclude this 
would not happen. The State department echoed CIA’s rather relaxed view of regional 
circumstances. The National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and Vice 
President Mondale, who expected the situation to escalate toward armed intervention, 
challenged this view.
Brzezinski in particular urged that strong warnings be sent to the Soviet Union 
about their “creeping intervention.” He stressed grave strategic possibilities, recalling 
traditional Russian expansion toward the Indian Ocean and Moscow’s suggestion to 
Berlin, during the period of the Nazi-soviet non-aggression pact, that the Soviet Union be 
granted control of South Asia. Brzezinski also pushed American policy toward being 
“more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to preserve their country’s 
independence”-a  euphemism for increasing clandestine aid to insurgents. He recalled in 
his memoirs, “Mondale was especially helpful in this, giving a forceful pep talk, 
mercilessly squelching the rather timid opposition of David Newsom, who was 
representing the State department.” 139
Soviet understanding of American involvement wavered between suspicion and 
conviction. Gromyko recorded, “We are under the impression that the Americans are 
still wavering and cannot come to a definite conclusion. Apparently, they have not
139 Quoted in Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 221.
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worked out any specific evaluations.” 1 4 0 However, as Soviet involvement increased, so 
American commitment to tying the USSR into Afghanistan grew, and thus prospects for a 
Soviet invasion.
The situation in Afghanistan continued to destabilize. President Taraki’s second- 
in-command, Hafizullah Amin, began amassing power quietly during the fall of 1979.141 
Amin, like Taraki, was an early intellectual figure in the development of Afghani 
Marxism. 142 In October 1979 he overthrew Taraki and orchestrated his murder. Amin 
shook off many of his communist trappings and publicly announced his intentions to 
place Afghanistan in a position of Cold War neutrality. 143
The Politburo had long been wary of Amin’s loyalties. 1 4 4  It kept an even closer 
eye on him after he seized control of Afghanistan. 145 Amin met with U.S. officials in
1 40  Excerpt from transcript, “Meeting of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and 
Afghan Foreign Minister Shah-Valih, New York, 27 September 1979,” Cold War 
International History Project, trans. Daniel Rozas, available at 
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction-library.document&id=39, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
141 “ . . .  Amin continued actively preparing to achieve his aims and Taraki, as 
before, was indecisive and was clearly unable to put an end to Amin’s activities. As a 
result, all the levers of real power by now are essentially in Amin’s hands. He controls 
the leadership of the armed forces, the state security organs, and the internal affairs 
organs.” See “On the Situation in Afghanistan.”
1 4 2 Amin graduated from Kabul University and later earned a Master’s degree 
from Columbia University in New York City. In 1979 he said that he had gained his 
political awareness while taking Summer courses at the University of Wisconsin in 1958, 
although he later changed his story to the more politically correct stance that his views 
were entirely the result of his realizations about “the reality of the ideology of the 
working class.” Bradsher, Afghan Communism, 9.
143 O’Ballance, Afghan Wars, 80.
144 Dixit, An Afghan Diary, 17.
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Kabul soon after he came to power. The United States desperately sought an ally in the 
region to replace the loss of Iran and its strategically important location. The KGB 
suspected Amin of “doing a Sadat on us” -  abandoning Soviet patronage for that of the 
United States. 146
The strategic implications of an Afghanistan aligned with the United States were 
unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Dangerous scenarios abounded in Moscow.
Installation of listening posts in northern Afghanistan would offer its American 
adversaries a windfall of electronic intelligence. More ominously, any future deployment 
of missiles in Afghanistan would have been at least as unacceptable, if not much more so, 
to Moscow as Soviet deployments in Cuba had been to Washington in 1962.147
“One thing was certain to the Soviets. Afghanistan was not to be allowed to 
abandon its socialist orientation.” 148  Unwilling to accept the possibility of an American 
client state on its southern flank, the Soviet Union undertook several efforts to remove
145 Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC, 29 October 
1979, To the CPSU CC, “The situation in Afghanistan following the events of September 
13-16 of this year, as the result of which Taraki was removed from power and then 
physically destroyed, remains extremely complicated.” Liakhovskii, Tragedy and 
Valour, 102.
146  “Recently there have been noted signs of the fact that the new leadership of 
Afghanistan intends to conduct a more “balanced policy” in relation to the Western 
powers. It is known, in particular, that representatives of the USA, on the basis of their 
contacts with the Afghans, are coming to a conclusion about the possibility of a change in 
the political line of Afghanistan in a direction which is pleasing to Washington.” 
Liakhovskii, Tragedy and Valour, 102.
147 Soviet leaders felt much the same about the deployment of Pershing II 
missiles to West Germany, which offered no more than a four-minute warning between 
detection and detonation in Moscow. The Soviets had significantly better prospects of 
precluding any possibility of this development in Afghanistan with political and military 
action than it had in the case of a nation that was both a European power and NATO 
member.
148 Sarin and Dvoretsky, The Afghan Syndrome, 39.
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Amin from power. It initiated contacts with other members of his government and 
authorized two unsuccessful assassination attempts. 1 4 9  The Soviet leadership also began 
preparations for an invasion, if necessary, to remove Amin from power.
Geostrategic prospects for a successful Soviet invasion of Afghanistan appeared 
initially very optimistic. India was friendly to the Soviet Union A military coup in 
Pakistan in 1977 and a fundamentalist revolution in Iran in 1979 had removed the 
possibility of counter-invasion by two potential adversaries. 150 The Chinese military, 
despite its size, did not have much in the way of expeditionary forces and had disgraced 
itself in the Sino-Vietnamese War earlier that year. Finally, Brezhnev considered Carter 
a weak President who would be unlikely to authorize the use of substantial military force
1 4 9  Personal memorandum, Andropov to Brezhnev, early December 1979:
“1. After the coup and the murder of Taraki in September of this year, the
situation in Afghanistan began to take an undesirable turn for us... At the same time, 
alarming information started to arrive about Amin’s secret activities, forewarning of a 
possible political shift to the West. [These included:] Contacts with an American agent 
about issues which are kept secret from us. Promises to tribal leaders to shift away from 
USSR and to adopt a “policy of neutrality.” Closed meetings in which attacks were made 
against Soviet policy and the activities of our specialists. The practical removal of our 
headquarters in Kabul, etc ...  .All this has created, on the one hand, the danger of losing 
the gains made by the April [1978] revolution.” See “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 
1978-1989: Personal memorandum, Andropov to Brezhnev, n.d. [early December 1979],” 
in Cold War International History Project Bulletin no. 8: New Evidence on the Soviet 
Intervention in Afghanistan, trans. by Daniel Rozas, available at 
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=:1409&fuseaction=library.document&id= 181, 
accessed 14 November 2004. One of the assassination attempts at the presidential palace 
wounded the chief of intelligence, Amin’s nephew Assadulah. Anthony Arnold, 
Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective, Hoover International Studies no. 10 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), 90-4.
1 50  President Carter ceased U.S. military aid to Pakistan in 1979 after developing 
suspicions that it was hying to manufacture a nuclear bomb. Khomeini’s fundamentalist 
revolution in Iran ejected the United States’ staunchest supporter in the Muslim world.
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in an election year. In this he was mistaken, although not without justification. 151 An 
invasion is precisely what many in the Carter administration came to believe would be 
the likely outcome of its efforts in Afghanistan. Brzezinski, “We didn't push the 
Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.” 152  
In late 1979 events demonstrated that Amin’s position in Afghanistan was no 
more secure than Taraki’s had been. His top political advisors exploited their contacts 
within the Soviet leadership and made preparations to unseat him from power. 153 Amin 
responded with intense domestic repression, including mass arrests of “suspect persons” 
and the deaths of at least 300 Afghanis. As the situation continued to deteriorate, Amin 
made increasing demands on the Soviet Union for military assistance. 154
151 Robert Gates writes of an American intelligence community that had drawn 
much the same conclusion: “The Carter administration, from the top down -  except for 
Brzezinski -  arrived in Washington suspicious and distrustful of CIA.” The idea that 
Carter would choose covert action, to most observers, seemed to be very improbable. 
Gates, From the Shadows, 136.
1 5 2  “Interview of Zbigniew Brzezinski,” 76.
153 Andropov to Brezhnev in early December 1979: “Recently we were 
contacted by group of Afghan communists abroad. In the course of our contact with 
Babrak [Karmal] and [Asadullah] Sarwari, it became clear (and they informed us of this) 
that they have worked out a plan for opposing Amin and creating new party and state 
organs . . .  In these conditions, Babrak and Sarwari, without changing their plans of 
opposition, have raised the question of possible assistance, in case of need, including 
military. . .  We have two battalions stationed in Kabul and there is the capability of 
rendering such assistance. It appears that this is entirely sufficient for a successful 
operation. “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Personal Memorandum.”
1 5 4  Extract from CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 6 December 1979, Cold War 
International History Project, available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction-library.document&id 
=39, accessed 21 February 2005. CC Secretary L. Brezhnev to the CPSU CC: “Amin 
recently has been raising the issue of the necessity of sending to Kabul of a motorized 
rifle battalion for defense of his residence . . .  we propose that it is possible to drop it in
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During this time General Ivan Pavlosky, a Deputy Defense Minister, concluded 
from his three-month visit to Afghanistan that, regardless of who was in charge of the 
communist government, it could not survive much longer without substantial outside 
assistance. 155 The Afghan government had generated too strong a resistance among the 
population to regain control of country in any meaningful way. The Soviet Union 
responded by increasing the head count of its military mission in Afghanistan from 1,500 
to more than 5,000 persons. During the night of December 7-8 a full Soviet airborne 
assault brigade appeared at the Bagram airfield, approximately 40 miles north of Kabul. 
On December 20th it moved out to secure the strategically-critical Salang Tunnel, 
remaining there to ensure the safe passage of Soviet ground troops.
Four days later a massive Soviet airlift brought two more Soviet airborne assault 
brigades to Bagram. It offered strong air cover, which proved unnecessary as the Soviet 
military mission succeeded in grounding the Afghan air force and confining the Afghan 
army to its barracks. On December 25th Soviet forces overwhelmed local forces and 
seized the main government centers in Afghanistan. 1 5 6  Soviet forces stormed Amin’s 
temporary headquarters on December 27th. Information about the manner of Amin’s 
death is sparse and ambiguous, but his reign ended in the Soviet assault. 157
on airplanes of military transport aviation during the first half of December of this year. 
Com. Ustinov, D.F. is in agreement. Liakhovskii, Tragedy and Valour, 107.
155 Hafizullah Emadi, State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan (New 
York: Praeger, 1990).
1 56  See Sarin and Dvoretsky, The Afghan Syndrome, 73-6.
157 Accounts of the battle range from almost no opposition to the Soviet Spetsnaz 
unit sent to capture Amin to full-scale resistance that included Amin personally 
accounting for many deaths before his own. Others claim a shoot-out between rival 
factions of Amin’s military guard ended his life.
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The head of a rival faction within Amin’s party, Babrak Karmal, returned lfom 
exile in Eastern Europe to be installed as the new Afghan leader by the Soviets. On the 
evening Karmal arrived -  reportedly riding in a T-72 tank -  Kabul Radio, broadcasting 
from Soviet soil, announced his immediate election as President by a newly reshuffled 
Revolutionary Council. Karmal was given the impossible task of solidifying his hold 
over Afghani communism and persuading the Afghani people to end their revolt and 
adopt a communist-style society.
The United States, along with the rest of the world, reacted with calculated anger 
and outrage. Publicly, Carter condemned the action and expressed his surprise, calling it 
“a shock to a world which yearned for peace.” 158  Privately, many of the more hawkish 
members of the Carter administration rejoiced. They proposed increasing the operation 
to unprecedented levels. Opposition came, not surprisingly, from the mid-level staffers 
who wanted to conduct all aspects of U.S. foreign policy according to precepts of 
American exceptionalism.
The administration initially had a difficult time getting its Afghan supply
operation up and running. Carter met stiff bureaucratic reluctance to instructions for
implementing his more aggressive tactics. “The funny thing here,” Stansfield Turner
recalled, “is this was Carter and Turner pushing the CIA”:
We couldn’t get them interested in this. I was mad. I wanted to show we 
could react. They [the Soviet-made arms supplies] were still in Texas or 
someplace, and I couldn’t get these people to move them off, so I set a 
deadline myself. They didn’t really appreciate that Turner and Carter
158 Carter, Keeping Faith, 471.
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would back this thing. They figured we’d get them [the Mujahadeen] 
started and then leave them hanging down there. Personally, I had to beat 
people over the head to get the program moving. 159
Despite domestic opposition, the United States came to understand that the moral
consistency of the Carter administration seemed to have little effect on the Politburo.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dispelled the last remaining vestiges of his faith that
the leaders of the Soviet Union could accept peaceful and honorable coexistence with the
United States. At the same time he concluded that peaceful coexistence with such a
nation was not morally acceptable.
A special session of the United Nations General Assembly demanded 
unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops in early January. A few weeks later the first- 
ever Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) 
seconded the U.N.’s demand. The European Community, while sharing American views 
that the invasion posed a threat to the region, feared derailment of the already dead 
detente. It refused to endorse punitive U.S. sanctions or Carter administration’s decision 
to freeze arms talks. 1 6 0  Instead it offered a proposal, later quietly endorsed by Carter, for 
guaranteed neutrality in Afghanistan in return for a Soviet withdrawal. Gromyko rejected 
the plan as unrealistic during a July 1981 visit by its sponsor, British Secretary for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Peter Carrington, to Moscow.
1 5 9  From Christopher Andrew’s interview with Admiral Stansfield Turner, March 
18. 1994. Quoted in Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, 448.
1 6 0  Riaz M. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 7.
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In February 1980 the Politburo still protested, to no avail, that Soviet forces had 
entered Afghanistan to protect it from foreign influence. 161 “In fulfillment of our treaty 
commitments, we were obligated to defend the national sovereignty of Afghanistan 
against external aggression.” 1 6 2 The Soviets warned, “Washington is openly 
accelerating the delivery of arms to the so-called insurgents. As illustrated by the visit of 
the minister of foreign affairs for the PRC, Huang Hua, Beijing does not lag behind 
Washington.”
The Soviets also accused Washington and Beijing of attempting to enlist several 
Arab states in their efforts to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. This was, in fact, what they 
were trying to do. The United States made reconciliatory overtures to Pakistani President 
Zia, offering him $400 million in military aid a few weeks after the Soviet invasion. Zia 
contemptuously rejected this package as “just peanuts” and informed the Carter 
administration that his friendship -  and the dangers inherent in Pakistani opposition to the 
Soviet Union -  would require $2.6 billion, including F-16 fighter aircraft. 163 Brzezinski
161 The Soviets maintained that their invasion had been in response to an 
invitation by President Karmal under the terms of the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 
1978. However, Karmal’s return to Afghanistan and assumption of power did not take 
place until after the invasion, an inconvenience that severely undermined the Soviet 
position. Brezhnev also occasionally quoted Article 15 of the United Nations Charter as 
justification.
162 In their meeting on January 4, 1980, Gromyko instructed Afghan Foreign 
Minister Shad Mohammad Dost: “It is necessary to emphasize that the deployment of a 
limited military contingent in Afghanistan has been undertaken by the Soviet Union as a 
response to repeated appeals by the DRA to the government of the USSR. These requests 
had been voiced earlier by Taraki during his visit to Moscow and by Amin. See “The 
Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989.”
163 Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot.
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and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher flew to Pakistan one month later to 
begin more specific discussions. The final, expanded U.S. aid package amounted to $3.2 
billion of military sales credits and economic assistance over six years, including the sale 
of forty F-16s.
The strategic adjustment made by the United States during the last years of the 
Carter administration is unmistakably demonstrated by this U.S. policy toward 
Afghanistan. Brzezinski recalled nearly twenty years later, “That secret operation was an 
excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you 
want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to 
President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam 
war.” 164
The Soviet Union’s strategy began to falter almost immediately after the initial 
success of its invasion. Soviet Muslims, dispersed among the countryside to work with 
Afghan government forces, more often than not sided with the resistance fighters. They 
provided intelligence, arms, and food to the rebels. Soviet commanders, horrified, pulled 
these troops out of the country. They began to replace the Soviet Muslims stationed 
within the formations with Slavic conscripts. 165
Very soon after the invasion, Moscow started to seek a political settlement as an 
alternative to war. In May 1980 Soviet leaders called for negotiations that would lesson 
the need for direct Soviet action by securing legitimacy for the Karmal regime. The
164  “Interview of Zbigniew Brzezinski,” 76.
165 O’Ballance, Afghan Wars, 97.
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United Nations began tentative efforts at mediation, although even vague agreements on 
agenda and procedure did not take shape until 1982.166 Meanwhile Brezhnev continued 
to insist that cessation of all foreign interference in Afghanistan must be a prerequisite for 
Soviet withdrawal. This played perfectly into American plans, especially those of 
Brzezinski, who sought to keep the Soviets in Afghanistan as long as possible by means 
of covert assistance.
The Politburo concluded sagely on January 27,1980, “Providing increasing 
assistance to the Afghan counter-revolution, the West and the PRC are counting on the 
fact that they will succeed in inspiring an extended conflict in Afghanistan, as the result 
of which, they believe, the Soviet Union will get tied up in that country.” 167 It began 
outlining strategies for dealing with the escalating situation in Afghanistan, including 
plans leaving the country. 168
Despite Soviet recognition of American efforts to entrench the Soviets in 
Afghanistan, on February 7th Ustinov projected Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan 
within the next 12-18 months. 1 6 9  On April 10th the Politburo concluded its decision to
166  Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 7-8.
167 “About Further Measures to Provide for the National Interests of the USSR in 
Relation to the Events in Afghanistan,” in CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 28 January 
1980, with Report by Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev, 27 January 1980, Cold 
War International History Project, available at
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfin?topic_id=1409&fuseaction-library.document&id=::690, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
168 “On the Situation in Afghanistan.”
169 Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report on Events in Afghanistan on 
27-28 December 1979, Cold War International History Project, trans. Mark H. Doctoroff, 
available at
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invade was still the correct one. 1 7 0  Nevertheless, by June 19th the Politburo had decided 
it would be “expedient to withdraw several military units whose presence in Afghanistan 
now is not necessary.” 171 The Soviet Union was unable to do so for nearly a decade.
The sources of pressure were frustratingly apparent: foreign efforts to foment and
aid insurgency grew apace with Soviet entanglement. Defense Minister Ustinov reported
to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on October 2,1980:
Following the revolution in Afghanistan, the USA and it allies in NATO, 
as well as China, Pakistan, Iran, and several reactionary Arab countries, 
launched subversive actions against the DRA, and these actions were 
greatly stepped up once Soviet troops were sent into Afghanistan.
The USA and its allies are training, equipping, and sending into DRA 
territory armed formations of the Afghan counter-revolution, the activity 
of which, thanks to help from the outside, has become the main factor 
destabilizing the situation in Afghanistan.
Ustinov continued, informing the CPSU that Afghans rebels were being trained at 42
sites in Pakistan and 13 sites in Iran. He alleged that 65,000 Afghans had been trained
since 1980 by American, Chinese, Pakistani, and Egyptian instructors; 53,000 of them
had already found their way back to Afghanistan and were fighting the Soviet puppet
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=180, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
HO “The development of the situation in Afghanistan after the introduction of the 
limited contingent of the Soviet troops in December 1979 confirms our assessment that it 
was a timely and a correct action. It undermined the plans to overthrow the revolutionary 
regime in DRA and prevented the emergence of a new hotbed of military threat on the 
Southern borders of the Soviet Union.” See CPSU CC Politburo Decision on 
Afghanistan, 10 April 1980, with report by Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Zagladin, 7 April 
1980, Cold War International History Project, trans. Svetlana Savranskaya, available at 
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=695, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
171 CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 19 June 1980, Cold War International History 
Project, trans. Sveta Savranskaya, available at
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfin?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=697, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
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regime. He cited American efforts as particularly strenuous, including active 
participation by instructors from its “International Policy Academy” in Washington, DC 
and “School of Subversion” in Texas. Ustinov made the case that these Americans were 
the prime organizers of rebel operations in Afghanistan. 172
Along with instruction came the weapons to be used. Through a complicated 
scheme involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China, and Texas, the United States funneled 
arms, intelligence, and Islam through Pakistan and into the hands of Afghan rebels. One 
of the main goals was to unite the Afghan tribes’ efforts. The American advisors 
promised unlimited supplies of arms if they did so.
The American-led covert aid operation swelled from approximately five hundred 
thousand to tens of millions of dollars in its first year. 173 Its effectiveness in drawing the 
Soviets into their own seemingly endless quagmire gathered the attention of the next 
administration. Under the Reagan administration the covert operation in Afghanistan 
grew tremendously, drawing off an ever-increasing percentage of Soviet power. One 
Congressman deeply committed to the scheme remarked in 1985, “There were 58,000 
[U.S.] dead in Vietnam and we owe the Russians one . . .  I think the Soviets ought to get 
a dose of it.” 1 7 4  The Soviets did not find an escape from Afghanistan until it signed the
172 Report by Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov to CPSU CC on “Foreign 
Interference" in Afghanistan, 2 October 1980, Cold War International History Project, 
available at
http://wwics. si .edu/index.cfin?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=7 01, 
accessed 14 November 2004.
173 Gates, From the Shadows, 147.
174 The Daily Telegraph, 14 January 1985.
I
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Geneva Accords on April 14,1988 and withdrew its troops in early 1989. The invasion 
and occupation of Afghanistan was the last major military campaign fought by the Soviet 
Union.
Conclusions
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dispelled any notion still held by the United 
States -  especially its President -  that coexistence with the Soviet empire, peaceful or 
otherwise, was acceptable.175 The Soviets made plain that the force of international 
opinion and U.S. moral suasion made little difference in Moscow. Robert Tucker, 
writing in 1980, noted that a “sea-change has occurred over the past decade in the 
military relationship of the superpowers. The consequences of this change do not begin 
in Afghanistan. They have been increasingly apparent since the mid-1970s. What 
Afghanistan has done is to make them considerably more explicit than before.”176
Yet the American public either did not notice Carter’s transformation to hard-line 
policies or felt he could not pursue this strategy effectively. Even many in U.S. foreign 
policy circles failed to perceive the fundamental shift in U.S. strategy. Barry Posen and
175 Daniel Yankelovich and Larry Kaagan recorded, “By the end of 1980, a series 
of events had shaken us out of our soul-searching and into a new, outward-looking state 
of mind. The public had grown skeptical of detente and distressed by American 
impotence in countering the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It felt 
bullied by OPEC, humiliated by the Ayatollah Khomeini, tricked by Castro, out-traded 
by Japan and out-gunned by the Russians. By the time of the 1980 presidential election, 
fearing that America was losing control over its foreign affairs, voters were more than 
ready to exorcise the ghost of Vietnam and replace it with a new posture of American 
assertiveness.” Yankelovich and Kaagan, “Assertive America,” 1.
176 Tucker, “America in Decline, 480.
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Stephen Van Evera complained in 1980, “The strategy that requires new spending 
remains vague.”177 Norman Podhertz believed one important factor was missing from 
American confrontation of the Soviet Union: ideology. 178 He protested -  several years 
after Carter began his rebuilding of American exceptionalism -  that it was insufficient for 
American strategists to treat the superpower rivalry as merely another struggle between 
great powers. Podhertz asserted that scholarly approaches might display the rise of 
Soviet power and the fear this causes in Washington, but the American citizenry craves 
deeper meaning to its contests. For a “new nationalism” to take root and sustain itself, 
the conflict must be one of freedom and democracy versus totalitarian dictatorship. The 
fight for American interests could not take place without also being a fight for American 
values.
This was in fact one of Carter’s primary strategic themes, but was unable after 
1979 to make the case that he was the man to lead the fight. Americans wanted a more 
credible and strident statement of the positions Carter had learned to embrace. Ronald 
Reagan made these principles compelling themes in his 1980 campaign.179 He 
trumpeted the structural realist themes of Brzezinski and Kissinger while asserting the 
value of morality as a source of international power. In this way the Reagan
177 Barry R. Posen and Stephen van Evera, “Overarming and Underwhelming,” 
Foreign Policy, no. 40, (Fall 1980), 99.
178 Norman Podhoretz, The Present Danger (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1980).
179 “It seems clear the election turned precisely on the theme of imperial decline. 
Are Americans doomed to watch the Soviets assume military mastery? Is the economy 
past the point of renewal? Can industries compete effectively again? Are you better off 
than you were four years ago?” Krieger, Politics o f Decline, 140.
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administration embraced the new, sophisticated, and uniquely American grand strategy 
emerging in the late 1970s despite its lack of a similarly credentialed grand strategist.180
Second Adjustment: Pushing for Preeminence 
Ronald Reagan, like his predecessor, came to Washington, D.C. championing a 
renewal of American power. He felt the United States had lost but could reclaim its 
rightful heritage as the world’s preeminent military, economic, and moral power. All it 
lacked was political leadership that had faith in the possibility of American triumph. 
Reagan’s rhetoric struck a chord with American aspirations and frustrations. Joel Krieger 
notes, “Reaganism was no accident. Each element of his appeal -  the populist anti-state, 
anti-welfarist rhetoric, the Manichean cast of foreign policy, and the no-pain promises of 
supply-side economics -  succeeded at least in part because of objective 
circumstances.”181
180 Robert Osgood pointed out, “The greatest discontinuities spring from 
responses to unanticipated events, not from changes of Administration.” Robert E. 
Osgood, “Revitalization of Containment,” in The Reagan Foreign Policy, ed. William G. 
Hyland (New York: New American Library, 1987), 19. Sterling Kemek, in a 1993 
discussion of Reagan’s foreign policy, agreed. “Robert Osgood put it rather well when 
he said that “The continuities of American foreign policy are always greater than the 
political claims to innovation would have one believe.” To be sure changes occur, but 
much of it has a familiar rhythm. Osgood described the oscillation in America’s world 
role between assertion and retrenchment. It has tended to reflect perceived changes in the 
Soviet threat.” From “Reagan’s Foreign Policy Leadership,” presented in a forum at the 
Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, August 16,1989, and reprinted in 
Foreign Policy in the Reagan Presidency: Nine Intimate Perspectives, ed. Kenneth W. 
Thompson III of The Miller Center Reagan Oral History Series (New York: University 
Press of America, 1993), 5.
181 Krieger, Politics o f Decline, 135.
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Reagan’s virulent campaign statements, unrestrained by the requirements of 
national governance, had been similar to that of Kennedy and Nixon during their bids for 
the White House. The two former Presidents had achieved the Oval Office by warning 
an uneasy populace that the United States was losing the military balance and needed to 
take immediate and strong corrective measures. Each had also changed their view on this 
very soon after taking the oath of office. This led many observers to erroneously dismiss 
Reagan’s stances as over inflated campaign rhetoric.
The Soviet Union had the opposite reaction. Publicly, Soviet ideologists 
proclaimed the move to be a desperate choice of a wounded animal, evidence that the 
United States “was in the throes of a systematic crisis.” The election of “right-wing 
ideologues bent on war” was a sure sign of America’s “impending fall.” Privately, the 
results of the 1980 election shook the Soviet leadership. “There was widespread concern 
and actual fear of Reagan on the Central Committee,” recalls Yevgenny Novikov, then a 
senior member in the International Department of the Central Committee. “He was the 
last thing they wanted to see in Washington.” Oleg Kalugin, then a KGB general and in 
charge of foreign counterintelligence, concurs: “Reagan and his views disturbed the 
Soviet government so much they bordered on hysteria. There were cables about an 
imminent crisis. He was seen as a very serious threat.”182
A more assertive American strategy was in some part, although not entirely, what 
the United States wanted from its government. The seemingly static nature of U.S.-
182 Oleg Kalugin, comments at the Hoover Institution. Quoted in Schweizer, 
Victory, 17.
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Soviet competition aroused polarizing sentiments within the West. Robert Legvold wrote 
in 1980 of “a permanent competition.”183 By 1981, albeit very expensively, the Soviet 
Union had achieved a position of marginal strategic superiority -  meaning that with good 
luck and judgment it would win at modest cost; with less good luck and less good 
judgment it should still win, though very probably at catastrophic cost.184
Robert Tucker described foreign policy circles as still being divided in late 1980 
between “those who believe that we must adjust our interests and behavior to the more 
modest position we now occupy in the world” and “those who believe that we can and 
must recapture the position and leadership we once enjoyed.” Tucker specified that, for 
the former, “adjustment to our diminished status is a necessity we can attempt to escape 
only at our peril.” For the latter, “the reassertion of something akin to the former policy 
of global containment is the only safe course we can take.”185
This was not the view that predominated among the individuals the American 
people placed in charge of their nation’s grand strategy. They felt “mutual restraint” had 
never characterized the behavior of the Soviet Union, nor had containment contained or 
detente slowed its ever-increasing military strength.186 Reagan and his advisors rejected 
detente and its acceptance of Soviet ideology as a legitimate counterweight to American
183 Legvold, “Containment without Confrontation,” 75.
184 Gray, “National Style in Strategy,” 36.
185 Robert W. Tucker, “The Purposes of American Power,” Foreign Affairs 59, 
no. 2 (Winter 1980/81), 242. Tucker argued that a renewed confrontation of the Soviet 
Union required the mobilization of ideology and must therefore take place in the form of 
global containment. See also 262-65.
186 Caspar W. Weinberger, In the Arena: A Memoir o f the 20th Century 
(Washington, DC: Regnery, 2001), 328.
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values. The newly elected president derided detente was “a French word the Russians 
had interpreted as a freedom to pursue whatever politics of subversion, aggression, and 
expansionism they wanted anywhere in the world.”187 Reagan’s distaste for detente and 
moral objections to the Soviet system, as well as its behavior, was a significant factor in 
the more hostile Cold War stance the United States would adopt under his administration.
Changing Strategic Situation: Weakening Adversary
During the late seventies, I felt our country had begun to abdicate that historical role as 
the spiritual leader of the Free World and its foremost defender of democracy. Some of 
our resolve was gone, along with a part of our commitment to uphold the values we 
cherished.
President Ronald Reagan, An American Life
Robert Tucker asked, “While pursing a restoration of American power and 
position, and while once again drawing lines which the Russians are expected not to 
violate, can we still keep the relationship short of one that is under constant strain?” 
Reagan not only thought this was possible -  it seemed to him the only course of action 
consistent with American values that could ensure long-term American security. He 
refused to accept the view that the Cold War was a permanent competition between 
equally valid ideological systems. “In my speeches and press conferences, I deliberately 
set out to say some frank things about the Russians, to let them know there were some
187 Ibid, 278. Quote in Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1990), 265.
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new fellows in Washington who had a realistic view of what they were up to and weren’t 
going to let them keep it up.”
The advisors Reagan brought to his administration appeared to substantiate 
Western expectation that American foreign policy would revert to something more akin 
to the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger days. National security slots were given to longstanding 
Washington figures such as Alexander Haig (State) and Caspar Weinberger (Defense).188 
He filled domestic positions with associates of no clear ideological adherence, such as 
Donald Regan (Treasury), or moderate conservatives such as Malcolm Baldridge 
(Commerce) and Drew Lewis (Transportation).
Reagan deplored Kissinger’s use of the National Security Council to promote his 
strategic vision. Like nearly every President before him, he decided initially that the 
Secretary of State would be his primary advisor, architect, and spokesman on 
international relations.189 Reagan, however, stuck to this pledge and made his National 
Security Adviser a less prominent figure in his administration. He nominated Richard 
Allen, a former NSC staff member from the Kissinger days, and placed him and the NSC 
subordinate to the presidential counsel.190
188 Haig would later be forced to resign and be replaced by George Shultz. Vice 
President-elect George Bush, known for his quiet demeanor, had foreseen this conflict as 
early as 1980. He told a group of transition team members who were considering Cabinet 
slots, “Do what you want to. But if you pick A1 Haig, I predict you’ll have serious 
problems.” Quoted in Persico, Casey, 201.
189 The glaring exception to this tradition was Henry Kissinger, who eclipsed 
Secretary of State William Rogers in this respect during the Nixon administration.
190 From 1953 to 1981 the United States had nine National Security Advisors. 
During Reagan’s eight years in office he appointed six: Richard V. Allen: January 21,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
258
Reagan’s choice for Secretary of State Alexander Haig, was a powerful 
Washington insider who had all but run the United States during Nixon’s last six months 
in office. Crisp and decisive, sometimes overly so, Haig made an immediate move to 
consolidate power over national security. On inauguration day he submitted a draft 
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-1), calling for transfer of most of the NSC’s 
power to State.
Haig requested Reagan’s signature on the spot and was refused. His brusque grab 
at power solidified the forces against him, bringing together presidential advisors James 
Baker, Mike Deaver, and Ed Meese. As presidential councilor Meese had the National 
Security Council, disenfranchised and dispirited, under his authority. He intercepted 
Haig’s draft NSDD-1 and had it rewritten as a confirmation of the status quo. The 
Reagan administration left in place most of its predecessor’s policies and arrangements 
while it studied the situation.
The choice of Weinberger to run the Pentagon seemed an important sign that 
Reagan was not serious about pursuing a quick defense buildup. A former director of the 
Office of Management of Budget, he was known in Washington circles as “Dr. No” or, 
more often, “Cap the Knife” for his efforts to cut federal spending during the Nixon
1981 - January 4,1982; William Clark: January 4,1982 - October 17,1983; Robert C. 
McFarlane: October 17, 1983 - December 4,1985; John M. Poindexter: December 4, 
1985 - November 25,1986; Frank C. Carlucci: December 2,1986 - November. 23,1987; 
Colin L. Powell: November 23, 1987 - January 20, 1989. A full list of Advisors is 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gOv/nsc/history.html#appendix, accessed 7 
November 2004.
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administration.191 The Reagan transition team, by choosing Weinberger, appeared to be 
backing away from its campaign pledge for a massive military rebuilding program.
This interpretation, however, was incorrect.192 Weinberger combined virulent 
anti-communism with enthusiasm for technological innovation. He lobbied nearly 
everyone he met on the idea of a resurgent military. “I was already aware of the general 
deterioration of our military during the Carter years, bust as I began receiving the 
classified data on our capabilities, I found that it was even worse than I had thought. It 
was truly appalling.”193 Weinberger became a staunch supporter of the administration’s 
push for larger and more powerful armed forces, lobbying hard for more and newer 
weapons programs.
The absence of a strong National Security Advisor and apprehension about Haig 
allowed power over foreign affairs to diffuse throughout the government. When Reagan 
settled on Bill Casey to run the CIA, Casey received unprecedented authority. He had 
been a member of the Office of Strategic Services, forerunner of the CIA during the 
Second World War, in its energetic days under “Wild Bill” Donovan.194 After Casey
191 The nickname came from presidential speechwriter and future columnist Bill 
Safire. Weinberger, In the Arena, 208.
192 “In view of my reputation from California and my OMB days as a zealous 
budget cutter, many may have thought it odd that the president-elect would ask me to 
conduct and lead the great military buildup that we both knew was necessary. I had 
always felt that we needed to maintain a strong defense at all times. I had recognized this 
back in 1972, when I was director of the budget, and I made no secret of my opinion.” 
Ibid, 274.
193 Ibid, 273-74.
194 “I could see some many similarities between him and Bill Donovan,” 
observed John Bross, a former OSS member who worked directly for Casey at CIA.
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assumed the directorship at CIA, he quickly reverted to his concept of the role and 
methods of intelligence as he had learned them forty years earlier.195 Casey complained 
publicly, “It is hard to overstate the damage done to the intelligence service dining the 
1970s.”196 During his tenure the CIA would rebuild its capabilities and reassume its 
energetic pursuit of U.S foreign policy goals. This process took a few years, limiting 
initially its ability to supply President Reagan with the more forceful tools of covert 
confrontation the United States had begun to use under Carter.
The first nine months of the Reagan administration, in fact, showed remarkably 
little movement on international relations. Reagan’s first priority was the economy. He 
spent the majority of his efforts in the first year of his administration filling out his 
cabinet, recovering from an attempt on his life in March, and working to pass his budget. 
While Reagan focused on the economy, his administration tried to sort out ways of 
implementing Reagan’s vision for U.S. foreign affairs and who should be in charge of it.
In October 1981 Reagan turned his attention more fully to foreign affairs. He and 
Weinberger presented the first attempt at a coherent strategy, National Security Decision 
Directive (NSDD-12), in a disastrous ceremony that demonstrated neither man had yet 
defined a clear vision and strategy for the nation. Chastised by the press and frustrated 
with his administration’s performance, Reagan restructured the National Security Council
Richard Helms, Casey’s roommate during his OSS days and a future DCI himself, 
agreed: “They were both connivers in their own way.” Quoted in Persico, Casey, 208 
and 209, respectively.
195 Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA: Revealing the Secrets o f the World’s Most 
Powerful Spy Agency (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), 110.
196 Address to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, San Francisco, 
California, May 21,1982. The full text of the speech can be found in Scouting the 
Future: The Public Speeches o f William J. Casey, compiled by Herbert E. Meyer 
(Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1989), 10-2.
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and replaced Richard Allen with William Clark, a longtime friend whom he felt he could 
trust with the position. Clark received the kind of access that had been denied Richard 
Clark and the authority to put together a new NSC staff.
Under the leadership of Clark, Weinberger, and Casey a coalition of like-minded 
experts, just below Cabinet level, formed around its shared view that the Soviet system 
was weakening.197 This view was hardly universal among Americans. Seweryn Bialer 
and Joan Afferica stated in 1982, “Even were the West able to impose extreme economic 
choices on the Soviet Union, the system would not crumble, the political structures would 
not disintegrate, the economy would not go bankrupt, the elites and leadership would not 
lose their will and power to rule internally and to aspire externally to the status of a 
global power.”198 This view of the futility of confronting the Soviet Union, while 
prominent and very popular in some circles, did little to deter the aspirations of the 
majority of American people in their choice of grand strategy.
Scholarly Insights: American Opportunism 
In the early 1980s the United States came to accept Reagan’s assertions that 
communism was the continuation of the totalitarian threat it had faced and defeated in the
197 Economist Norman Bailey and Thomas Reed, former Secretary of the Air 
Force, were staff officers of the National Security Council. Andy Marshall was the 
longtime Director of Net Assessment at the Pentagon. Henry Rowen chaired the National 
Intelligence Council. Bill Lee worked at the Defense Intelligence Agency.
198 Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, “Reagan and Russia,” Foreign Affairs 61, 
no. 2 (Winter 1982/83), 263.
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Second World War.199 Americans viewed the existence of the Soviet system itself as a 
threat to international stability and morality. They still subscribed to Carter’s ideas about 
the efficacy of moral authority in international relations, but believed dealing with the 
Soviets required substantially more forceful efforts to confront and roll back their 
advances. The American purpose was still moral and, therefore, exceptional, but its Cold 
War policy was to be based on “strength and realism.”200
Perceptions of American strength were not as optimistic as had been promulgated 
by the Carter reelection campaign. Restoration of American moral credibility was a long 
and arduous process that required more than displays of an administration’s moral 
consciousness in the periphery. Carter began this process in areas of the world in which 
morally indignation and championing of “the good” bore fewer costs and lesser risks. A 
complete recovery of American credibility in this area meant doing so in the face of 
annihilative nuclear power and overwhelming military forces. American moral authority 
would not be restored to its full strength until it had established a consistent record of 
tough diplomatic, economic, and military opposition of its most powerful adversary.
199 The administration pushed this view relentlessly, for it formed the core of its 
belief in the immorality of the Soviet system. Casey, for example, proclaimed in a 
speech in 1983 at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri -  location of Winston 
Churchill’s famous “Iron Curtain” warning about the Soviet Union -  “The threat posed 
by the Soviet Union is the lineal descendant of the same threat Western civilization has 
faced for better than two thousand years . . .  The chief threat posed by the Soviet Union .. 
. (lies) in the relentlessness of its assault on our values.” Address to Westminster 
College, Fulton, Missouri, October 29, 1983. Available in Scouting the Future, 16-24.
200 Reagan, An American Life, 267.
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Reagan, like Carter, chose the University of Notre Dame as the forum for a major 
address on foreign policy. He told the audience defiantly that the United States was not 
destined for Cold War stalemate and unending superpower coexistence. Instead, “The 
West will not contain communism, it will transcend communism.” Under his leadership 
the United States would push the Soviets in ways that demonstrated for their own 
citizens, as well of those of Eastern Europe, the limitations of their own totalitarian 
system. It would, in turn, help expose their preference for American-style democratic 
values.
This began with deterrence through the kind of strength the Soviets understood: 
military might. Unfortunately, the United States did not yet possess sufficient military 
strength to be effective in stemming Soviet expansionism. Weinberger records, “All of 
this causes me -  and President Reagan -  more than a little alarm. When we took office, 
the first thing we did was to add $32 billion to the Carter administration’s Defense budget 
requests for fiscal years 1981 and 1982 . . .  in truth it wasn’t nearly enough.”201 Barry 
Posen and Stephen Van Evera noted with alarm that U.S. grand strategy “is the most 
expansive and demanding strategy adopted by any administration since Eisenhower’s. Its 
requirements substantially exceed those suggested by the original logic of the American 
policy of Soviet containment.”202
201 Weinberger, In the Arena, 276.
202 Barry R. Posen and Stephen van Evera, “Reagan Administration Defense 
Policy: Departure from Containment,” in Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American 
Foreign Policy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 76.
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Reagan’s decision to challenge the Soviets on both moral and structural grounds 
meant a substantial amount of his administration’s energy would be devoted to finding 
ways to make life hard for the Soviet Union. During the early and mid-1980s the United 
States’ focus on Cold War issues would become more central to overall grand strategy. 
Some thought this reversal of Carter’s rhetoric about “North-South” being more 
important than “East-West” went too far. Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica noted, “In 
foreign policy President Reagan has subordinated almost all decisions to the East-West 
conflict as the central axis of American international concerns” and that it continues “to 
display the characteristics of an ideological crusade.”203
This indeed appeared the case unless one understands the Cold War in the context 
of larger American grand strategy. The United States sought to create the conditions of 
sustainable preeminence, which at this time required that it reverse Cold War trends 
toward bilateral equality and eventual subordination to Soviet power. The Reagan 
administration wanted to find and exploit Soviet weaknesses to help this process along.
As it believed the Soviet system was inherently weak to begin, the campaign for support 
was largely a case of convincing the American public and especially the foreign policy 
community that their assessments of Soviet power were correct. Casey, for example, 
presented this case to the Annual Meeting of the Business Council in May 1981: “The 
Soviet economy is gasping under its inherent inefficiencies and its burden of enormous 
military expenditures; also its many billions each year to Cuba and Vietnam, cut-rate oil
203 Bialer and Afferica, “Reagan and Russia,” 249.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
265
to East European satellites, and huge worldwide expenditures for propaganda and 
subversion.”204
On February 5,1982 the President signed National Security Study Directive 
Number 1 (NSSD-1), instructing the NSC staff to review U.S. national security 
objectives and examine the ways in which Soviet power affected them.205 Thomas Reed, 
after coming on board the NSC in January 1982, noted American foreign policy was 
changing course. “Words like “containment,” “detente,” and “mutual assured 
destruction” were out.”206 The United States was in the process of leaving behind 
notions of a permanent competition and moving toward ending the Cold War on a basis 
acceptable to American values. It was at this time that the phrase “evil empire” first 
made its way into official drafts of Reagan’s speeches. It was cut, reinserted, and cut 
again from his 1982 British Parliament speech, a year and a half before Reagan said them 
to the National Association of Evangelicals.207
The Regan administration codified the United States’ commitment to this view in 
its National Security Decision Directives. “The key military threats to U.S. security 
during the 1980s will continue to be posed by the Soviet Union and its allies and clients. 
Despite increasing pressures on its economy and the growing vulnerabilities of its
204 Address to the Annual Meeting of the Business Council, Hot Springs, 
Virginia, May 9,1981. Available in Scouting the Future, 16-24.
205 For an account of the study by the man in charge of it, see Thomas C. Reed, 
At the Abyss: An Insider’s History o f the Cold War (New York: Ballantine Books, 2004), 
235-36.
206 Ibid, 236.
207 Weinberger, In the Arena, 328.
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empire, the Soviet military will continue to expand and modernize.”208 This reflected the 
administration’s view of the threat of Soviet military power, yet asserted the possibility of 
direct confrontation remained remote. One such memorandum concluded, “The Soviet 
Union remains aware of the catastrophic consequences of initiating military action 
directly against the U.S. or its allies.”209 This meant the United States could push 
aggressively for favorable changes in the bilateral structure without precipitating major 
war (111. 12).
Ill 12. Reagan Administration's Perception of Relative Power 
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208 “National Security Decision Directive 23: U.S. Civil Defense Policy,” 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-023.htm, accessed 7 November 
2004.
209 Ibid.
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Reagan and his advisors understood their assertive stances and combative policies 
would increase the risk of confrontation. They counted on greater Soviet efforts to tie up 
their resources in an attempt to prevent the United States from reversing the USSR’s 
recent gains. Such an effort from an already vulnerable state would exhaust its people 
and weaken their government’s authority. NSDD-32 declared, “.. .the decade of the 
eighties will likely pose the greatest challenge to our survival and well-being since World 
War II and our response could result in a fundamentally different East-West relationship 
by the end of this decade.”210
IE 13. Transition of Views ca. 1976 and 1980
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The prominence given to Cold War concerns meant perceptions of bilateral 
relative power trends would be more critical to the overall picture of U.S. international 
power than during the previous administration. Their effects would factor more 
prominently in U.S. strategic thinking (111. 13). This creates for the United States an 
overall picture that looked bleaker in the short term, but held out the possibility that it 
could improve dramatically with the successful rollback of Soviet power.
The election of a more assertive president fit structural realist patterns of a nation 
caught in a deep relative decline. The United States was in the throes of insecurity and 
could be expected to attempt aggressive measures to stave off what Soviet leaders viewed 
as the inevitable fall of the West. At the same time it perceived an opportunity to weaken 
severely the economic and political foundations of the Soviet empire. These maneuvers 
would take place on those battlegrounds that American strategists at this time believed 
most advantageous: overall economic power, the productive capacity of the military- 
industrial complex, high technology, and ideological appeal.
Adjusting Grand Strategy: Escalating Adversarial Confrontation
The conclusion of NSSD-1, which ran from February to the end of April, was the 
creation of NSDD-32, titled “U.S. National Security Strategy.” In its eight pages the 
Reagan administration laid out in plain language the strategic objectives of the United 
States that had been evolving since the mid-1970s. NSDD-32 began by enumerating 
longstanding objectives of preserving democracy, protecting citizens, promoting 
economic growth, and fostering an international order based on American values. It then 
moved into specifics of threat posed to these objectives by Soviet power, a tabulation of
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Soviet strengths and weaknesses, predictions of increased confrontation between the 
superpowers, and, finally, a resolution that the United States would seek the dissolution 
of the Soviet empire. 211
Under Reagan the United States escalated the conflict by challenging the Soviets 
on both moral and physical grounds. His rhetoric reflected his beliefs and reinforced 
American strategy. In his foreign policy speeches Reagan condemned communism as a 
failed experiment, called for massive reform in Soviet behavior and within the Soviet 
system, and predicted its impending downfall. American policies reflected this attitude 
as well -  it sought to push the Soviet Union in ways that exposed the inherent 
contradictions of its authoritarian government.
NSDD-32 spelled out the specific policies that would achieve these objectives. It 
stated the administration’s belief that the United States was at a strategic disadvantage in 
nuclear and conventional forces, civil defense, and access to strategic minerals and 
petroleum. It identified five areas of strategic adjustment that would remedy this: 
modernizing U.S. military forces, increasing military support by U.S. allies, economic 
pressure on the USSR and its allies, political pressure on their governments, and covert 
operations designed to make the Soviet empire more difficult to hold together.212
211 “National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy,” 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-032.htm, accessed 10 August 2004.
212 Christopher Simpson, National Security Directives o f the Reagan & Bush 
Administrations: The Declassified History o f U.S. Political & Military Policy, 1981- 
1991 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 62-4.
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Shortly thereafter Alexander Haig finally resigned and was replaced at State by 
the highly experienced Washington economist George Schultz, a longtime Reagan 
associate and a colleague of Weinberger’s at both OMB and Bechtel Corporation.
Schultz shared the administration’s pessimistic view regarding the viability of the Soviet 
empire.213 Replacement of Haig with Schultz meant American diplomacy would reflect 
more clearly the administration’s desire to confront the Soviets on ideological grounds, 
pressuring on human rights, dissident persecution, and totalitarian repression of the 
inherent human desire for freedom.
The administration’s rebuilding of the American military so soon after its 
experience in Vietnam seemed to indicate an almost desperate effort to swing, at least 
temporarily, the correlation of forces in the Americans’ favor. Meanwhile, Bill Casey 
had been restructuring the CIA and preparing it for the tasks associated with a more 
aggressive foreign policy. The heightened secrecy, extraordinary levity, and sudden 
exuberance of the United States’ intelligence services in the early 1980s seemed to 
indicate a flurry of covert activity would soon follow. Taken together, these maneuvers 
were the most visible preparations for its indirect confrontation of Soviet power.
The United States held important advantages over the Soviet Union in the areas of 
advanced technology, moral authority, and overall economic performance. These would 
become the battlefields on which the United States would choose to confront its
213 As early as 1979 Schultz had been making this view public. He told an 
audience at Stanford University, “The Soviet system is incompetent and cannot survive.” 
George Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary o f State (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
271
adversaries. The most vulnerable point in the Soviet empire was its economy. The 
Soviet Union simply could not afford its commitments as a global superpower and 
competitor of the United States. It suffered from imperial overstretch, or taking on more 
than its empire could afford.214 The tremendous pressure was becoming unbearable.
Recognizing this, the Reagan administration specifically sought situations it could 
use to exacerbate the situation. It implemented policies and programs designed to make 
the Soviet Union pay a high price for its superpower status. At the same time it took 
steps to formalize the United States’ strategic break with the past. On January 17, 1983 
Reagan signed NSDD-75, “U.S. Relations with the USSR,” making official the U.S. 
abandonment of its thirty-year commitment to containment.215 Reed recalls, “NSDD-75 
was a confidential declaration of economic and political war.”216 The thrust of its 
strategy was made public eight weeks later in Reagan’s famous “evil empire” speech.217
The first major action taken in this context was an escalation of covert aid to the 
Afghan resistance. Casey took one look at Brzezinski’s program and decided it was 
exactly the kind of confrontation the United States should be pursuing. “We need twenty 
Afghanistans.” He pushed for increased aid to the Afghan rebels, who were tying up
214 See Kennedy, Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers.
215 “National Security Decision Directive 75: U.S. Relations with the U.S.S.R.,” 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-075.htm, accessed 7 November 
2004.
216 Reed, At the Abyss, 240.
217 The “evil empire” line finally made it into the speech Reagan gave before the 
National Association of Evangelicals, Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983. Reprinted in 
Ronald Reagan, Speaking My Mind: Selected Speeches (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1989), 168-80.
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Soviet military forces and draining the system of many of its war supplies. He declared 
as early as 1981, “The USSR has fallen into a hornet’s nest in Afghanistan.”218 By 1983 
the Reagan administration had converted the nest into a truly dangerous quagmire.
The United States accelerated its supply of military equipment to Afghanistan, 
while maintaining for at least a few years its highly transparent arms-length arrangement. 
The weapons sent to aid the fighters were designed by Russians, produced by Egyptians, 
paid for by Saudis, and smuggled through Pakistan into Afghanistan. The United States 
also provided the disorganized bands with maps showing the location of strategic Soviet 
supply lines. It eventual broke with the policy’s original conception of ensuring all 
weapons funneled to Afghanistan would be of communist origin. In 1986 Reagan 
decided to accede to field commanders’ requests and provide the Afghan fighters with the 
brand-new Stinger missile. This brought to the Soviet battlefield a “wonder weapon” that 
destroyed or warded off Soviet gunships and jets.219 By then Reagan had told the CIA in
218 Address to the Annual Meeting of the Business Council, Hot Springs, 
Virginia, May 9,1981. Available in Scouting the Future, 16-24.
219 The Stinger missile was both an effective battlefield weapon and a source of 
fear for Soviet pilots. Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, head of the Afghan Bureau of 
Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence, was responsible for training and operational 
planning for the Mujahadeen inside Afghanistan and, later, the Soviet Union from 1983 
to 1987. He described the introduction of Stinger missiles in stark terms: “It fired an 
infra-red, heat-seeking missile, capable of engaging at low-altitude, high-speed jets, even 
if flying directly at the firer. The missile carried a high explosive warhead with 
significant countermeasure immunity. Once a missile has locked on to a target no other 
heat source, such as flares, can deflect it. The only possible way to avoid the lock-on is 
to keep so high as to be out of range, or to dispense flares as such a rate that there is 
virtually no interval between them. This entailed knowing when to start firing flares and 
having an inexhaustible supply.” See Brig. Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin,
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a Presidential Directive that the aim of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan had changed 
from increasing the costs to the USSR to trying to push the Soviets out.
The ideological front required tangible efforts to demonstrate the superiority of 
the American model and aid those attempting to break free from Soviet domination. The 
first opportunity that presented itself was the Solidarity labor movement in Poland. A 
group of Polish workers formed an illegal trade union and began demonstrating for the 
right to organize and bargain with their communist government. The popularity of the 
movement forced the government to recognize Solidarity as legitimate and begin 
discussing the tiniest measures of democratic reform within the Polish Communist Party. 
The Soviet Union responded by sending its troops to the Polish border for “maneuvers” 
in spring 1981. A military regime assumed power in Poland under Soviet orders to end 
Poland’s liberalization. It also cut off the supply of loan credits, leaving the Polish 
people and their economy without much in the way of foreign assistance or, because of 
their failed communist system, domestic production.
“I wanted to be sure we did nothing to impede this process and everything we 
could to spur it along. This is what we had been waiting for since World War II.”
Reagan recalled.220 The United States could not provide visible support for Solidarity 
without sending an inadvertent signal that it would repel any Soviet invasion.221 This 
might give the Polish people false hope of overt American aid while providing the 
Soviets with a pretext for invasion. There was an intricate problem to be solved: how to
Afghanistan -  The Bear Trap: The Defeat o f a Superpower, 2nd ed. (Havertown, PA: 
Casemate, 2001), 174-75.
220 Reagan, An American Life, 301.
221 This lesson came from the unsuccessful 1956 uprisings in Hungary.
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help the Polish people without either propping up its communist government or 
destroying it and inviting Soviet intervention.
The solution was a combination of policies. Reagan made public statements 
condemning the threat of Soviet aggression and private assurances to the Soviet 
leadership that an invasion would have dire consequences for its other, more important 
aims such as arms control and trade relations. At the same time the United States began 
providing clandestine assistance to Solidarity. Dissent became more widespread 
throughout Poland. On December 13, acting on orders from Moscow, the Polish 
government declared martial law, closed the country’s borders, and arrested the leaders of 
Solidarity. Reagan and Brezhnev exchanged unpleasantries and within weeks the United 
States imposed sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union and suspended their 
negotiations for a new grain sale.
Support for Solidarity in Poland grew into a propaganda war for the hearts and 
minds of Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union itself. The Reagan administration 
convinced Voice of America, which was usually sensitive to efforts to make it any part of 
a propaganda campaign, to aid these efforts at stirring up regional ethnic identities within 
the Soviet Union. American Ambassador to Moscow, Jack Matlock made repeated trips 
to the ethnic states within Soviet Russia, taking special care to deliver his speeches in
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native languages. Voice of America aided this effort by helping his translations of his 
speeches into the native languages.222
Reagan himself spearheaded the ideological argument. In a dramatic speech
delivered before the British Parliament, he told a stunned audience about Soviet
immorality, Soviet economic difficulty, and the ways in which he believed the tides of
history would favor the West:
We are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis, a crisis in which the 
demands of the economic order are conflicting directly with those of the 
political order. But the crisis is happening not in the free, non-Marxist 
West, but in the home of Marxist-Leninism, the Soviet Union. It is the 
Soviet Union that runs against the tide of history by denying human 
freedom and human dignity to its citizens.223
Knowing the Soviet Union lacked the capacity to compete with the United States 
in high technology, the Reagan administration placed a great deal of emphasis on projects 
developing the next generation of military sophistication. The primary projects were 
stealth technology and cruise missiles. In 1977, the year the movie Star Wars was 
released, the idea of space-based lasers was already under investigation by some of the 
United States’ top physicists. Dr. Robert M. Bowman, an Air Force colonel in charge of 
the U.S. military space program, submitted a classified report warning of the 
destabilizing effects of any future laser battle stations on the overall strategic nuclear
222 See Jack F. Matlock, Jr. Autopsy on an Empire (New York: Random House, 
1995), 12-3.
223 Ronald Reagan, Address to the Members of the British Parliament, Palace of 
Westminster, June 8, 1982. Reprinted in Reagan, Speaking My Mind, 107-20.
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balance.224 Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) published an article in Strategic Review 
titled, “Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defense.”225 Reagan received 
briefings from Wallop and Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham on this subject during the 1980 
campaign.
The first White House meeting on missile defense took place in September 1981. 
Reagan attended the second in January 1982, at which missile defense was portrayed as 
the next Manhattan Project. The president showed enthusiasm for the idea and instructed 
those present to move ahead on it.226 On March 23, 1983 Reagan proposed the idea of 
Strategic Missile Defense (SDI) and challenged American scientists to find a way to 
make it work.227
The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) opened within the 
Department of Defense in April 1984. The department’s own history of the program 
reflects, “At the inception of the SDIO, the vision of BMD embraced by President Ronald 
Reagan of eliminating the threat of nuclear attack by use of space- and ground-based 
interceptors needed tremendous amounts of research before it held the promise of
224 Cited in Gordon R. Mitchell, Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and 
Politics in Missile Defense Advocacy (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University 
Press, 2000), 50.
225 Malcolm Wallop, “Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile 
Defense,” Strategic Review, no. 7 (Fall 1979), 13-21.
226 Mitchell, Strategic Deception, 51.
227 The feasibility and implications of SDI was the subject of a remarkable work, 
edited by Zbigniew Brzezinski, titled Promise or Peril: The Strategic Defense Initiative; 
Thirty-five Essays by Statesmen, Scholars, and Strategic Analysts (Washington, DC: 
Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1986). See also the edited volume by Robert Tucker, 
“SDI and U.S. Foreign Policy,” SAIS Papers in International Affairs, no. 15 
(Washington, DC: Westview Press / Foreign Policy Institute, 1987).
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reality.”228 Reagan, noting that his critics had called SDI unfeasible and a waste of 
money, responded, “Well, if that’s true, why are the Soviets so upset about it?”229
The Soviet leadership did not take Reagan’s assertion at face value. In a January 
1983 interview, Gromyko showed contempt for the idea that SDI would remain a 
research project. “And who can guarantee that it will stop there after research has been 
completed? Will there not be people, scientists and others, who will say: we have spent 
so many billions of dollars on research, why waste all this money?” He called the policy 
of conducting research alone “wholly untenable.”230 At the same time the Soviet 
leadership understood what was happening: the United States had challenged the Soviet 
Union to a competition it could ill afford to sustain.
Case Study: Soviet Energy Exports 
No single facet of the confrontational approach drew more criticism, strained 
allied relations moTe dangerously, and in the end perhaps crippled Soviet power than the 
United States’ longstanding efforts to disrupt the Soviet petroleum industry. In 1949 the 
Truman administration pressured its European allies and Japan to form the Consultative
228 The DOD assessment is quoted in Anthony Cordesman, Strategic Threats and 
National Missile Defenses: Defending the U.S. Homeland (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 
185.
229 Speech delivered to the Republican Party of California, August 1985. Jerry F. 
Hough, “Soviet Interpretation and Response,” in Arms Control and the Strategic Defense 
Initiative: Three Perspectives, Occasional Paper 36 (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley 
Foundation, 1985), 5.
230 “A.A. Gromyko: Interviewed by Soviet Political Analysts, January 13, 1985” 
(Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1985).
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Group-Coordinating Committee (COCOM) as an institutional vehicle for a multilateral 
Western embargo against the Soviet Union and its allies. Based on a series of executive 
agreements, rather than a formal treaty, it gave American strategists a weak but effective 
structure through which they could leverage east-west trade toward containment of Soviet 
influence.
Among the most strictly controlled COCOM sectors was energy. Oil and natural 
gas are highly strategic commodities. There was deep concern among American 
strategists that Soviet political influence would flow along with Soviet petroleum. They 
did not take long to translate these fears into policy. According to the state department’s 
Battle Act Report of 1950, “All basic specialized equipment for the exploration, 
production, and refining of petroleum and natural gas” was on the COCOM embargo 
list.231
The Soviet Union had no choice but to create these technologies on its own. As a 
result the Soviet petroleum industry lagged behind its potential; it did not even recover its 
pre-war strength until the end of the 1950s. In 1950 the United States strengthened its 
policy by passing the Mutual Defense and Assistance Control Act, making any COCOM 
member state that violated the export controls ineligible for Marshall Plan aid. Any 
conceivable trade relationship the Soviet might offer would not compete with the 
amounts of aid from the Marshall Plan. This legislation, therefore, was very effective in
231 Quote in Bruce W. Jentleson, Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political 
Economy o f East-West Energy Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 8.
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persuading Western allies to comply with U.S. export controls and containment 
objectives.
Eventually the Soviet petroleum industry recovered its strength and became an 
effective tool for the extension of Soviet political influence. The hard currency it 
generated helped fund the restoration of dominance over its satellites in Eastern 
Europe.232 It also offered opportunities for the Soviets to make inroads in Western 
Europe. Trade with the Soviets could provide a source of cheap and plentiful petroleum. 
It also would open a market for the revived West European industry in machine parts.
West European nations also recovered their strength in the 1950s. They used their 
rebuilt political power to pursue their own economic interests, which they saw as 
hampered by American restrictions through COCOM. They balked at American 
leadership during the 1956 Suez Crisis, straining the Western alliance. Soon thereafter 
the Eisenhower administration agreed to relax COCOM restrictions as a means of 
stabilizing the transatlantic relationship 233 Although COCOM continued to restrict 
certain vital energy technologies, the Soviet Union and Western Europe found ways of 
expanding dramatically the scope of their trade relationship. The Soviet Union 
completed its Friendship Pipeline to supply Western Europe with petroleum and Western 
Europe supplied the Soviet Union with a steady supply of hard currency.
232 For details on Soviet oil exports and their effect on balance-of-payments, see 
Margaret Chadwick, David Long, and Machiko Nissanke, Soviet Oil Exports: Trade 
Adjustments, Refining Constraints, and Market Behaviour (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), Ch. 6.
233 Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, 43-4.
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The Suez Crisis underscored Western Europe’s need for alternative sources. 
American’s European allies began searching for them. France, for example, initially 
looked to its Algerian oil fields, which began production in the early 1960s. Algerian 
nationalization of the fields in 1971 forced France to diversify its sources further.2 3 4  The 
oil crisis of 1973 sent ripples of instability through Western European economies. Faced 
with a series of supply disruptions, price swings, and general market unpredictability, the 
demand for a stable and profitable petroleum trade with the Soviet Union grew 
irresistible.
Transatlantic differences over the negotiation of oil prices sharpened in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. The United States, as the lead consumer, demanded the lead role in 
negotiations with Arab petroleum producers for allied purchases. Other nations, such as 
France, wanted to make its own separate bargain for the European Community.2 3 5  The 
differences were papered over during a December 1974 meeting between Presidents Ford 
and Giscard, but allied enmity over petroleum policy remained strong.
Substantial increases in petroleum prices in the 1970s plunged the Western world 
into deeper recession. Reduced growth rates and rising unemployment were extremely 
worrisome trends, weakening governments and deepening divisions in national societies. 
One way for Western Europe to bring their economies out of this slump was to expand 
their petroleum contracts with the Soviet Union. They did so assiduously. The view
2 3 4  Horst Mendershausen, Coping with the Oil Crisis: French and German 
Experiences (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 28.
2 3 5  Ibid, 60-1.
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predominated that “The real danger for France today is the oil crisis, not the SS-20.” 2 3 6  
The same held true for other West European allies.
The Soviets were delighted with the prospect of expanding their already profitable 
oil and natural gas exports to Western Europe. In the 1970s, when the price of oil 
skyrocketed, Soviet hard currency earnings had risen 272 percent, while the volume of its 
exports increased only 22 percent.2 3 7  Moscow had been using its hard currency earnings 
to fund Soviet projects throughout Africa and in Afghanistan 2 3 8  It welcomed the 
opportunity to receive more hard currency from Western Europe, especially as its 
entanglement in Afghanistan escalated and required substantially more financing than 
initially projected.
Unfortunately for Moscow, the Soviet petroleum industry was not poised to 
deliver the profits demanded by the Politburo. It needed to expand oil and natural gas 
production at a time when Soviet exports and domestic industrial investment were 
declining. This led to implementation of a broad range of short-term solutions that would 
produce quick profits but ruin long-term prospects. By 1980 over 85 percent of the oil 
produced in the USSR was extracted with the aid of a practice known as “waterflooding” 
-  injecting water into the well under high pressure to raise the oil and make recovery
2 3 6  Robert J. Lieber’s interview with a leading French expert on foreign policy, 
Paris, May 17, 1979. Quoted in Robert J. Lieber, “Energy, Economics, and Security in 
Alliance Perspective,” International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980), 139.
2 3 7  Schweizer, Victory, 105.
2 3 8  Energy exports in 1978 accounted for 64 percent of all Soviet hard-currency 
earnings. Over the next two years that share grew larger still, even though the actual 
volume of Soviet oil exported declined. See Thane Gustafson, “Energy and the Soviet 
Bloc,” International Security 6 , no. 3 (Winter 1981/82), 6 6 .
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easier.2 3 9  This places enormous strain on equipment and is generally considered a 
practice that provides faster initial oil recovery but shortens the useable lifespan of the 
well considerably. Furthermore, the Volga-Urals oilfields had “peaked” a decade earlier 
than expected.2 4 0
Soviet energy export growth had been declining for several years and only an 
extraordinary upswing in the productive capacity and profitability of the Soviet 
petroleum industry could meet the requirements of the Soviet Union’s command 
economy. The future of the Soviet-West European trade relationship, in turn, depended 
on a steady flow westward of Soviet energy exports and a steady flow eastward of 
Western hard currency and technology. Hamstrung by the limitations of its own 
inconvertible ruble, the Soviet Union used Western hard currency to pay for Western 
technology and equipment. A steady supply of it encouraged West European 
governments and banks to extend credit for the purchase of industrial technology. Any 
interruption in Soviet shipments of petroleum to Western Europe might put doubts in the 
minds of Western Europeans about the Soviets’ reliability as an energy supplier. It 
would endanger, in turn, the Soviet Union’s most reliable and profitable source of hard 
currency.
The Soviet Union placed top priority on keeping the oil and natural gas flowing.
It tried to maintain its contracts with Western Europe by reducing the supply of cut-rate
2 3 9  U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, “Technology and Soviet 
Energy Availability” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 51.
2 4 0  Gustafson, “Energy and the Soviet Bloc,” 73.
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oil to the East European satellites. In the early 1970s the Politburo notified them that 
Soviet oil deliveries in 1976-1980 would be held to the 1975 level. In 1979 they repeated 
this gesture, holding the line at 1980 levels, which had grown nevertheless by nearly one- 
third.2 4 1  These supply reductions were temporary measures at best, while pressure 
mounted for a better solution. The Soviet Union needed to develop, quickly and 
extensively, new sources of oil and natural gas to stave off critical economic difficulties.
Western Siberia offered the best prospects.2 4 2  Its fields could be tapped to 
increase production, generate more hard currency, and stabilize the Soviet economy. 
However, accessing Siberian petroleum resources required large quantities of more 
advanced industrial technology than the Soviet Union had been able to produce on its 
own. Soviet industrial equipment production was, in fact, entirely dependent on the 
West2 4 3  The Soviet system was incapable of mass-producing civilian products to 
Western performance and reliability standards. One official of the French Machine Tool 
Association outlined the limitations of Soviet industry starkly: “The Russians can 
produce quality and they can produce quantity. Their problem is mass producing 
quality.” 2 4 4
2 4 1  Ibid, 73.
2 4 2  See Han-ku Chung, Interest Representation in Soviet Policymaking: A Case 
Study o f a West Siberian Oil Coalition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987).
2 4 3  A 1979 study of Soviet industrialization concluded, “By 1930 there was not a 
single important industrial process” in the Soviet Union “which did not derive from 
transferred Western technology.” See Carl Gershman, “Selling Them the Rope: Business 
& the Soviets,” Commentary 67, no. 4 (April 1979), 37.
2 4 4  John W. Kiser, “What Gap? Which Gap?” Foreign Policy, no. 32 (Fall 1978),
92.
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One reason for this was critical weakness was a tradeoff between military 
investment and investment in the energy sector. Unlike the United States, the Soviet 
Union was not powerful enough to achieve all of its primary growth objectives 
simultaneously. Soviet leaders had to choose among them. “Each time capital 
investment for economic growth has been the chief victim; consumption growth has been 
cut back less and defense growth hardly at all.” 2 4 5  The high-quality steel, for example, 
needed to make strong drill pipe was reserved for high-priority military uses. 
Consequently, the Soviet oil industry had to use drilling technologies that do not require 
top-grade steels; that in turn imposes limits on the depth and speed of their drilling.” 2 4 6  
The USSR needed an infusion of Western technology to update and revitalize its 
petroleum industry so it could exploit new reserves.
The Soviet Union began to negotiate in 1980 with West European companies to 
acquire the technology they to explore and develop their Siberian fields.2 4 7  It was touted 
as “the deal of the century” -  a 5,000 kilometer pipeline bringing natural gas from fields 
in western Siberia to Western Europe.2 4 8  Its path lay across frozen terrain, over the Ural
2 4 5  Myron Rush, “Guns over Growth in Soviet Policy,” International Security 7, 
no. 2 (Winter 1982/83), 167.
2 4 6  See Arthur A. Meyerhoff, “Soviet Petroleum: History, Technology, Geology, 
Reserves, Potential, and Policy” (discussion paper prepared for the Association of 
American Geographers Project on Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy, June 
1980). Cited in Gustafson, “Energy and the Soviet Bloc,” 69.
2 4 7  Jonathan P. Stem, “Soviet Oil and Gas Exports to the West: Commercial 
Transaction or Security Threat?” Energy Papers no. 21 (Hants, UK: Gower Publishing 
Company Ltd, 1987), 33.
2 4 8  The project initially proposed to exploit even larger reserves on the Yamal 
Peninsula, some 150 miles to the north. The costs and engineering challenges were more
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Mountains, through a dense forest, and required seven hundred river bridge points. It 
was a monstrous business project that involved large infusions of Western industrial 
technology financed by unprecedented amounts of European credit. The Siberian 
pipeline project offered the Soviet Union the opportunity of securing an estimated $ 8  
billion per year in hard currency if it could be completed on schedule.2 4 9
Only the kind of deal put together for western Siberia could have made the project 
possible. The Soviets required the more advanced Western industrial technology to 
circumvent their own systemic blockages. While much of the equipment that was needed 
for the project could be made within the Soviet empire, the nature of its system precluded 
much in the way of efficient production and distribution.2 5 0  Bureaucratic procedures, 
production bottlenecks, inherent resistance to innovation, and a host of other problems 
made the use of Soviet technology prohibitively expensive.251 West European nations 
welcomed the large Soviet requests to buy more of their drilling equipment and pipe.2 5 2
The United States initially warned its European allies against the dangers of 
dependence on the Soviet Union for their energy, but stopped short of actively pressuring 
them not to sign the deal. With twin prospects of profitable industrial exports and 
inexpensive petroleum imports, there was strong incentive for West European allies to
substantial, especially considering the hard currency situation and state of Soviet 
industrial production. The project reverted to the already tapped Urengoi reserves. 
Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, 172.
2 4 9  Ellen L. Frost and Angela E. Stent, “NATO’s Troubles with East-West 
Trade,” International Security 8 , no. 1 (Summer 1983), 182.
2 5 0  U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, “Technology and Soviet 
Energy Availability,” 76-7.
2 5 1  Kiser, “What Gap? Which Gap?” 91.
2 5 2  U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, “Technology and Soviet 
Energy Availability,” 19-80.
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ignore American protests about strategic implications and help the Soviets. They 
enthusiastically signed large contracts with the Soviet Union to help it develop its 
Siberian fields. These included subsidized loans and other preferential practices as a 
further incentive to get the petroleum flowing as quickly as possible.
American strategists never relished the cooperation its West European allies were 
offering in the growth of the Soviet economy and the subsequent sustenance of USSR’s 
foreign adventures. Americans viewed the regulation of east-west trade as a logical 
extension of the Cold War rivalry. Successive administrations believed they could 
significantly weaken the Soviet economy by denying their Soviet adversaries the benefits 
of trade with the West. Western Europe’s eagerness to provide petroleum technology, 
much of which was produced under American license, angered many U.S. strategists. 
They complained that their allies were shortsighted and selfish in their willing to increase 
Soviet power in exchange for Soviet petroleum. The American ambassador in Paris,
Evan Galbraith, summed up the long-standing U.S. objection: “It was especially galling 
to see the West not only sell the rope with which to hang the West, but also to finance the 
sale of the rope with subsidized credit terms.” 2 5 3
In April 1977 the White House Press Office released a newly declassified CIA 
study, “The International Energy Situation: Outlook to 1985."254 The report accurately 
identified technological difficulties experienced by the Soviet petroleum industry that
2 5 3  Evan G. Galbraith, Ambassador in Paris: The Reagan Years (Washington, 
DC: Regnery Gateway, 1987), 20.
254 Public Papers o f the Presidents 649. Cited in Andrew, For the President’s 
Eyes Only, 432.
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made keeping pace with its foreign contracts and its own growing domestic demand 
almost impossible. Unfortunately, the study suggested erroneously that by 1985 the 
Soviet Union would need to import 3.4 to 4.5 million barrels a day -  a conclusion fiercely 
disputed by experts who gave evidence to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 
Some accused the CIA of having “cooked the facts to fit the President’s recipe.” 2 5 5  This 
cut the persuasiveness of the study’s conclusions. Nonetheless, it brought the issue to the 
attention of the Carter and Reagan administrations.
The Carter administration initially vacillated between liberalization and tight 
controls in its attempts to balance Cold War concerns with the need to rebuild 
transatlantic cooperation. Its policy hardened as it moved toward greater confrontation 
with the Soviet Union. In May 1979 it granted a license to Dresser Industries to export 
desperately needed drill bits and build a factory in the Soviet Union. It suspended the 
license a few months later following Soviet imprisonment of two prominent dissidents. 
The Carter administration then lent its support to the Export Administration Act, a 
Congressional initiative that liberalized American policy. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
ended the oscillation -  Carter declared an across-the-board cutoff of technology.2 5 6
2 5 5  Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, The Soviet Oil Situation: An 
Evaluation o f CIA Analyses o f Soviet Oil Production, 95 Cong., 2 Sess. (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978) and Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Report to the Senate Covering the Period May 16, 1977-December 31, 1978, 
96 Cong., Sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 35-6. Cited 
in Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, 432.
2 5 6  J. Fred Bucy, “Technology Transfer and East-West Trade: A Reappraisal,” 
International Security 5, no. 3 (Winter 1980/81), 133. For more information on Bucy’s
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West European allies, nevertheless, moved in to provide the technology the 
United States refused to sell to the Soviets. Much of this equipment produced in Europe 
was done so under license from American companies. Administration efforts to enforce 
its policy met with strong resistance from Western Europe. European leaders would have 
a difficult time convincing themselves and their electorates that they needed to 
subordinate their respective national interests to the East-West rivalry. 2 5 7  American 
frustration with Western Europe’s seemingly selfish opportunism and its enthusiastic 
embrace of contracts that strengthened their mutual adversary increased substantially.
Allied collaboration regarding Cold War strategy degraded to the point at which 
one commentator referred to transatlantic relations as a “partial partnership.” 2 5 8  Even 
when there was allied agreement on an issue -  that Soviet acquisition of advanced 
Western technology, for example, poses a military threat to the West -  there were 
disputes about the proper response. Everyone agreed that Western technologies that 
could be adapted by Soviet engineers for wartime use should be banned. The
warnings, see his “On Strategic Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union,” International 
Security 1, no. 4 (Spring 1977), 25-43.
2 5 7  Robert J. Lieber concluded in 1980, “Although the importance of traditional 
military and strategic issues should not be minimized, for most Europeans, including the 
informed public and even those generally attuned to foreign policy, discussion of 
European deterrence and defense has tended to become somewhat abstract and removed. 
SALT II, the SS-20, grey area weapons, MBFR, enhanced Pershings, and a 3 percent real 
increase in NATO defense budgets are debated among a relatively limited number of 
specialists. By contrast, economic and energy security issues have become pressing and 
important subjects of great attention in both public and elite arenas.” See “Energy, 
Economics, and Security, 139.
2 5 8  Koldziej, “The Partial Partner,” 104. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Economic Affairs (1977-1981) Ellen Frost and Georgetown 
University professor Angela Stent opened their 1983 study of the situation lamenting, 
“East-West economic relations have never before played such an important and divisive 
role in the politics of the Western alliance as they do today.” Frost and Stent, “NATO’s 
Troubles,” 179.
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disagreement was over the extent to which east-west trade in industries vital to military 
effectiveness should also be restricted.
The Export Administration Act of 1979 authorized Carter to impose export 
restraints for foreign policy reasons alone (as opposed to the needs of national security). 
As the United States moved toward a more adversarial stance with Moscow, Carter 
broadened security controls to include goods and technologies that contribute to the 
conduct of war. These included Western exports that served to strengthen the entire 
Soviet industrial base.2 5 9  Unlike the grain embargo, the Soviets could not find 
alternative suppliers when it came to Western industrial technology. Europe and Japan 
offered the best hope of providing this technology. The United States put strong pressure 
on them to prevent this from happening.
Meanwhile, a series of American estimates in the early 1980s regarding the health 
of the Soviet economy began identifying the full severity of the difficulties that were 
described in the 1977 CIA study. One such estimate concluded, “The Soviet Union’s 
hard currency situation will probably deteriorate. The U.S.S.R. currently has a net hard 
currency debt of $9.6 billion to the West.” 2 6 0  The Soviets would have to use large 
amounts of hard currency in the next few years to help its allies in Eastern Europe repay 
their growing debt to the West. The best way for the Soviet Union to alleviate the 
pressure on its economy would be to get its Siberian operations working as quickly and
2 5 9  Frost and Stent, “NATO’s Troubles,” 180.
2 6 0  Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Centrally Planned Economies 
Current Analysis Newsletter, December 7,1982. Cited in Frost and Stent, “NATO’s 
Troubles,” 182.
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fully as possible. This meant completion of both new strands of its Siberian pipeline, a 
project known as Urengoi-6 , was a top priority.
As the United States moved toward greater confrontation of its Soviet adversary, 
members of the Reagan administration seized on the Soviets’ hard currency situation as 
an excellent opportunity to cripple Soviet power. They began a two front war on Soviet 
hard currency. It sought to drain the Soviet treasury by increasing the already high costs 
of supporting its overextended empire while restricting the flow of hard currency into the 
Soviet Union. The underlying purpose of American efforts to stir up discontent in 
Eastern Europe and Soviet Central Asia reflected the first component of this. The Soviet 
petroleum industry was the natural place to implement the second part of this plan. It 
was simultaneously the primary source of hard currency and the target most vulnerable to 
American economic manipulations. Restricting Soviet exports while lowering their 
profitability would deliver a one-two punch to the Soviet economy.
Lowering profitability meant lowering the price of oil. CIA estimates concluded 
that for every $1 drop in the price of a barrel of oil, the Soviets lost $1 billion a year in 
hard currency earnings.2 6 1  This was an amazing figure, considering most the entire 
Soviet economy had a total of $30 billion a year in hard currency earnings, half of which 
came from the export of oil and natural gas. For this the United States needed the 
cooperation of OPEC’s swing producer, Saudi Arabia. Reducing Soviet petroleum 
exports meant taking measures to decrease Soviet production while finding ways of
2 6 1  Schweizer, Victory, 105.
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lowering demand for Soviet oil and natural gas. Preventing or slowing development of 
its Siberian field was a top priority for both goals. It would limit Soviet influence in 
Western Europe and place enormous pressure on the Soviet economy.
In 1981 Reagan presented his administration’s analysis of the negative strategic 
implications of the Siberian pipeline project at the Ottawa Summit. He got a cool 
reaction from European leaders. Later that year the communist government in Poland, 
unable to suppress growing dissent through normal procedures, imposed martial law.
The United States imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union and suspended the licenses of 
American companies exporting equipment to the USSR that was linked to the pipeline 
project. Reagan administration officials felt there was enough moral indignation in 
Europe to push for more restrictive trade policies and against completion of the Siberian 
pipelines. 2 6 2  COCOM became once again a focus of new proposals to limit trade.
When European leaders did not support the American position, the Reagan 
administration reacted with the anger bom of intense frustration. To them the Soviet 
threat was clear and called for strong punitive measures. West Germany’s refusal to go 
along with the sanctions particularly rankled the Reagan administration. The President, 
and indeed most Americans, thought of West Germany as a nation that ought to be full of 
penitence and gratitude. 2 6 3  Germany was responsible for starting two incredibly 
destructive world wars and drawing the reluctant United States into the responsibilities of
2 6 2  See “National Security Decision Directive 6 6 : East-West Economic Relations 
& Poland-Related Sanctions,” available at http://Avww.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd- 
066.htm, accessed 7 November 2004.
2 6 3  Galbraith, Ambassador in Paris, 18.
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world leadership. Americans believed West Germans owed their current health to their 
generosity and protection, including the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Berlin Airlift.2 6 4
The Reagan administration pushed its agenda relentlessly at the G-7 meeting in 
Versailles. The president placed finding alternative sources of petroleum for Europe and 
ending its subsidized credits at the top of his agenda 2 6 5  European leaders rejected his 
proposals outright. Reagan proposed a compromise: the Soviets could build one pipeline 
instead of two, but the subsidized credits would stop and export controls tighten. This 
was not much of a concession and proved a non-starter. The summit ended with nothing 
but allied enmity about the U.S. position and a vague joint communique about fighting 
preferential agreements. Francois Mitterand reported to France that there had been no 
change in policy. Reagan made one last appeal for European cooperation at the next 
leadership meeting in Bonn. He pleaded with his colleagues to place their individual 
needs subordinate to the needs of the alliance. His colleagues barely listened 2 6 6
2 6 4  Marion Donhoff, then co-editor of Die Ziet, complained in Foreign Affairs 
that, “Americans feel -  often probably quite unconsciously -  that we Germans should 
still act like well-behaved pupils with only one aim in mind: to be in tune with 
Washington.” See “Bonn and Washington: The Strained Relationship,” Foreign Affairs 
57, no. 5 (Summer 1979), p. 1052.
2 6 5  Galbraith had already raised this issue with France. Locating petroleum 
sources for a friendly government was unusual assignment for an ambassador, but 
indicative of the seriousness of the Reagan administration’s efforts to hurt the Soviet 
economy while preventing Western Europe from becoming dependent of Soviet 
petroleum.
2 6 6  According to a U.S. official present at the meeting, German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt gazed out the window throughout Reagan’s presentation, purposefully 
ignoring him.
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The job of selling American positions to the alliance fell to Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig. He developed personal relationships with most European leaders during 
his days as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and seemed a natural bridge between 
their positions and the position of the United States. Haig was perhaps the only 
administration official who understood the opposition the U.S. position would generate in 
Europe. He soon fell into further disfavor among Reagan’s advisors his refusal to push 
the Europeans on the pipeline issue. The president wanted someone to sell U.S. positions 
to the Europeans, not act as an arbiter.
In June 1982 the United States announced its license suspensions would include 
European licensees of American firms and backdated the measures to cover the period 
during which the pipeline contracts had been signed. Within weeks of the American 
action, France, Italy, Britain, and Germany decided to oppose the action and ordered their 
firms to proceed with their contractual deliveries. American opposition was rejected on 
the grounds that it was an unacceptable extension of U.S. law into the internal affairs of 
sovereign nations.2 6 7  Allied relations worsened.
The Reagan administration ended its grain embargo a few weeks after it imposed 
pipeline sanctions. The availability of alternative suppliers meant the embargo was not 
going to have much effect on the Soviet economy, while grain imports by the USSR 
helped deprive its treasury of hard currency. This move incensed the same leaders
2 6 7  Robert J. Lieber, “International Energy Policy and the Reagan Administration: 
Avoiding the Next Oil Shock?” in Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American 
Foreign Policy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 167-89, esp. 178-79.
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Reagan was trying to convince to sacrifice their nations’ individual economic objectives 
for the larger goal of alliance security. They pointed out that Reagan was not willing to 
defy farmers’ lobbies for Cold War objectives. Allied leaders held that Reagan should 
not ask of their manufacturers what he would not ask of his farmers.2 6 8
Faced with immovable opposition from its allies in Western Europe, the United 
States eventually backed off its demand. In November, after lengthy consultations with 
allied leaders and sharp internal disagreement among his own staff, Reagan announced 
the lifting of sanctions against companies taking part in the pipeline project. Allied 
governments would allow no new contracts to be signed, tighten controls on strategic 
items, and make efforts to put financial relations with the Soviet Union in their strategic 
context.
Much damage had already been done to the Soviet economy. The Soviet response 
to the pipeline sanctions was to prioritize the acquisition or manufacture of embargoed 
items. The command economy enabled the Politburo to pull some of the Soviet Union’s 
best engineers away from existing projects and employ them in making the gas project 
work. This kind of rearrangement is expensive and has important effects on the stability 
of the other sectors, largely civilian, that found themselves suddenly missing their top 
experts.
2 6 8  Reagan did, in fact, face opposition from American companies involved in the 
pipeline project. More than sixty American firms were affected by it. Caterpillar Tractor 
lost a $90 million order for pipe-laying equipment. General Electric lost an order worth 
$175 million. See Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 135-45.
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The Soviets also conducted a large-scale operation of industrial espionage that 
sought to steal the technology that the Americans would not sell. Reagan, like Carter 
before him, turned to covert action to achieve what diplomacy could not. Expecting this, 
CIA director William Casey commissioned engineers to create purposefully flawed 
industrial schematics and allowed Soviet agents to steal them. As a result the Soviet 
Union built a number of critically important turbines, drills, and other machines that did 
not work. U.S. efforts to hamper the Soviets’ pipeline project had become a series of 
clandestine operations.
The effectiveness of American efforts against the Siberian project is uncertain. 
Some American scholars concluded the technology restrictions and economic sanctions 
had little effect on the Soviets’ timetable for completion and hard currency earnings.2 6 9  
Jonathan Stem noted in 1987, “In terms of delaying the pipeline and/or dissuading 
European utilities from signing contracts, the Reagan sanctions could generally be 
considered a failure.” 2 7 0  The Soviet Union was “inconvenienced” by having to use 
equipment produced domestically and scored a large propaganda victory by completing 
the pipeline on schedule. Actual deliveries to Western Europe were smaller than
2 6 9  A senior fellow at the Brooking Institution, Ed A. Hewitt, concluded in 1984 
that U.S. efforts were a waste of time and political capital. “There is probably little the 
United States can do to influence the development of the Soviet energy sector, and 
through that economic performance and Soviet economic relations with the two 
Europes.” Ed A. Hewitt, Energy, Economics, and Foreign Policy in the Soviet Union 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984), 222.
2 7 0  Stem, “Soviet Oil,” 33.
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anticipated, but largely because a European recession lowered demand for petroleum and 
left the pipeline with excess capacity.
Others believe the Soviet energy industry was already on the brink of catastrophe 
and the American efforts helped push it over the edge. Thane Gustafson, for instance, 
argued the USSR’s struggles to cope with its energy problems ranked them “the single 
most disruptive factor in Soviet industry since the mid-1970s” and one of the leading 
causes of its stagnation.2 7 1  This lends credence to the view taken by many, including 
most Soviet observers, that even a slight nudge by the United States in the area of oil and 
natural gas would have catalyzed the Soviet economic collapse.
The United States continued to restrict trade in energy-related technologies, 
albeit without much support from its allies.2 7 2  On January 17,1983 Reagan signed 
NSDD-75, which added specifics to the general U.S. Cold War strategy and called for 
further efforts to keep the Soviets from getting what they needed to complete their 
pipeline projects. Subsequent studies and discussion within the framework of the 
International Energy Agency led to an agreement among importing governments to limit 
Soviet gas to no more than 30-35% of total gas supplies in any West European country.
American efforts to disrupt the Soviet petroleum industry were aggressive, costly, 
and as least in some measure effective. The United States paid a high price for its efforts 
in terms of alliance unity and cooperation. Transatlantic relations during these years
2 7 1  Thane Gustafson, Crisis amid Plenty: The Politics o f Soviet Energy under 
Brezhnev and Gorbachev (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 5.
2 7 2  NSDD-75, “U.S. Relations with the U.S.S.R.,” available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-075.htm, accessed 7 November 2004.
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were extraordinarily frosty as the Americans unrelentingly pushed European 
governments to drop the project, or at least limit its scope. There was also a price to be 
paid at home: American firms watched begrudgingly while their European licensees 
made profits on the very technology they had developed but were prevented from selling 
to the Soviets.
Conclusions
In the early 1980s the United States began to view its international position as 
increasingly threatened by the Soviet Union. American strategists adjusted their grand 
strategy to allow for greater confrontation of their primary adversary as a necessary 
component. Only by defining Soviet communism as the inheritor of the totalitarian threat 
of the Second World War could this assertive America accept the realities of power 
politics without abandoning its sense of exceptionalism. The Soviet Union became not 
just a threat to American hopes for preeminence, but an evil empire that required the 
active opposition of the United States.
This process started during the last years of the Carter administration and 
continued more forcefully under Reagan. Robert Osgood argued that the Reagan 
administration followed a typically American pattern in gaining office by criticizing its 
predecessors and then later claiming credit for following their policies.2 7 3  Throughout
2 7 3  “Each newly elected Administration of the alternative political party launches 
its foreign relations with themes that were developed during the national campaign in 
opposition to the policies of its predecessor. But then comes the down beat: unexpected
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1981 this was often the view among experts within the Soviet Union as well. One study 
noted, “Many Soviet specialists on the United States regarded the Reagan Administration 
as “Carterism without Carter,” that is, as a continuation and intensification of policies 
pursued during Carter’s last year in office.” 2 7 4  Within the next two years, as the United 
States focused more heavily on its foreign affairs, most experts abandoned this view. 
Despite the persistence of many of his predecessor’s policies, American grand strategy in 
late 1970s and early 1980s represented a major break with the past. Caspar Weinberger 
noted, “From the earliest days of his administration, President Reagan made a concerted 
effort to win the Cold War and consign the Soviet system to “the ash heap of history” . . .  
such was the grand strategy and greatest foreign policy accomplishment of the Reagan 
administration.” 2 7 5  This process began with the abandonment of containment, detente, 
and policies of sustainable equivalence and ended with an aggressive American 
confrontation of the Soviet Union.
Conclusions
In the late 1970s the most powerful nation in the world decided its grand strategy 
was insufficient for its security objectives. The United States had undergone a 
fundamental shift away from classically realist power politics and their assumptions
domestic and international conditions contradict (or appear to contradict) the underlying 
premises of the “new” foreign policy. Then either the Administration abandons or 
modifies its themes (in substance, if not in rhetoric) or it takes uncontested credit for the 
transformation. This phenomenon began with the Eisenhower Administration. It has 
deep roots in the American political system and the American approach to the outside 
world.” Osgood, “The Revitalization of Containment,” 19.
2 7 4  Bialer and Afferica, “Reagan and Russia,” 253.
2 7 5  Weinberger, In the Arena, 286-87.
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about morality that did not figure into American traditions of exceptionalism. The 
longstanding expectation among American strategists that their nation would settle into 
perpetual preeminence was challenged by an inexorably growing Soviet empire and the 
unexpectedly amoral nature of American own responses to it.
Many elements of the decision to abandon its defensive mentality were foreseen 
by some scholars and analysts before, during, or immediately after they took shape. 
However, perceptions of the fundamentally different nature of the new American grand 
strategy went largely unnoticed by both sides. These observations were never assembled 
in any fashion that allowed one to identify the nature of the changes taking place. This is 
not the fault of any particular community in international relations. Throughout the 
period many scholars produced very useful insights and, in hindsight, appear to be at 
times quite prescient.
What prevented wider recognition of the shift in American viewpoints and grand 
strategy was the lack of a consistent approach to behavioral analysis based on the 
assumptions and views of the very people who made it happen. Scholars were 
constrained, and properly so, to advancement of their theoretical work and, therefore, 
bound by the assumptions underlying their models. Policy makers were constrained by 
their professional viewpoints and the duties of leadership. The responsibility for bringing 
them together falls to the analyst. Only in the area of analysis can one pursue a proto- 
theoretical approach that is free of the limitations of theorizing and policy-making.
Between the end of the Second World War and the mid-1970s the American 
people were learning what it was like to engage in protracted struggle with an adversary 
capable of defeating them. They were disturbed both by their first real taste of fear for
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their nation’s survival and their own surprising willingness to overlook minor 
transgressions of cherished U.S. morality to ensure their own survival. They understood 
that continued erosion of American morality in international affairs had brought with it a 
deterioration of international power and acted to preserve this heritage.
American strategists recognized that they would need every source of power 
available to them if they were going to withstand the encroaching power of the Soviet 
Union and achieve lasting preeminence in the international system. Military, economic, 
and ideological power were all required for successful confrontation of the Soviet assault 
on the free world. Failure to muster all sources of American power would create an 
unacceptable situation of relative power parity and perhaps even irreversible inferiority. 
Such a situation, obviously, would not be consistent with American preeminence.
Faced with an unavoidable threat to its long-term international position, the 
United States abandoned its decades-old pursuit of containment in favor of rebuilding its 
sources of power and an energetic confrontation of its primary adversary. Whether the 
Soviet Union possessed the capacity to achieve full parity with the United States remains 
a matter of vigorous contention. The answer does little to explain U.S. strategy, for the 
important thing to note is that Americans in the mid-1970s believed it was possible. 
Alarmed by expected trends in bilateral and multilateral power, the United States created 
and implemented a grand strategy bent on dispatching its primary challenger while it 
remained the more powerful nation.
The Americans took the fight to those areas in which it held an especial Cold War 
advantage: ideology, economy, and high technology. They sought to increase the price 
of superpower competition with the United States in precisely those areas that would hurt
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the Soviet Union most dearly. To rebuild ideological power the United States elected 
Jimmy Carter and abandoned as many immoral elements of American foreign policy as it 
thought possible. This meant relinquishing control of the Panama Canal to boost 
credibility for fidelity to agreements. It made Camp David a prominent place as Carter 
sought to reestablish America’s role as a force for peace in the world. It brought human 
rights to the fore of international relations discussions. It prevented the United States 
from winning at all costs in the Horn of Africa.
Rebuilding American economic and military power proved a surprisingly short 
process, proof of the resilience and potential of the United States. Investment in high 
technology, such as cruise missiles, stealth technology, and strategic defense, presented 
the Soviets with an area in which it could not afford to compete, but ill-afford not to try. 
Aggressive confrontation of Soviet power in places like Afghanistan and Poland 
increased the amount of hard currency and effort expended to maintain the Soviet empire. 
Pressuring the Soviet economy by restricting its earnings from petroleum exports and 
forcing restructuring on its already-strapped industrial base exacerbated the economic 
woes of the vulnerable communist system.
That this strategy proved effective hardly requires explanation. In the mid-1980s 
the United States realized its confrontation of Soviet power had become so successful 
that the Soviet Union and its far-flung empire experienced the first throes of a systemic 
crisis. Neither side sought the destabilization of the Cold War. The Politburo, 
recognizing that only a wrenching transformation of the Soviet system could save it, 
handed power to Mikhail Gorbachev.
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The American grand strategy of renewal, confrontation, and preeminence 
displayed all the characteristics of policy oversteer. The United States continued to 
pressure the Soviets throughout the 1980s to compete simultaneously with American 
economic output, military might, and ideological appeal. Reagan visited Berlin to 
challenge his Soviet counterpart to “tear down this wall” and allow those under Soviet 
domination to decide if they wished to remain so. The American strategy adopted in late 
1970s worked so well that within ten years of its inception it was abandoned in favor of a 
strategy of stabilization. The United States, aware of the dangers dissolution of an 
empire could pose in a nuclear world, eased but did not end its assertive confrontation. 
The seventy-year Soviet experiment with communism came to an end as the people of 
Eastern Europe and Russia took to the streets to demand freedom.
Five decades after the United States initially sought to maintain its tenuous 
position as the preeminent nation of an increasingly integrated and cooperative 
international system, it achieved it. American ideology proved more attractive than that 
of the Soviet Union, causing the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe and, finally, the 
Soviet Union itself to cede defeat and adopt the American model. American armed 
forces stood unchallenged as the preponderant military institution on the globe. The 
American economy, freed from its Cold War restrictions, erupted with the next 
generation of information technology and unprecedented prosperity.
At this moment in history President George Bush proclaimed the arrival of the 
New World Order, based on an ever-expanding international preference for the American 
model. The United States, freed from the longstanding threat of its greatest adversary, 
began looking at ways of refashioning the international order to sustain its position. It
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national armed forces. This bore fruit in the efforts of a truly international coalition, led 
by the United States, which responded to the invasion of Kuwait by ejecting the 
occupying Iraqi military forces and reestablishing Kuwaiti sovereignty and regional 
security. The United States solidified its economic position with a series of economic 
maneuvers, including more extensive trade with its partners, opening of markets, 
expansion of the World Trade Organization, and the creation of the North American Free 
Trade Association.
This strategy itself, in turn, would be modified in response to a series of terrorist 
attacks on American soil, beginning with devastating bombings at the World Trade 
Center and American embassies. They culminated in simultaneous airplane hijackings 
that were used subsequently to attack the Pentagon and destroy the World Trade Center 
in 2001. Suppression of terrorism became a requirement of long-term international 
stability, inducing the United States to invade Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2002 and 
replace the governments of both nations. The imperial nature of American foreign policy 
at the turn of the millennium has repercussions for the ways in which Americans view 
their country. Understanding changes in American grand strategy that result from this 
offers opportunities for further research, analysis, and projection.
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION
International relations scholarship is an invaluable accompaniment of political 
interaction. It provides the vision, wisdom, and adroitness that together enable the 
evolution of human interaction. Recognizing patterns of human activity allows national 
leaders to avoid many of the most treacherous perils of statecraft. Scholarly investigation 
of patterns of human activity produces a striking body of work, intellectually engaging to 
the casual observer and invaluable to the policy maker. Yet it is in a sense perpetually 
unfinished. There will always be more to accomplish in the theory, practice, and analysis 
of international relations.
The implications of proto-theory are manifold. The analysis that flows from it 
deepens understanding by bringing the best insights of scholars to bear on the situations 
faced by policy makers immersed in details seemingly remote from most scholarly 
propositions. When scholars and policy makers work together more effectively, they 
create more sophisticated and prescient grand strategies. These serve the interest of the 
both the nations that create them and the international community.
This work sought to demonstrate the utility of a proto-theoretical approach to 
understanding international relations. It did so from the point of view of the political 
analyst that resides in each scholar and policy maker -  that patient observer of events and 
discemer of their larger implications. By suspending the observer’s own assumptions 
about the international system the observer can transcend his or her own prejudicial 
judgments and analytical tendencies to identify instead those areas of inquiry most
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relevant to understanding the situation at hand. This kind of understanding leads to better 
analysis of historical and evolving situations while offering a better opportunity for 
identifying the which trends are most likely to shape events.
A proto-theoretical approach to analyzing international behavior avoids many of 
the pitfalls inherent in applying scholarly insights to real-world situations. It reduces the 
likelihood that analysts will contaminate their work with views and assumptions that do 
not correspond to those of the investigated situation. It is also meant to benefit scholars, 
whose work often is dismissed by unwarranted criticism that their theories do not explain 
developments in situations that do not parallel their assumptions. Proto-theoretical states 
provide a kind of political agnosticism that allows observers to temporarily suspend the 
limitations of their own viewpoints. Proto-theory encourages preference of scholarly 
insights that are most useful, rather than those most preferable to those doing the 
investigation. Strenuous effort must be made to eliminate as much as possible the human 
tendency to see all situations from one’s own view of the world. Maintaining a proto- 
theoretical state of mind at the outset of political analysis makes this possible.
Frustration with the growing density of international relations demonstrates the 
need for reliable means of understanding them. As human civilization progresses the 
international system and all the nations in it continue to push the bounds of complexity. 
Each generation finds its world more interconnected and confusing than the one into 
which it was bom. Some of this can be perception can be attributed to the greater 
understanding of depth, subtlety, and nuance that comes with increasing age. The rest is 
produced by a world that is, in fact, growing more complex daily.
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Risks, consequences, and unexpected reverberations multiply as civilization 
continues its inexorable embrace of complexity. The pressure to be prescient grows ever 
more difficult to bear. Decision makers want answers, not ever more multifaceted 
understandings of the questions. Therefore the continued inability of international 
relations theorists to produce a “magic bullet”—a single, reliable predictor of 
international behavior—causes the rest of the world to lose patience with their scholarly 
investigations and dismiss their findings as immaterial.
Consigning theoretical work to scholarly panels and academic journals might 
appear at first glance to be a sensible course of action. Understanding its value requires 
time and patience, both scarce resources in the fast-paced, high-energy world of 
international politics. In the midst of never-ending crises and policy making, why stop to 
listen to the unintelligible discussions of an academic community that begins and ends its 
presentations with the conclusion that more study is needed? The answer is that doing so 
makes both political and practical sense.
In political terms the use of the most advanced and powerful approaches to the 
understanding and conduct of international relations is psychologically reassuring to 
those who must find confidence in the analysis being used to make decisions. On the 
advice of their most trusted scholars, the leaders of history’s various polities consulted 
what they considered the most effective means at their disposal. Caesar’s advisors 
scrutinized animal innards, Chinese emperors poked at I-Ching hexagrams, European 
rulers besought Nostradamus, and countless heads of state from Abraham of Genesis to 
Abraham Lincoln prayed to God for guidance. Many of these methods seem utterly 
ineffective to those bom in more scientific and computerized ages, but they were the best
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methods available to them and that fact made their use comforting to both policy makers 
and citizens. Outcries over the use of anything other than the most advanced form of 
behavioral prediction, such as those heard regarding the consultation of a San Franciscan 
psychic advisor during the Reagan administration, are a forceful reminder that public 
dissatisfaction with results of modem theoretical analysis may not be nearly as powerful 
as public dissatisfaction with continued use of outdated methods.
Practically speaking, modem international relations scholarship has been 
genuinely useful to those making and understanding grand strategies. Theoretical models 
provide a rigorous format for the study of international phenomena and often identify 
influences and trends that slip past even the most observant diplomat. To ignore their 
insights, and rely solely on the experience and wisdom of foreign policy practitioners, 
would be to leave fallow a resource essential to any serious player in the competitive 
environment of international politics. It also opens one’s grand strategy to 
counterproductive and even dangerous fluctuations, which often limit the effectiveness of 
any particular grand strategy to the length of the administration that implements it. 1
1 Henry Kissinger made the case forcefully in 1977 that a well informed and 
consistent grand strategy was essential to security: “Our country cannot uproot its whole 
foreign policy every four or eight years -  or imply that it is doing so -  or else America 
will itself become a major factor of instability in the world . . .  Of course, a foreign policy 
that stresses continuity above all else would be stultifying and would in time be 
overwhelmed by events. A new Administration is obviously not elected to carry out all 
the policies of its predecessor. But change in our policy should be seen as reflecting new 
circumstances and not change for its own sake.” From “Continuity and Change in 
American Foreign Policy,” the Arthur K. Salomon Lecture, given September 19,1977 at 
the Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University, New York City.
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International relations theory and diplomatic expertise are highly complementary, 
each straining toward greater understanding of international behavior. Grand strategists 
who exclude either sphere have only a limited understanding of the international 
environment, a weakness often revealed by inconsistent and largely ineffective foreign 
policy. More than ever before it is incumbent upon analysts, advisors, and decision 
makers to use all effective means available to understand the forces driving international 
events. The world has always been and remains a very dangerous place. Periods of 
international tranquility are brief and opportune times in which every effort to establish a 
more stable, secure international order is critical. It is during such times that full 
comprehension and energetic implementation of grand strategies will be most effective, 
for rapid successions of perilous international events have a way of stalling, often 
permanently, debate over long-term objectives.
The days in which identification and pursuit of grand strategy fell by the wayside 
are usually those that historians identify as those days in which steps should have been 
taken to prevent the calamities that followed. The machinery of effective foreign policy 
implementation -  effective intelligence networks, well-established response plans to 
likely scenarios, methods of crisis management -  cannot be adjusted quickly to respond 
to crises. They must have structures and purposes that are consistent with long-term 
strategic goals. Strategic thinking encourages the kind of foresight necessary to prevent 
nations from becoming myopic over present-day particulars and later overwhelmed by
Published in Henry A. Kissinger, For the Record: Selected Statements, 1977-1980 
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1981), 77.
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unforeseen events.2  Successful grand strategy requires application of the best insights of 
international relations scholarship.
Scholarly pursuits occur with equal brilliance in many directions. The analyst 
must be proficient in situations both intimately familiar and completely foreign. Proto­
theory offers the analyst the capacity for, at least the beginnings of investigation, similar 
levels of effectiveness. The resources one can marshal for deepening analysis will, of 
course, affect the explanatory power of the work. However, suspending preferences for 
one kind of scholarly construct increases the versatility of the analyst, whose insightful 
mind is no longer confined to the realm of his or her own experience.
This study sought to demonstrate the effectiveness of a proto-theoretical approach 
for the study of U.S. grand strategy. The next logical avenue of investigation is its 
application to a situation in international relations that assumes a very different pattern of 
human relations. Religious fundamentalism, transnational terrorism, and organized crime 
are all examples of analytical situations that do not correlate very closely with the 
structural realism (non-state actors) or constructivism (as they do not construct a coherent 
system of politics). The next phase of research can demonstrate the wider applicability of 
proto-theoretical states to all areas of grand strategy analysis by working outside these 
areas.
2  An example of this viewpoint can be found in the excellent presidential address 
on the subject given by Robert Jervis to the APSA in 2001 and reprinted as “Theories of 
War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace,” American Political Science Review 96, no. 1 
(March 2002), 1-14.
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While proto-theory is, of course, not a universal theory of international relations, 
it is a universally valid method of applying scholarly insights effectively to the study of 
international relations. If offers an approach to international relations analysis that can 
produce results useful to both scholars and policy makers. A unified field theory of 
political behavior does not exist and does not appear likely to evolve. A proto-theoretical 
approach is perhaps the best substitute.
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